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Executive summary 
The purpose of the Competitiveness Report is to 
provide an analytical contribution to the policy 
debate on how to make Europe a more dynamic 
and competitive economy. 
Over the last decade, the European Union has taken 
major steps forward in terms of institutional and 
economic reform. The completion of the Internal 
Market and the introduction of the Euro speak for 
themselves. Yet, in comparison with our past per-
formance or with the performance of our main part-
ner and competitor, the United States, the impres-
sion that Europe "could do better" remains. 
The first part of the report deals with the overall eco-
nomic performance of the European Union vis-à-vis 
the United States and Japan. In clarifying the causes 
of the weaker growth record of the EU, when com-
pared with the US, in recent years, the analysis 
moves successively from productivity developments 
to investment and, particularly, to patterns of infor-
mation and communication technology adoption. 
The second part takes stock of the structural changes 
in recent decades and gives particular emphasis to 
the services sector, underlining its role as a source of 
growth and competitive performance. It assesses the 
penetration of services in the productive system and 
evaluates progress in their internationalisation. The 
last section of the report takes stock of business to 
business electronic commerce developments and 
prospects as well as of the policy issues it raises. 
Performance of Europe 
relative to the US and Japan 
Measured by GDP per capita at purchasing power 
standards, the EU lags well behind the US in its stan-
dards of living (35 % lower) and ranks lower than 
Japan. The European economy also offers its popu-
lation significantly fewer jobs (see Table 1). Despite 
considerable progress in some Member States, 
employment rates in all EU countries are well below 
those in the US and Japan. 
Europe fares better when aspects of living standards 
other than GDP per capita are taken into account. 
The employed population in Europe enjoys more 
leisure time than in America due to shorter weekly 
working hours and longer holidays.
1
 
1 As GDP "lost" due to extra leisure time In Europe amounts to only 6-7% of total GDP 
at current levels of labour productivity, the pronounced gap with the US in terms of 
standards of living remains even after adjustments for differences In leisure time are 
made. 
Table 1 GDP per capita and employi 
Total 
Country/Region population' 
EU 375.8 
US 271.4 
Japan 126.7 
nent rates in 1999 
GDP 
1000 PPS" 
19.11 
29.52 
21.12 
pei  ■ capita 
Growth' 
1.6 
2.1 
1.4 
Employment 
rate
d 
63.4 
81.7 
76.3 
Notes: 
a Million inhabitants. 
b Purchasing Power Standards at 1995 market prices. 
c Average annual % change of GDP per capita at 1995 market prices (1989-99). 
d Total employment as % of population aged 15-64. 
Source: European Commission. European competitiveness report 2000 
Catching-up process interrupted 
Since the 1950s, European GDP per capita had been 
catching up with the level in the United States. This 
process has come to an end (Figure 1). Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, the living standards of the 
European Union have increased more slowly than 
that of the United States. The same has been true for 
Japan, which had outstripped Europe by the end of 
the 1970s. 
This turnaround is not due to a decline in living 
standards in Europe; GDP per capita continued to 
grow during the 1990s (Table 2), and even acceler-
ated in the second half of the decade. However, this 
was even more the case in the US, where, in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, GDP per capita grew not only 
more than in the EU but also faster than in the pre-
vious two decades. 
Factors behind the new trends in living 
standards 
A country's GDP performance can be decomposed 
into employment performance and productivity 
performance. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
main source of greater growth in the US standard of 
living was better employment performance. Total 
employment expanded rapidly, and the employ-
ment ratio increased considerably, overcoming 
Japanese levels by the end of the 1980s. 
Over the entire period, the European economy has 
failed to provide as many jobs in relation to the pop-
ulation of working age as the US economy. While 
Europe has managed to increase its employment 
rate since 1995, the increase has been insufficient to 
close the gap with the US. As the difference 
between employment growth in the US and Europe 
shrank in the 1990s compared to previous decades, 
the employment performance alone does not 
Figure 1 GDP per capita relative to the United States 
US GDP per capita = 100 
85 
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
-"-EU -*- apan 
Source: European Commission. 
Table 2 Growth of GDP per capita, 1960-1999 
1960-75 1975-85 
EU 3.4 2.0 
US 2.5 2.4 
Japan 7.0 3.1 
1985-90 
2.8 
2.3 
4.2 
1990-95 
1.0 
1.4 
1.1 
1995-99 
2.0 
3.4 
0.8 
Source: European Commission. Executive summary 
Table 
EU 
US 
Japan 
Source: 
3 
Europear 
Growth rate of 1 
Commission. 
abour productiv 
1960-75 
3.9 
1.9 
7.0 
ity per 
1975-85 
2.2 
1.2 
3.0 
employee, 1960-
1985-90 
1.7 
1.0 
3.6 
1999 
1990-95 
1.9 
1.3 
0.7 
1995-99 
1.3 
2.2 
1.0 
explain why the US economy grew faster during the 
1990s.
2 
The second reason for the higher GDP per capita of 
the US is a higher level of labour productivity. Until 
the 1990s, Europe raised its output per employee 
faster than the US economy (see Table 3). Since the 
second half of the 1990s, however, this pattern has 
changed, and the US economy has been leading in 
terms of labour productivity growth. These gains took 
place at a time when US labour productivity was still 
significantly higher than in Europe and Japan. 
Factors behind changes in productivity 
patterns 
In the past, the increase of labour productivity in 
Japan and Europe was, to a large extent, due to 
higher capital expenditures for rationalisation. The 
lower growth of labour productivity in the US 
reflected a lower rate of substitution of capital for 
labour, which, in turn, resulted from lower wage 
costs and a stagnating real wage. Did the approach 
of full employment in the US induce companies to 
put more emphasis on rationalisation and to 
increase the rate of substitution of capital for labour? 
Estimates presented in Figure 2, upper part, confirm 
the increase in the rate of substitution of capital for 
labour in the US. After fifteen years of very low val-
ues, the rate of substitution of capital for labour 
increased significantly in the US in the 1990s. In the 
second half of the 1990s, it was, for the first time, 
slightly stronger than in Europe. 
The second and more important element was the 
acceleration of the rate of total factor productivity 
(TFP) in the second half of the 1990s in the US 
(Figure 2, lower part), while in Europe, total factor 
productivity in the 1990s slowed down. It is, there-
fore, the better performance in total factor produc-
tivity that explains the rise in US competitiveness 
and the "new" 
standards. 
pattern of improvement in living 
2 European GDP per capita would be higher by more than 10 % if the European eco-
nomic system could generate the same employment ratio as the US (under the 
hypothesis that the additional jobs would have only half of the average level of 
European labour productivity to date). 
Although the difference in the pace of capital 
deepening was not the key factor in the turnaround 
in the relative growth of labour productivity, it 
is worthwhile to have a closer look at investment 
activity. 
In fact, the composition of gross fixed capital for-
mation (GFCF) in the US points to a higher content 
of new technologies. No such shift took place in 
Europe or Japan. As such, the observed acceleration 
of TFP growth may be partly linked to the different 
investment patterns. 
Measured by the ratio of gross fixed capital forma-
tion to GDP in the period 1960 to 1990, the US con-
sistently invested less in physical capital than did 
Europe and Japan. However, deceleration of capital 
expenditures in Europe and acceleration in the US 
during the 1990s brought about a convergence. 
Moreover, US investment in machinery and equip-
ment increased much faster than residential and 
nonresidential investment during the 1990s, whilst 
in Europe the ratio of equipment investment to GDP 
dropped to levels lower than in the 1980s. This 
trend is even more striking in terms of evolution of 
GFCF in equipment, which shows a significant accel-
eration in the US relative to the EU. 
New equipment is often viewed as a carrier of new 
production technologies. Thus, the rise in the US 
investment ratio may reflect an increased propensity 
of all industries to invest in new technologies. 
This brings us to the key issue of information and 
communication technology (ICT), which is now 
widely believed to be a major factor in productivity 
growth. The fact that, during the 1990s, US indus-
try spent more in absolute and relative terms on the 
diffusion of information technology than did its 
European (and Japanese) counterparts supports this 
conjecture. 
In 1999, ICT expenditure represented 5.8 % of GDP 
in the EU, 7.3 % in the US and 5 % in Japan (see European competitiveness report 2000 
Figure 2 Determinants of labour productivity growth 
Substitution of capital for labour 
Average annual growth in % 
1960-1975  1975-1985 1985-1990 
■ EU "US »Japan 
1990-1995  1995-1999 
Total factor productivity 
Average annual growth in ' 
ι EU »US »|apan 
Source: European Commission. 
Figure 3). The evolution of ICT in relation to GDP 
exhibits different patterns in the three geographical 
areas. The EU followed the growth path of the US 
until 1997 and since then has been catching up 
slowly. The EU market size relative to the US 
increased between 1991 and 1999. During the 
1990s, the US retained its position as the largest 
spender in ICTs but Europe registered the fastest 
growth. Nevertheless, the gap between the US and 
Europe still remains significant. Japan followed an 
upward path similar to the EU pattern but at a 
slower pace. 
Looking beyond the effects of ICT, it should be 
stressed that total factor productivity is a catch-all 
variable. International differences in TFP growth 
may reflect a variety of factors, including different 
capacities of economic systems to innovate and to 
adjust to the effects of external shocks and to the Executive summary 
Figure 3 ICT intensity in the Triad 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 
Source: EITO. 
effect of changes in the economic system and in the 
policy framework. The 1990s were not only charac-
terised by the emergence of basic new technologies, 
but also by far-reaching political changes and the 
frictions of the globalising economy. The EU 
economies endured the tension and financial mar-
ket turbulence following German unification, the 
effects of labour market rigidities and, more 
recently, the adverse trade effects of the financial cri-
sis in emerging countries. They also had to cope 
with the painful, if ultimately beneficial, experience 
of budgetary stabilisation in the approach to mone-
tary union. 
The combination of more rigidities in their eco-
nomic systems and, arguably, a greater exposure to 
external shocks may go some way to explain why 
the European economy suffered more from growth 
frictions than the US economy during the 1990s. 
This may be an element in explaining why TFP 
growth slowed down in Europe. European competitiveness report 2000 
Structural change in the 
European economy 
In a changing environment, the competitiveness of 
firms, industries and nations depends on their abil-
ity to react quickly to new opportunities and chal-
lenges. In other words, the speed at which produc-
tion reacts to changes in demand or to changes in 
the comparative advantages of a country is an indi-
cator of competitiveness. An indicator of the overall 
structural change for each country - the macro 
speed of change - shows that change was consider-
able between 1980 and 1997.
3
 
Figure 4 shows the contributions of the agriculture, 
industry and service sectors to overall structural 
change. Approximately one half of the change 
occurred in the service sector, while the lion's share 
of the other half took place in industry. The change 
in agriculture - a decline in all countries - averaged 
less than one tenth of the total change, but with 
very large differences across countries. 
Among the 25 sectors analysed, the greatest change 
is the increase in "market services", the share of 
which increased by about one quarter for the EU. If 
competitiveness depends on the ability of produc-
tive systems to adapt to new opportunities, and if 
the speed of change indicator is a good measure of 
this ability, we would expect to find a positive link 
between growth rates and this indicator. Indeed, 
data show that countries with higher speed of 
change also tend to achieve higher growth rates. 
Figure 4 Contributions to macro speed of 
change 1980 - 1997 
Π Services ■ Industry ■ Agriculture 
Greece | 
Ireland Γ 
X 
Portugal C 
United Kingdom C 
Finland C 
Italy £ 
Germany C 
Austria E 
Spain C 
France ■ 
Belgium ■ 
Sweden C 
Netherlands C 
Denmark C 
10  20  30  40 
Source: WIFO calculations using National Accounts ESA, EUROSTAT. 
In general, the share of technology-driven indus-
tries, of high skill industries and of industries with 
high content of knowledge-based services 
increased, while the share of labour-intensive and of 
low-skill industries decreased. Furthermore, growth 
is higher in countries with a large share of advertis-
ing-intensive industries and in countries where the 
share of high skilled employees rose. 
Industrial change and input use 
Structural change within the industrial sector is eval-
uated by computing the speed of change at the 
level of 93 industries over the period 1985-1998. 
The industry speed of change is lower in Europe 
than in Japan and the US. The indicator is 1 7.9 for 
Europe, 19.1 for Japan and 19.3 for the US." This 
suggests that structural change in Europe may be 
insufficient; a situation that has been analysed, with 
regard to specialisation and concentration patterns, 
in last year's report. 
Assessing the adaptability of supply to demand 
requires a more comprehensive evaluation of eco-
nomic activity than a single indicator. Three addi-
tional indicators of structural change were con-
structed based on the main input used. 
3 This indicator sums the absolute changes in the value added shares of 25 broad 
sectors, including agriculture, industry and services. It would be zero if no industry 
changed its share of total value added, and Increases the more Industries change 
their relative position. 
4 In the US and Japan the data end in 1997. 
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Europe's position in quality 
competition 
The European Union is a high wage region. The 
wage differential with respect to lower wage coun-
tries is compensated by higher productivity, but 
only partially. A way of responding to this higher 
labour cost is for firms and industries to bet on qual-
ity rather than low prices. By competing in quality, 
pressure from the cost side is mitigated and high-
cost firms are able to remain competitive. Focusing 
on quality is a promising strategy, since Europe has 
a competitive advantage in quality competition rel-
ative to new competitors with cheap labour costs: 
high incomes favour product differentiation and 
boost demand for goods in the upper quality seg-
ments, skilled labour, training, stable labour rela-
tions, research input and the use of information 
technology support innovation and improve the 
quality of processes and products. 
Is Europe a provider of quality? 
A contested quality premium 
A first assessment of the position and evolution of 
the EU in terms of quality is made by using "unit val-
ues".
6 Increases in unit values may be due to rising 
demand or to rising costs. But they also reflect 
changes in quality, shifts to higher price segments 
and to more specific value-enhancing features. Unit 
values differ widely across Europe and in general 
increased over time. The dispersion of unit values 
across countries also increased over the last ten 
years. 
European exports in manufacturing (extra-EU trade) 
amounted to 665 bn Euro in 1998 and imports to 
only 579 bn Euro. This resulted in an export surplus 
of 86 bn Euro, which is more than three times as 
high as ten years before (25 bn Euro). In 1998, the 
export surplus can be attributed to a quality pre-
mium in exports: the export unit value is higher by 
almost one third than the import unit value. If 
exports were priced as low as imports, European 
exports would decrease by 161 bn Euro. Roughly 
half of this "quality premium" in European trade 
comes from specialisation in high unit value indus-
tries, while the other half is due to higher unit values 
within the same industries. 
The premium comes from trade with non-Triad 
countries (see Figure 5). In trade with the US, 
Europe has a surplus, but exports are priced 12 % 
lower than imports. Half of this bilateral trade is in 
technology-driven industries, where the unit value 
of European exports is 40 % lower than that of 
imports from the US. 
6 The unit value is defined as nominal value divided by physical volume. 
Figure 5 Regional destination of exports and quality premium, 1998, bn Euro 
700 -
600 
500 
-100  EU extra EU vs. ]apan EU vs. US EU vs. EU vs. Emerging EU vs. Other 
Accession countries countries 
I Exports ■ Imports ■ Trade balance D Quality premium 
Source: WIFO calculations using EUROSTAT. 
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Compared to 1988, the ratio of export to import 
unit values for European manufacturing was lower 
in 1998, and hence the relative premium fell 
roughly from two thirds to one third. This mirrors 
the catching-up process, for example, of the acces-
sion countries, whose export unit value is now about 
half of Europe's, whereas ten years earlier it was only 
one fifth. On the other side of the quality spectrum, 
the US has increased its unit value more than Europe 
in bilateral trade, while Europe has reduced a small 
part of its large trade gap with Japan. 
Quality upgrading strategies: comparing 
Europe to the United States 
In assessing the quality position and upgrading 
effort of a country, two strategies can be considered. 
One strategy, intra-industry upgrading, is for firms 
to move into higher price segments within a given 
industry. Under this strategy, the quality level of an 
industry is revealed by its position within price seg-
ments. 
An alternative strategy, inter-industry upgrading, 
requires a switch from price sensitive industries to 
quality sensitive ones. 
Looking at trade data with these two strategies in 
mind, it is found that: 
• The trade surplus of the EU comes from the qual-
ity sensitive sector. 
• More than half of EU exports (51.3 %) are in the 
high price segment. 
• Over the past 10 years, the EU increased its share 
in the high price segments for exports and 
decreased its share of low quality exports. There 
is a slight indication of convergence across coun-
tries in the quality position. 
Europe has a strong quality position, attained over 
the last ten years. However, the US has a lower share 
of price sensitive industries in production, and is 
shifting its exports and imports more quickly from 
price to quality sensitive sectors. This suggests that 
demand in the US may be shifting to quality sensi-
tive industries faster than in Europe. 
Further, the favourable picture for quality is in con-
trast to that drawn by the share of technology-
driven industries, where European imports from the 
US are higher than exports, and where unit values 
are shown to be unfavourable for Europe. The high 
shares of technology-driven industries in the US, 
their high unit value and their increasing share in 
domestic demand may challenge the future com-
petitiveness of Europe in the high quality sectors. 
In conclusion, the main result is that Europe is posi-
tioned as a provider of high quality; it upgrades 
quality continuously, as is needed by a high wage 
area. However, the long-term position in quality 
competition is contested at both ends of the quality 
spectrum: first by economies that are catching up 
and, secondly, by competitors at the technological 
cutting-edge. 
Quality upgrading has many dimensions. Besides 
shifting into less price sensitive industries, or posi-
tioning in higher quality segments, a quality increas-
ing strategy requires increasing the skills of the 
workforce, strong clusters of firms in fast moving 
industries, adding service components and specifi-
cally knowledge-based service inputs. 
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External services, structural 
change and industrial 
performance 
The rise of the service economy was the predomi­
nant structural change of the 20
l
h century. A major 
determinant of this tertiarisation process was the 
increasing demand of producers for external service 
inputs provided by specialised suppliers (as opposed 
to in-house activities). The underlying sources of this 
process are revealed by the decomposition of out­
put growth into its components: demand side 
effects, changes in technology and shifts in interna­
tional patterns of comparative advantage. 
Decomposition of output growth shows that: 
• Since the Ί 970s, the process of tertiarisation has 
been driven primarily by the growth of knowledge-
based services. Knowledge-based services (com­
prising financial services, business-related serv­
ices, and communications) have consistently 
been the fastest growing sector, outperforming 
manufacturing growth. However, the same can­
not be said of the other service categories, in 
which average annual growth of gross output is 
closer to that of the manufacturing sector and in 
some cases even lags behind. 
• Among the sources of structural development, the 
increase of domestic demand has had the most 
pronounced impact on growth. Besides knowl­
edge-based services, personal and social services 
benefited most from this rise in consumption. 
• The technology effect has been most pronounced in 
knowledge-based services. 
Thus, the general shift of economic activities in 
favour of the tertiary sector has not occurred uni­
formly across industries. There is one particular 
group, knowledge-based services, which has bene­
fited most from technological change and increases 
in demand. What makes this group different is the 
specific role that it can play as source of innovation, 
product differentiation and productivity growth for 
the rest of the economy. 
Knowledge-based services contribute to economic 
development, not only through their own growth in 
employment and income, but also through their 
potential to improve performance in the economic 
system via knowledge transfer and progressive spe­
cialisation. They are capable of stimulating produc­
tivity growth through various sources of competitive 
advantage. 
The data leave no doubt that the rise of the knowl­
edge-based economy is under way. 
External service inputs and competitive 
performance 
Different levels of demand for inputs of various types 
of external services affect the competitive perform­
ance of manufacturing industries. Analysis for the 
EU, the US and Japan shows that industries with 
high shares of inputs from knowledge-based serv­
ices: 
• Appear at the top of the labour productivity 
rankings in all three regions. 
• Grew above the average for total manufacturing. 
• Had the lowest decline of employment in the EU 
and in Japan, while the US experienced large-
scale reductions of the labour force in these 
industries, which are not observed in other 
industry groups. 
• Rank first in quality differentiation. 
In other words, high demand for knowledge-based 
services is associated with higher labour productiv­
ity, higher growth, more stable employment and 
higher quality differentiation. 
Patterns of production and export specialisation 
within the Triad show that the US is strong in indus­
tries characterised by high shares of inputs from 
external knowledge-based services. In contrast, the 
EU is more specialised in the group of industries 
which are less dependent on external service inputs. 
These exhibit low potential for product differentia­
tion, the most severe decline in employment, below 
average growth of value added and the lowest level 
of labour productivity. 
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The internationalisation of 
European services 
In a world of increasing globalisation, where politi-
cal, economic and technological barriers are rapidly 
disappearing, the ability of a country to participate 
in global activity is an important indicator of its eco-
nomic health. Given the growing importance of the 
services sector on the one hand, and the ongoing 
liberalisation of services markets on the other, it is 
natural to inquire about the extent of international-
isation of European services. 
From a broad perspective, internationalisation can 
be seen not only as a phenomenon that affects indi-
vidual firms or sectors, but also as one that has wider 
reaching implications for regions and countries. 
Success in internationalisation, and, in turn, the eco-
nomic growth that it engenders, depends not only 
on the collective ability of firms to compete interna-
tionally, but also on their ability to forge partner-
ships with internationally successful firms. Thus, the 
potential benefits, and risks, for countries and 
regions may result from either, or both, outward 
internationalisation (i.e. by home-based firms) and 
inward internationalisation (i.e. by foreign-based 
firms). The theoretical discussion of the internation-
alisation of service activities stresses the importance 
of commercial presence as a means of undertaking 
international trade in services. In this respect, data 
show that: 
• Conventional trade is less important for services 
than for goods, while foreign direct investment 
(FDI) is more important for services than for 
manufacturing. 
• FDI in services is expanding more rapidly than 
conventional trade and both are increasing faster 
than GDP. 
• Compared to conventional trade in goods and 
FDI in manufacturing, services are growing 
faster, and, in particular, the share of services in 
total FDI flows and positions is increasing sub-
stantially. 
These findings point to an increasing internationali-
sation of European services, with commercial pres-
ence becoming the preferred mode of international 
expansion. 
Concerning the importance of European integra-
tion, relative to the integration of Europe in world-
wide service markets (intra-EU versus extra-EU), data 
on trade and FDI convey a mixed message (see 
Figures 6 and 7): 
• Data on conventional trade show that the share 
of services in total intra-EU trade has changed lit-
tle during the 1990s, and the share of intra-EU 
trade in total services trade (both imports and 
exports) has been fairly stable. 
Thus, although trade in services is growing, the 
Internal Market does not seem to have resulted in 
Figure 6 Intra-EU trade and FDI flows in services as a percentage of GDP 
3.5 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
■ Exports o FDI Outflows 
1997 1998 
Source: NEI calculations using NewCronos. EUROSTAT. 
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faster growth in services than in goods, or in higher 
service trade growth within the EU than with the 
rest of the world. 
• By contrast, the share of services in total intra-EU 
FDI inflows has risen considerably, showing that 
commercial presence in services within the EU is 
expanding more rapidly than in other sectors. 
This is an encouraging sign of service integration 
within Europe, since commercial presence is a 
potentially more important component of integra-
tion in services than in goods. 
• At the same time, the data point to an increas-
ingly outward orientation of European FDI, with 
the share of intra-EU outflows in total services 
outflows declining from three quarters to a half 
between 1992 and 1998 and the share of intra-
EU inflows remaining fairly stable. 
Thus, although integration of EU service markets 
through FDI is growing rapidly, there is an increas-
ing emphasis on investment outside the EU by 
European investors. 
Concerning the geographical composition of extra-
EU transactions, the US is undoubtedly the most 
important partner in service transactions (both 
inward and outward). On the basis of current 
trends, this situation looks set to continue in the 
future. Nonetheless, European Union FDI outflows 
to regions other that the US and EFTA, traditionally 
important partners, are the fastest growing regional 
component of total FDI outflows for services, point-
ing to an increasingly global dimension in the devel-
opment of EU service providers. 
Cross-country comparisons 
Analysis of the relative importance of service trade 
for EU Member States indicates that smaller coun-
tries tend to trade more intensively and to have a 
higher ratio of intra-EU trade to total trade. 
Overall, the evidence from trade, FDI and mergers 
and acquisitions data suggests that economies of 
scale are important for services and, thus, service 
sectors in smaller countries with correspondingly 
small domestic markets are more "open" to interna-
tionalisation. At the same time, however, service 
sectors in the larger economies are more outwardly 
(i.e. extra-EU) orientated. 
Cross-sectoral comparisons 
Across sectors, patterns of international transactions 
vary considerably. In communication services and 
computer and information services, conventional 
trade is growing extremely rapidly, both inside and 
outside the EU, with the share of intra-EU trade in 
total trade rising, thus hinting at greater integration 
of EU services in these sectors. 
Figure 7 Extra-EU trade and FDI flows in services as a percentage of GDP 
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The wholesale trade sector, as well as a number of 
knowledge-intensive service sectors, displays a rela-
tively large commercial presence of nonnational 
companies. Air transport and wholesale distribution 
are both sectors with a high share of cross-border 
operations and, within these, a high share of opera-
tions within the EU. This indicates that internalisation 
is important for these sectors, and that restructuring 
is currently focussed on the integration of markets 
within the EU, rather than being more outwardly 
orientated. Extra-EU international operations appear 
most important for advertising, sea transport and 
research and development. 
Business to business 
e-commerce 
It is in the business to business domain (B2B) that 
the real e-commerce revolution is happening. B2B is 
the core of the "e-market" with more than 80 % of 
total e-commerce activities and the fastest growing 
area. In addition to its direct impact, B2B e-com-
merce also has effects that reach far beyond the 
total amount of trade. It impacts on company and 
market structures and affects the competitiveness of 
individual firms as well as of entire sectors of the 
economy. B2B is changing traditional patterns of 
economic behaviour and shaping a new business 
culture. 
According to various estimates, B2B is already big -
according to Goldman Sachs it reached 1 35.3 bil-
lion USD in 1999 and it is growing fast, expected to 
reach 1 304 billion USD in 2002 (Figure 8). 
If quantitative measurements remain imprecise, 
qualitative assessment of the B2B revolution is more 
reliable. Complex and accelerating structural 
changes in companies and markets are taking place. 
From cutting costs to shaping marketplaces 
Cutting costs has been a powerful initial driver of 
B2B. Cost savings represent up to 40 % on purchas-
ing and procurement. This has a measurable impact 
on individual companies, and on the economy as a 
whole. It may either result in higher profits or in 
lower prices - thus channelling growth through dif-
ferent mechanisms and with a different sectoral 
impact. 
From closed to open markets, from linear 
to multidimensional relationships 
The evolution is from "basic" e-commerce, with its 
focus on reducing costs, on control of the supply 
chain, and on trading tangibles, to "full" e-com-
merce, centred on maximising value, on creative 
and proactive strategies and on adding value 
through service and relationships. 
Impact on inter-enterprise relations: outsourcing 
and "intangible" assets 
B2B not only affects the internal organisation of 
companies; it has a strong impact on inter-enter-
prise relations - e.g. subcontracting, supply chain 
management, procurement, product develop-
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Figure 8 Business to business e-commerce world revenues 
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ments, marketing and distribution. B2B is accelerat-
ing the move to outsourcing, paving the way for 
innovative, dynamic and flexible forms of inter-
enterprise relations. This is reinforced by the emer-
gence of increasingly complex, intangible products 
(software, services, etc.). 
Impact on market structures: 
electronic exchanges 
A specific aspect of such new relationships is the 
fast-growing phenomenon of electronic market-
places (e-exchanges). Over the past year, more than 
1000 such electronic marketplaces were launched 
and this number is expected to triple until 2003. 
E-marketplaces establish communities of buyers and 
sellers, as well as mechanisms that allow business to 
participate cost-effectively in national and global 
markets. Electronic marketplaces could be the 
"small business' ticket to B2B e-commerce". In fact, 
in many areas, SMEs are already key users of such 
marketplaces. 
Enterprise policy issues 
The development of B2B has crucial implications for 
the EU's enterprise policy. It has a direct impact on a 
number of key areas, such as competitiveness issues, 
SME policies and standardisation. The EU's policy 
has traditionally focused on removing inhibitors and 
barriers in order to foster a market-driven process. 
This has been done, primarily, by guaranteeing 
undistorted competition, preventing anti-competi-
tive market developments, and ensuring the right 
conditions for entrepreneurship to develop. 
Consensus building (e.g. through standardisation, 
or through the promotion of self-regulation and co-
regulation) has also played a key role. 
In this perspective, a number of new questions and 
challenges may arise. These concern the impact of 
B2B on productivity, prices and growth, the means 
ensuring a broad participation of SMEs in B2B, the 
role of standardisation in shaping open electronic 
marketplaces, the development of better synergies 
between SME policies, research, innovation and 
standardisation to promote the take-up of B2B and 
finally how to encourage traditional sectors to 
embrace fully the new opportunities. 
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Introduction 
Over the last decade, the European Union has taken 
major steps forward in terms of institutional and eco-
nomic reform. The completion of the Internal Market 
and the introduction of the Euro speak for them-
selves. Intensive efforts brought about an impressive 
macroeconomic turnaround. The current favourable 
outlook is based on sound and robust grounds, thus 
allowing prospects for a virtuous circle and a growth 
dividend. Yet, in comparison with our past perform-
ance or with the performance of our main partner 
and competitor, the United States, the impression 
that Europe "could do better" remains. 
In this context, the Lisbon European Council (23-
24 March 2000) set the European Union a new 
strategic goal for the next decade: to become the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of sustainable eco-
nomic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion. 
The purpose of the Competitiveness Report is to 
provide an analytical contribution to the policy 
debate on how to make Europe a more dynamic 
economy. It is being produced yearly at the 
invitation of the Council in its Resolution of 
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h November 1994 on strengthening the compet-
itiveness of European industry. 
Last year's report focused on structural change in 
European manufacturing - specialisation and con-
centration - and on its prime determinants, tangible 
and intangible investment and organisational 
change. Change, as a proxy for adaptation, remains 
the underlying theme that holds together the vari-
ous parts of the present report. However, policy 
does not pursue change per se. Following Lisbon, 
the policies that contribute to the new strategy have 
as an overriding objective the acceleration of the 
transition towards the knowledge-based economy. 
The present report examines in detail some of the 
elements that determine this transition: productiv-
ity, take-up of information and communication 
technology (ICT), role of knowledge-based services 
in the economy and the emergence of business to 
business electronic commerce (B2B). 
The report is structured as follows: a first, introduc-
tory chapter deals with the overall economic per-
formance of the European Union vis-à-vis the US and 
Japan. In trying to understand the reasons behind 
the weaker growth record of the EU over the US in 
the recent years, the analysis moves successively 
from productivity developments to investment and, 
particularly, to ICT adoption patterns. An annex to 
this chapter presents the key policy developments of 
the year from the point of view of the competitive-
ness of the whole economy. It is a reminder that 
action is the ultimate purpose of research, of analy-
sis and of debate. 
In investigating structural change this year's report 
takes a broader perspective than last year, looking at 
the overall productive system. The correlation 
between growth and speed of change is confirmed 
once again. 
A study of the extent and role of quality upgrading 
in European manufacturing answers the question on 
how, over the long run, a high wage region can 
maintain a healthy exports record, in a competitive 
environment. In doing so, it reveals the importance 
of a subclass of services, specifically the knowledge 
based services (KBS). 
This observation makes the linkage with a more 
detailed study of the service sector, set in motion at 
the request of the Council.' A first chapter provides 
1 Council (Industry) conclusions of 9.11.1999 on Competitiveness and entrepreneur-
ial policy of the European Union. 
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a long view on services, their growing importance 
and their penetration in the various sectors of the 
productive system. It also searches for a possible link 
between the use of knowledge based services as 
inputs and sources of competitive performance. On 
this question, data show that KBS-intensive indus-
tries rank first in terms of labour productivity, aver-
age annual growth, level of product differentiation 
and quality premium in exports. Further trade data 
analysis discloses a possible source of worry: the EU 
displays a weakness, relative to the US, in the spe-
cialisation in KBS-intensive industries, both in terms 
of shares of value added and in terms of exports. 
In a world of increasing globalisation, where politi-
cal, economic and technological barriers disappear 
at a fast pace, the ability of a country to participate 
in global activity is an important indicator of its 
good economic health. Following this line, a second 
chapter has been dedicated to the internationalisa-
tion of the services sector. In doing so, "classical" 
trans-border trade data have been integrated with 
data from foreign direct investment, mergers and 
acquisitions and foreign affiliates' activities. 
Structural change can sometimes be spectacularly 
fast. Business to business electronic commerce is 
revolutionising the organisation of the supply chains 
of several sectors. In a last section, the report takes 
stock of B2B developments and perspectives as well 
as of the policy issues that it raises. 
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Chapter 1 
Macroeconomic performance 
This chapter analyses the evolution of the European 
economy and confronts it with that of the United 
States and Japan. 
The EU is still significantly behind the US in terms of 
its standard of living and its employment perform-
ance. The catching-up process that has taken place 
since the 1950s has come to an end, and seems 
even to have reversed. Since the 1990s, living stan-
dards and wealth have increased at a faster rate in 
the US than in Europe. 
The reason for the turnaround is a new pattern of 
productivity trends. In the past, Europe managed to 
increase labour productivity at a higher rate than 
the US, through a greater substitution of capital for 
labour. Since the 1990s, however, the US economy 
has overtaken that of Europe in labour productivity 
growth. As it approached full employment, the US 
increased capital investment. More importantly, the 
US economy also managed to speed up the growth 
of total factor productivity. 
It is difficult to identify the exact reasons behind this 
new total factor productivity pattern. Various inter-
related factors seem to explain why the growth in 
total factor productivity decreased in Europe and 
accelerated in the US. It is now widely accepted that 
the acceleration of US productivity growth results 
partly from the quicker and deeper diffusion of 
information and communication technologies (ICT). 
The efficiency gains brought about by this technol-
ogy pave the way for reorganisation not only in fac-
tories, but also in distribution, services and adminis-
tration. 
1. Wealth and growth 
performance 
An economy is competitive if its population can 
enjoy high and raising standards of living and high 
rates of employment on a sustainable basis.' More 
precisely, the level of economic activity should not 
cause an unsustainable external balance of the 
economy nor should it compromise the welfare of 
future generations.
2 
The external balance approach to competitiveness 
focuses on the trade surplus situation and on indi-
cators of price and cost competitiveness. A large and 
positive trade surplus is often seen as a reassuring 
sign of competitiveness (in this respect the EU has 
been performing well) but one might, nevertheless, 
wonder whether higher growth would not have 
eroded the existing trade surplus. 
As far as cost competitiveness indicators are con-
cerned, there have been gains in competitiveness 
for the EU producers against their US competitors 
over the last five years.
3 Thus, a country whose 
competitiveness is increasing according to these 
indicators may nevertheless be losing ground in 
terms of standards of living measures - as illustrated 
by the position of the EU vis-à-vis the US in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s. 
Following the definition presented here, competi-
tiveness of countries concerns primarily their ability 
to provide goods and services to their citizens; in 
A concept of competitiveness along the same line Is presented in European 
Commission (1996a) as well as in European Economy (1998). For a discussion on 
the concepts of competitiveness, see the special issue on international competitive-
ness of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy (1996). 
To some extent, the containment of the public debt Imposed by the Maastricht 
Treaty limits the possibility of Increasing the welfare of the present generation at the 
expense of future generations. 
See European Commission (2000a). 
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Table 1.1 CDP per capita and employi 
Total 
Country/Region population' 
EU 375.8 
US 271.4 
Japan 126.7 
nent  rates  in 1999 
CDP 
1000 PPS" 
19.11 
29.52 
21.12 
per cap  ita 
Growth
1 
1.6 
2.1 
1.4 
Employment 
rate" 
63.4 
81.7 
76.3 
Notes: 
a Million inhabitants. 
b Purchasing Power Standards at 1995 market prices. 
c Average annual % change of GDP per capita at 1995 market prices (1989-99). 
d Total employment as % of population aged 15-64. 
Source: European Commission. 
other words, it concerns the countries' performance In the case of Japan, the higher employment rate is 
in terms of wealth creation. due, to a larger extent, to lower unemployment. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is the 
main yardstick of living standards. Nevertheless, the 
welfare of a population is further affected, for 
instance, by the amount of leisure time available, by 
the level of social security and by the quality of the 
natural environment.
4 As there are no accepted 
international standards for measuring the position in 
terms of these supplementary characteristics, the 
discussion will focus on GDP per capita. 
Europe's competitive position
5 
Measured by GDP per capita at the purchasing 
power standards (PPS) of 1995, the standards of liv-
ing in the European Union rank behind Japan and 
well below the level achieved in the United States 
(Table 1.1). The European economy also offers its 
population significantly fewer jobs. 
Compared to the US economy, the differences are 
pronounced. Except for Luxembourg, which bene-
fits from its specialisation in financial services, no EU 
Member State managed to create a higher per 
capita income than the US. Despite considerable 
progress in some Member States, employment rates 
in all EU countries are well below those in the US 
and Japan. 
The lower employment rate in Europe does not 
reflect only higher unemployment compared to the 
US and Japan. In fact, this factor only accounts for 
about a third of the observed difference between 
the US and the EU. The greater part of the difference 
is due to higher activity rates in the US, especially in 
the female population.
6 In addition, Americans tend 
to start working at a younger age and to work 
longer. The activity rates of Americans in the age 
brackets 15 to 25 and 55 to 64 are significantly 
higher than the corresponding rates for Europeans.
7 
Europe fares better when aspects other than GDP 
per capita are taken into consideration. The 
employed population in Europe enjoys more leisure 
time than its American counterpart because weekly 
working hours are shorter and holidays are longer. 
In addition, early retirement is more widespread in 
the EU than in the US. As GDP "lost" due to extra 
leisure time in Europe amounts to only 6-7% of total 
GDP at current levels of labour productivity, the pro-
nounced gap with the US in terms of standard of liv-
ing remains, even after adjustments for differences 
in leisure time are made. 
Catching-up process interrupted 
Since the 1950s, European GDP per capita has been 
catching up with the level in the United States. This 
process has come to an end (Figure 1.1). Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, the living standard of the 
European Union has increased more slowly than 
that of the United States. The same has been true for 
Japan, which had outstripped Europe by the end of 
the 1970s. 
The position of the EU and Japan relative to the US 
varied also due to differences in business cycles. In 
addition, Europe's position was depressed by the 
These supplementary factors correlate with the level ot GDP per capita, but the rela-
tionship Is not necessarily positive. The level of social security affects the distribu-
tion of income. Given two economies with identical GDP per capita, the economy 
with the more unequal income distribution is typically believed to suffer from more 
widespread poverty and lack of social cohesion. As higher GDP still tends to imply 
greater environmental pollution, one may even suspect a trade-off between GDP 
per capita and the quality of the natural environment. 
Throughout this chapter, the European Union is treated as a whole. The economic 
situation varies considerably across Member States; issues arising from this diver-
sity are treated in detail in other Commission documents (e.g. the Second Cohesion 
report, under preparation). 
Activity rates measure how many people of working age (15-64) are employed or 
looking for a job. The activity rate is calculated as a ratio between the labour force 
(sum of the number of employed people and the number of registered unemployed) 
and the population of working age. 
For details, see OECD (1999). 
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Figure 1.1 GDP per capita relative to the United States 
US GDP per capita = 100 
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Source: European Commission. 
Table 1.2 Growth of GDP per capita, 1960-1999 
1960-75 1975-85 
EU 3.4 2.0 
US 2.5 2.4 
japan 7.0 3.1 
1985-90 
2.8 
2.3 
4.2 
1990-95 
1.0 
1.4 
1.1 
1995-99 
2.0 
3.4 
0.8 
Source: European Commission. 
impact of German unification in the early 1990s: 
GDP per capita in Eastern Germany has been signif-
icantly below the EU average. However, the gap has 
also widened steadily since then. 
A new pattern seems to have emerged: the richest 
economy is able to increase its standard of living 
faster than its competitors. This turnaround is not 
due to a decline in living standards in Europe; GDP 
per capita continued to increase during the 1990s 
(Table 1.2), and even accelerated in the second half 
of the decade. This was even more the case in the 
US where, in the second part of the 1990s, GDP per 
capita grew not only more than in the EU but also 
faster than in the previous two decades; while the 
European economy lagged behind past growth 
rates. 
2. Factors behind the new 
trends ¡n living standards 
A country's GDP and GDP growth are determined 
by two components. One component is employ-
ment performance, e.g. how many people can find 
a job in relation to the population, and how much 
this ratio can be increased over time. The other 
component is productivity performance. The higher 
the value added per employee, i.e. labour produc-
tivity, and the higher its growth, the higher is the 
level and growth of the standard of living. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the main source of 
greater growth in the US standard of living was bet-
ter employment performance. Total employment 
expanded rapidly, and the employment ratio 
increased considerably, overcoming Japanese levels 
by the end of the 1980s (Figure 1.2). 
This trend continued in the second half of the 
1990s. Over the entire period, the European econ-
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Figure 1.2 Evolution of employment rate 
(total employment divided by population at working age 15-64) 
% 
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Source: European Commission. 
Table 1.3 Growth in total employment, 
1960-75 
EU 0.3 
US 1.8 
Japan 1.1 
1960-1999 
1975-85 
0.1 
2.2 
0.9 
1985-90 
1.4 
2.2 
1.0 
1990-95 
-0.4 
1.1 
0.7 
1995-99 
1.0 
1.9 
0.0 
Source: Eurqpearn Cormtrnitsaiaim. 
omy failed to provide as many jobs in relation to the 
population of working age as the US economy. Even 
assuming that the additional jobs would have only 
half the average level of European labour productiv-
ity to date, because of declining marginal labour 
productivity, European GDP per capita would be 
higher by more than 10% if Europe could generate 
as high an employment ratio as the US. 
As was the case in the second half of the 1980s, 
Europe has managed to increase its employment 
rate since 1995. The increase was not strong 
enough, however, to close the gap with the US. In 
the second half of the last decade, the number of 
jobs expanded faster in the US than in Europe 
(Table 1.3). Therefore, the superior ability of the US 
economy to create jobs continued to be a source of 
improvement of its standard of living. However, tak-
ing into account the very low level of the US unem-
ployment rate by historical standards, this contribu-
tion to the improvement of living standards might 
dry up in the near future. 
As the difference between employment growth in 
the US and Europe shrank in the 1990s compared to 
previous decades, the employment performance 
cannot explain why the US economy gained com-
petitiveness during the 1990s. 
The second reason for the higher GDP per capita of 
the US is a higher level of labour productivity. In the 
beginning of the 1960s, Europe's level of labour 
productivity was only half as high as that of the US. 
However, in terms of productivity, Europe managed 
to catch up. During the following three decades, 
Europe raised its output per employee (in real terms) 
faster than the US economy (Table 1.4). This is true 
both for labour productivity calculated as output in 
real terms per person employed as well as per total 
hours worked. 
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Table 1.4 Growth of labour productiv 
1960-75 
EU 3.9 
US 1.9 
Japan 7.0 
ty,  1960-1999 
1975-85 
2.2 
1.2 
3.0 
1985-90 
1.7 
1.0 
3.6 
1990-95 
1.9 
1.3 
0.7 
1995-99 
1.3 
2.2 
1.0 
Note: Labour productivity is defined as GDP per employee. 
Source: European Commission. 
Figure 1.3 Labour productivity levels relative to the United States 
US labour productivity =100 
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
-■—EU -*- Japan 
Source: European Commission. 
Since the second half of the 1990s, this pattern has 
changed, and the US economy has been leading in 
terms of labour productivity growth. These gains 
took place at a time when US labour productivity 
was still significantly higher than in Europe and 
Japan (Figure 1.3).
8
 
European and Japanese growth in labour productiv-
ity has lost ground since the beginning of the 
1990s. Except in Luxembourg, no EU Member State 
managed to keep pace with the productivity gains 
achieved by the US economy. 
The trend reversal was especially pronounced in 
manufacturing.
9 In this sector, the higher productiv-
ity growth also reflected the stronger expansion of 
demand for manufactured products in the US. The 
relationship between growth and labour productiv-
ity or employment over time was not stable over a 
long period. In the early 1990s, a structural break 
occurred, and productivity growth gained momen-
tum in US manufacturing. 
8 With productivity measured in terms of total hours worked, the gaps would be less 
sharp. Still, in the second half of the 1990s, per hour productivity grew faster in the 
US than in the EU, see European Commission (2000b). 
9 For details see Aiginger et al. (1999). 
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3. Factors behind changes in 
productivity patterns 
In the past, the increase of labour productivity in 
Japan and Europe was to a large extent due to 
higher capital expenditures for rationalisation. The 
lower growth of labour productivity in the US 
reflected a lower rate of substitution of capital for 
labour which, in turn, resulted from lower wage 
costs and a stagnating real wage. Did the approach 
of full employment in the US induce companies to 
put more emphasis on rationalisation and to 
increase the rate of substitution of capital for labour? 
To answer this question, the increase in labour pro-
ductivity has to be broken down into the impact of 
total factor productivity (TFP) and the impact of 
capital deepening. 
Estimates presented in Figure 1.4, upper part, 
confirm the supposed increase in the rate of substi-
tution of capital for labour in the US. After fifteen 
years of very low values, the rate of substitution of 
capital for labour increased significantly in the US in 
the 1990s and in the second half of the 1990s was, 
for the first time, slightly stronger than in Europe. 
The acceleration of the rate of substitution of capital 
for labour can only partially explain the higher 
growth of US labour productivity. More important 
was "the acceleration of the rate of total factor pro-
ductivity in the second half of the 1990s (Figure 1.4, 
lower part). In Japan, this rate was negative in the 
first half of the 1990s and very low in the second 
half. In Europe, total factor productivity in the 1990s 
rose at a significantly slower pace than in the past. It 
is, therefore, the better performance in total factor 
productivity that explains the rise in US competi-
tiveness and the "new" pattern of improvement in 
living standards. 
One should bear in mind that the above calculations 
do not take into account qualitative changes in the 
inputs. As a consequence, the impact of intangible 
investment such as in human resources, knowledge 
and innovation is implicitly accounted for in total 
factor productivity. 
Without innovation the new industries and the tech-
nical and organisational solutions necessary to 
increase labour productivity will not emerge. R&D 
expenditures, the number of researchers and invest-
ment in equipment give an indication of a country's 
innovation capability. New solutions have to be 
researched, developed and implemented through 
investment. R&D expenditures measure the R&D 
efforts from the input side while equipment invest-
ment measures the speed at which new capacities 
are created and the economy is modernised. 
Measured by the R&D expenditures of business in 
relation to GDP, European R&D efforts have contin-
ued to decline until recently (Figure 1.5). In contrast 
to the falling trend in Europe a revival of R&D 
expenditures can be observed both in the United 
States and in Japan. The pronounced difference in 
R&D effort is confirmed by employment figures. 
Whereas in the United States and in Japan 6 to 7 out 
of 1000 employees are researchers, European com-
panies employ only 2 to 3 researchers. Europe lags 
behind, even when the role of government financed 
research is taken into account, but the difference 
narrows. 
Box 1.1 Decomposition of labour productivity growth 
The rate of growth of TFP is by definition the difference between output growth and a weighted average of the growth 
of inputs necessary for production. At the macroeconomic level, only labour and capital are taken into account. The 
relationship between output and inputs is described by a macroeconomic production function. Assuming a simple pro-
duction function, the Cobb-Douglas, the rate of growth of output (y) depends on the rate of growth of labour inputs 
(e) measured by the growth in total employment, the rate of growth of capital inputs (k) measured by the growth of 
the capital stock and the rate of change in technical progress i.e. total factor productivity (tfp). The equation reads: 
y = tfp + a e + (1-o¡) k 
where α denotes the partial elasticity of output with respect to labour. As the rate of growth of labour productivity cor-
responds to the difference between the growth of output (y) and of labour (e), subtracting (e) from both sides of the 
equation yields the desired division of the rate of growth of labour productivity: 
y- e = tfp + (1-a) (k- e) 
where (k-e) corresponds to the rate of growth of the capital-labour ratio and measures the speed of capital deepen-
ing. Multiplied by (1- a), this expression measures the effect of the substitution of capital for labour. 
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Figure 1.4 Determinants of labour productivity growth 
Substitution of capital for labour 
Average annual growth in ' 
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Total factor productivity 
Average annual growth in ' 
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Source: European Commission. 
In general, fixed capital embodies technological 
components resulting from innovation. Indeed, very 
often, capital investment is a necessary condition to 
fully exploit the returns from R&D expenditures. 
The composition of gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) points to a higher content of new technolo­
gies of the vintages that were added to the US cap­
ital stock during the 1990s. No such shift took place 
in Europe or Japan. Thus, the acceleration of TFP 
growth observed may be partly linked to the differ­
ent investment patterns in the United States on the 
one hand and in Europe and Japan on the other. 
The previous Competitiveness Report already 
pointed out the change in the investment pattern. 
Measured by the ratio of GFCF to GDP in the period 
1960 to 1990, the US consistently invested less in 
physical capital than Europe and Japan. Because the 
growth of capital expenditures slowed down in 
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Figure 1.5 Business R&D expenditures per unit GDP in percentage 
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Figure 1.6 Gross fixed capital formation in equipment as a percentage of GDP 
(current prices - national currency) 
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Source: European Commission. 
Europe and accelerated in the US during the 1990s, 
the amount of GDP invested in new plant and 
equipment approached European levels during the 
1990s. This can be observed with data in nominal 
and in volume terms. The increase in the investment 
ratio of the US economy during the 1990s did not 
reflect an increased propensity to invest in specific 
industries; the propensity to invest rose both in 
manufacturing and in market-oriented services. 
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Figure 1.7 Evolution of gross fixed capital formation in equipment 
(constant 1995 prices) 
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Source: European Commission. 
Whereas the upswing in GFCF in the US was not 
propelled by specific industries at the observable 
level of breakdown, it did have pronounced prod-
uct-specific features. The growth of the US invest-
ment ratio was mainly induced by an increased 
demand from machinery and equipment industries. 
Indeed, investment in machinery and equipment 
increased much faster than residential and non-resi-
dential investment. 
In contrast to the markedly rising propensity to 
invest in new equipment in the US during the 
1990s, the recovery of the investment ratio after the 
setback caused by the European recession of 1993 
was not pronounced enough to regain the level 
achieved previously (Figure 1.6). The gap between 
Europe and the US, which had emerged in the first 
half of the 1990s, even widened in the second half. 
This trend is even more striking in terms of evolution 
of GFCF in equipment which shows a significant 
acceleration in the US relative to the EU (Figure 1.7). 
As mentioned above, new equipment is often a car-
rier of new production technologies. Thus the rise in 
the US investment ratio may reflect an increased 
propensity of all industries there to invest in new 
technologies.
1
0 
10 The fact that, during the 1990s, US industry spent more in absolute and relative 
terms on the diffusion of Information technology than did its European (and 
Japanese) counterparts supports this conjecture. 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
are now widely believed to be a major factor in pro-
ductivity growth. Given the importance of this 
debate, the extent of diffusion of ICTs in the EU and 
in the US is presented in Annex 1. 
Despite the consistency between the shifts in invest-
ment patterns and the changes in TFP growth that 
occurred in the United States, Europe and Japan, 
and despite the US lead in applying ICTs, additional 
factors may have been at work to bring about the 
observed change in the patterns of TFP growth. 
As TFP is a catch-all variable, international 
differences in TFP growth can also reflect different 
capacities of economic systems to innovate and to 
adjust, the effects of shocks to economies, and the 
effect of changes in the economic system and in the 
policy framework. 
The 1990s are not only characterised by the emer-
gence of basic new technologies, but also by far-
reaching political changes and the frictions of the 
globalising economy. The EU economies endured 
the tension and the financial market turbulence fol-
lowing German unification, the effects of labour 
market rigidities and, more recently, the adverse 
trade effects of the financial crisis in emerging coun-
tries. They had to cope with the painful, if ultimately 
beneficial, experience of budgetary stabilisation in 
the approach to monetary union. Japan suffered, in 
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addition, by the burst of its so-called "financial bub-
ble" at the beginning of the 1990s. Also, for geo-
graphical reasons, it was more strongly affected by 
the "Asian crisis" at the end of the 1990s. 
The combination of more rigidities in their eco-
nomic systems and, arguably, a greater exposure to 
external shocks may go some way to explain why 
the European and Japanese economies suffered 
more from growth frictions than the US economy 
during the 1990s. This may be an element in 
explaining why TFP growth slowed down in Europe 
and was even partly negative in Japan. 
Summarising, two sets of factors may have worked 
together to turn around the growth pattern of total 
factor productivity. On the one hand, the US econ-
omy has profited from its head-start in the applica-
tion of information and communication technolo-
gies and from heavier investment in modern 
equipment, leading to increased TFP growth in the 
1990s. On the other hand, Europe and Japan suf-
fered more from the external shocks of the 1990s 
because they were affected more strongly and 
because their economic systems are less flexible and 
less adaptable than the US economy. 
lower flexibility of labour and capital markets, and 
the less positive attitude in Europe towards eco-
nomic and social change, an alternative explanation 
could be that the volume of reforms has simply 
overtaxed the capacity to adjust. On the other 
hand, one could argue that the reforms were simply 
not radical enough, or that they could not produce 
any positive effects because their implementation 
was delayed. 
The consensual view of the European Union on this 
issue is that "the fact that the improvements in the 
framework conditions are not reflected in a stronger 
economic performance is indicative of the severity 
of the macroeconomic imbalances and structural 
rigidities prevalent at the start of the previous 
decade. In part, it also reflects the late start to eco-
nomic reforms in many Member States and the time 
it takes before an appropriate policy mix starts to 
bear fruit."'
3 
The key policy developments of the year bearing on 
the competitiveness of the whole economy are pre-
sented in Annex 2. 
The reform puzzle 
Puzzling in this context is the question of why the 
structural reforms designed to reduce the rigidities 
of the European economic system and to improve 
its innovative capacity failed to prevent this result. 
European policy has addressed the weak points 
diagnosed as "Eurosclerosis" back in the 1980s. The 
implementation of the Internal Market programme, 
the opening up to competition of the energy and 
transportation sectors, the liberalisation and privati-
sation of telecommunications, the deregulation of 
financial markets and the introduction of the euro 
aimed at increasing competition and economic 
dynamism in Europe. Some European countries also 
undertook steps to deregulate their labour markets. 
Such changes to the economic system were deemed 
to be capable of increasing the efficiency of the 
economy.'
1 
Why, then, did the rate of growth in total factor pro-
ductivity decline in the 1990s despite the pro-
nounced reform efforts in Europe? Several argu-
ments may reconcile this observation with the many 
economic reforms that took place in Europe. Time 
lags in the productivity effects of economic reforms'
2 
and the overshadowing effects of the external 
shocks might offer one explanation. In view of the 
11 See Cecchini et al. (1988). 
12 Time lags occur for several reasons: The reforms must first be designed in detail 
and implemented, and economic actors have to adjust their expectations and 
behaviour to the changed framework. Changes in the business and investment 
strategy of companies take time to materialise and to affect market structures. 
Further time passes until competition processes result in new market structures and 
a new organisation of production. As the competition process need not end in sta-
ble results, the measured productivity numbers might not reflect the full effects of 
reforms. 
13 Broad guidelines of economic policies (2000). 
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Annex 1 
Information and communication 
technologies in the EU during the 1990s 
Information and communication technology (ICT) 
has often been described as an area of special 
importance for the economy, resulting in new eco-
nomic structures and even in new economic laws. 
Meanwhile, the concept of the "new economy" has 
not only entered the scientific and public debate but 
is also being discussed at political level. Indeed, 
there is enough evidence to suggest that ICTs will 
have a profound impact on competitiveness and 
business practises. 
Computer prices have fallen constantly over the past 
thirty years; computer capabilities have risen and 
the use of computers in the economy has expanded. 
Beyond their potential importance, the impressive 
feature of computers, however, is the speed of 
change. According to the so-called Moore's law,' 
microchip capabilities double every 18 months. 
The objective of this Annex is to present a consoli-
date view of where Europe stands in ICT adoption. 
Information and 
communication technologies: 
a definition 
For the purpose of this analysis, information and 
communication technologies are defined as the out-
put of telecommunications, computer hardware 
and software and office equipment industries. This is 
a rather narrow definition of the ICT sector, given 
that large groups of products are omitted (elec-
tronic components, measurement instruments, 
medical devices, TV, video and audio equipment, 
etc.). Many of these products constitute areas of 
strength for the European economy and therefore 
the estimates are likely to underestimate systemati-
cally the strength of Europe in the area of ICTs. 
This narrow definition of ICTs has nevertheless a 
substantial advantage. The strategic importance of 
ICTs stems from its potential to optimise the flow of 
information, to reduce transaction costs, and as a 
result, to raise the productivity of economic sectors 
and the efficiency of markets. Following the defini-
tion of ICT, it is mainly this "horizontal" impact 
which is covered by this analysis. Other categories of 
ICT output, such as components, may induce fur-
ther productivity improvements or generate innova-
tions in products and services for specific industries, 
but they are likely to have a rather limited impact on 
businesses and market institutions in the economy 
as a whole. In short, the selection of this definition 
(i.e. essentially office machinery and telecommuni-
cations) facilitates to focus on the core areas of ICTs. 
ICT expenditure does not refer only to purchases of 
computers or telecommunication hardware; it also 
includes expenditures on software, telecom services 
and IT services such as the implementation of IT 
solutions, consulting and support. Thus, the defini-
tion used here is broader than the definition of gross 
fixed capital formation in equipment, which only 
covers purchases of hardware. The broader defini-
tion seems to be more appropriate for discussing 
issues of new technologies. The implementation of 
new IT solutions does not only call for new comput-
ers, peripherals and telecommunication hardware. 
Without the software and the other services, the 
profound changes in business processes, and there-
fore the macroeconomic effects of ICT investment, 
would not have taken place. 
1 The consistency of this trend led to its being named after Gordon Moore, an exec-
utive and founder of Intel who first observed the trend in 1964. 
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ICT as a general-purpose 
technology 
In 1993, IT represented, in nominal terms, just 2% 
of the capital stock of the US economy.
2 Although 
this may appear as a small fraction of the overall 
investment, IT is at the centre of both public and 
academic interest. One reason for this is that the 
impact of ICT is directly visible to consumers, e.g. 
through the Internet, cheaper telecommunications 
services, new computer-enabled services, quality 
improvements, wider choice, etc. But there is also 
another, economically more important reason: ICT 
is a generic technology that is affecting practically 
all economic activities. 
A generic technology has, by definition, the poten-
tial to impact, at maturity, all sectors and business 
practises. ICTs are generic technologies not only 
because they are embedded in all types of machin-
ery, but also because ICTs are related to manage-
ment and information systems and applications that 
are used across industries. These systems are not 
only among the fastest growing segments of ICTs 
but they also constitute the part that generates the 
most important overall impact, namely, the emer-
gence of new business organisational structures in a 
way similar to the impact that the telephone, the 
railways and the electric motor had on the business 
structures of the late 19
l
h century.
3 
The advent of the Internet as a tool to reorganise 
business and to shape new electronic marketplaces 
is further fostering the economic impact of ICT. First, 
the use of Internet has the potential to open new 
business opportunities, which may make processes 
more efficient, but also allows for the development 
of new business models, making possible new forms 
of partnership, and creating new types of business. 
Secondly, the Internet has important "network 
effects": the more users are connected to the net-
work and exchange transactions, the greater is the 
economic benefit for all of them. Connectivity is 
thus becoming the most important feature of pres-
ent ICT. The importance of connectivity as the cut-
ting edge of today's ICTs is demonstrated also in the 
area of mobile telephony where Europe has demon-
strated a significant lead during the 1990s. The 
European technological lead showed how technol-
ogy has the potential to affect both business 
processes and social patterns. 
ICT impact on performance: 
the productivity issue 
Most scientific breakthroughs, in biology, medicine 
or space exploration, became possible thanks to the 
computer. Personal computers have become the 
main office tools. Computers affect radically almost 
every aspect of everyday life, from normal products 
in supermarkets to the design of cars. The Internet, 
the most visible society-wide spin off of the com-
puter and telecommunications industry is rapidly 
reaching broad household penetration. 
Computers, in short, have been everywhere, but, as 
R. Solow remarked in 1987/ everywhere except in 
productivity statistics. In fact, long after computers 
became visible everywhere in society, they still had 
little measurable impact on performance according 
to the statistics - the so-called "productivity para-
dox".
5 Substantial research efforts in microeconom-
ics in the last decade resulted in a number of con-
clusions that unravelled, to a large extent, the 
productivity paradox and proposed reasonable 
explanations. 
There is a vast literature on the productivity paradox. 
The recent evidence suggests that there is, after all, 
a positive relationship between ICT investment 
and productivity.
6 A recent report of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, for example, refers to 
empirical findings which conclude "that surging use 
of IT (including computer hardware, software and 
communications equipment) in the second half of 
the 1990s, together with advances in the produc-
tion of computers and semiconductors, contributed 
about two-thirds of an estimated 1.06 percentage 
point acceleration in productivity growth between 
the first and second half of the decade".' However, 
there is still little statistical evidence available for 
Europe on this issue. 
One should bear in mind that in the EU and in the 
US different methods are used to measure price and 
quantity developments in computer production and 
spending. In particular, in the US, quality adjust-
2 See Sichel and Oliner (1994). 
3 See David (1990). 
4 See Tripplett (1999). 
5 Productivity (total factor) is defined as the increase in output while holding inputs 
constant. The increased use of ICT-related goods and services in the economy has 
as its primary effect, the substitution of labour and other inputs for computers and 
ICT related inputs. Another effect of ICTs (especially of the part of ICTs that affect 
managerial functions and market transactions) is to combine more effectively the 
production inputs, thereby generating productivity increases. 
6 See e.g., Berndt and Morisson (1995), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1998 a, b), Mairesse 
and Greenan (1996), Mairesse et al. (1998), Gordon (1999) and Triplett (1999). 
7 See U.S. Department of Commerce (2000), p. 37. 
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ments are made based on hedonic methods, while 
many European countries rely on more conventional 
methods. This suggests that quantity produced and 
productivity trends are underestimated in these 
countries. The extent to which GDP measures are 
influenced by the statistical method used depends 
on the size of the country's ICT sectors and on its 
propensity to import ICT equipment.
8
 
Growth and market shares 
of ICTs 
The figures for this and the following sections are 
from the 1993-2000 European Information 
Technology Observatory (EITO) Annual Reports and 
represent an analytical estimate produced by indus-
try experts.
9 EITO's figures on ICT refer to the final 
residential, business and government consumption 
together with the intermediate demand of busi-
nesses. The final business demand is essentially 
investment in new hardware and software systems, 
while the intermediate demand represents function-
ing costs for the installed stock of ICTs.
1
0
 
In 1999, the European Union represented 38% of 
the combined ICT market of the Triad (EU, US and 
Japan), in comparison with 48% of the US and 14% 
of Japan. During the 1990s, the European share 
remained constant while the US share increased by 
approximately 5% from 1991 to 1999 at the 
expense of Japan. 
The total market for information and communica-
tion technologies in Europe in 1999 was 415 billion 
Euro (at 1995 prices). This estimate includes com-
puter hardware and software (28%), office equip-
ment (2%), computer related services (16%), 
telecommunication equipment (12%) and carrier 
services (41%). Three European countries repre-
sented almost 60% of the European market for ICT 
in 1999, namely Germany (27%), the United 
Kingdom (18,5%) and France (1 7%). In real terms, 
all European markets have grown at a very similar 
rate of 11% per annum, with very little (less than 
0,5%) variation across countries. Data from other 
sources (Dataquest/Gartnergroup 1999) confirm 
these growth rates (see Figure 1). 
8 For a detailed discussion of these issues see OECD (2000b) and Schreyer (2000). 
9 The report uses data from market research companies (IDC and others) and is pro-
duced by a consortium of the main ICT manufacturing associations. Only recently, 
OECD (2000c) published the report "Measuring the ICT sector" which provides a set 
of statistics that measure the output of the ICT sector in different OECD member 
countries. This is a very Important first step in providing data drawn from official 
sources in a consistent manner and using a common international definition. This 
kind of data is a very useful addition to the existing non official market sources. 
10 In order to give an Idea of the size of expenditure, it Is worth noting that business 
spending on new computers in the US was over USD 160 billion (in 1992 dollars) 
compared to consumer spending of USD 52,7 billion, see Jorgenson and Stiroh 
(1999). 
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Such a strong and continuous growth is without 
precedent in recent economic history. In the 1990s, 
after a period of slow evolution at the beginning of 
the decade, the growth has strongly accelerated in 
the most recent years, with yearly rates above 10 %. 
The evolution of ICT 
expenditure per capita 
During the period 1991-1999, the ICT expenditure 
per capita rose by 188% in the EU (from 632 in 
1991 to 1187 Euro), 186% in the US (from 1086 to 
2023 Euro) and 1 33% in Japan (from 1010 to 1 349 
Euro), (see Figure 2). The evolution of ICT spending 
per capita was relatively stable between 1991 and 
1994 in the three geographic areas. After 1994, 
though, each area followed a different pattern. The 
US experienced, as a result of the Internet revolu-
tion, the fastest growth among the three. Japan fol-
lowed a similarly upward path but decelerated sub-
stantially after 1998. The EU evolved upwards at a 
stable pace and caught up partially with Japan while 
the gap with the US remains the same: the 
European ICT spending per capita is still only 58% 
of the corresponding US figure. 
There are important disparities in ICT spending per 
capita in different Member States. The top division 
in Europe is composed of Sweden and Denmark fol-
lowed at some distance by the Netherlands, Finland, 
the United Kingdom, Austria, France, Germany and 
Belgium. All Southern European countries as well as 
Ireland are below the EU average. It should be noted 
that, during the period 1991-1999, divergences 
have increased. The gap between the country with 
the lowest per capita ICT spending and the highest 
spender rose from 800 to 1357 Euro in constant 
1995 prices. Scandinavia, Central European coun-
tries and Mediterranean countries form three dis-
tinct groups (see Figure 3). 
Penetration of ICT 
The US lead in the "new economy", which is knowl-
edge based, highly computerised and globally con-
nected by the Internet, is also apparent through 
indicators other than ICT expenditures. More 
Americans, both in absolute and relative terms, 
work in ICT industries like the production of chips, 
computers, software and website design. US indus-
try uses ICT services more intensively. In the US, 
more people own basic elements for using ICT 
based services, such as PCs and Internet access both 
at work and at home (see Table 1). Within Europe, 
Figure 2 ICT expenditure per capita in the Triad (Euro) 
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Figure 3 ICT expenditure per capita in the Member States of the European Union 
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Table 1 Penetration of ICT (per 100 inhabitants - 1999) 
EU  US  Japan 
Number of business PCs (1998) 
(per 100 white-collar workers) 
Number of PCs (1998) 
Internet hosts 
Mobile phone subscribers (ITU) 
60 
20 
30 
39 
118 
51 
120 
31 
27 
13 
18 
45 
Sources: EITO Annual Report 1999, OECD 2000 and International Telecommunications Union. 
the Scandinavian countries are the leaders, with an 
ICT infrastructure comparable to that of the US. 
Except for mobile phones, the Southern members of 
the EU lag behind considerably. 
The evolution of ICT intensity 
ICT expenditure in relation to GDP (ITC intensity) 
rose from 4% in 1991 to 5,8% in 1999 in the EU, 
from 5,7% to 7,3% in the US and from 4,4% to 5% 
in Japan (see Figure 4). The evolution of ICT in rela­
tion to GDP reflects different patterns in the three 
geographical areas. The US has reached a peak in 
1997 (7,5%) and since then fluctuates around 7%. 
The EU followed the growth path of the US until 
1997 and is since then catching up slowly. The EU 
relative size increased from 70% of the US equiva­
lent in 1991 to 79% in 1999. During the 1990s, the 
US kept its position as the first spender in ICTs while 
Europe registered the fastest growth. Japan followed 
an upward path similar to the EU pattern but at a 
slower pace. 
Overall, in the EU countries there is a substantial 
increase in the volumes of ICT spending. This 
growth is an indication of substantial qualitative 
transformation in the business processes in the 
European economies during the decade. In this con­
text, it is interesting to note that three-quarters of 
this increase in ICT intensity took place in the last 
four years of the period under examination. More 
promising even than the growth itself is its ongoing 
acceleration over the years. 
With respect to the percentage of GDP devoted to 
ICTs, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
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Figure 4 ICT intensity in the Triad 
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Netherlands represent the top league. Portugal and strong evidence of convergence with the rest of 
Spain follow only closely behind. Greece and Italy Europe. Continental European countries (namely 
have the smallest fractions of their GDP devoted to France, Austria, Germany and Belgium) are below 
ICTs, but they present the highest rates of growth the EU average for the ICT to GDP ratio (see 
over the period. Overall, the south of Europe shows Figure 5). 
Figure 5 ICT intensity in the Member States of the European Union 
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Impact of ICT on the economy Impact of the ICT sector 
During the 1990s, the US spent a greater share of 
GDP than Europe on ICT. This lead was more pro-
nounced in IT than in telecommunications. In any 
case, it can be concluded that the US has invested 
more than Europe in modernising business 
processes and making them more efficient and com-
petitive. ICTs do not have only efficiency-increasing 
properties. They also have the potential to bring 
about radical changes in the organisation of pro-
duction and distribution of goods and services, and 
to create new markets and business opportunities. 
The clear lead of the US economy in the application 
of ICT implies a greater potential to increase effi-
ciency. This may be the reason why macroeconomic 
effects of ICT application could first be observed in 
the US. The acceleration of total factory productivity 
growth in the US indicates that the paradox "com-
puters are everywhere except in the productivity 
numbers" probably no longer holds. 
The productivity effects of investment in ICT can 
only be reaped by further organisational changes. 
Such organisational changes are, however, often dif-
ficult to implement because different skills are 
required and rigidities may slow down the process. 
In addition, such improvements often result in bet-
ter quality and consumer satisfaction rather than in 
a measurable increase of output. That is why effects 
on productivity only emerge with sometimes con-
siderable time lags. 
This is especially true in cases where organisational 
changes depend on a cooperation among compa-
nies and between companies and private house-
holds. Taking into account such time lags and the 
fact that the necessary technical infrastructure (dif-
fusion of PCs and Internet access) has only become 
widespread recently, one can expect substantial pro-
ductivity gains for the industries applying ICT to net-
working in the near future. This constitutes a possi-
ble avenue for higher productivity growth in the EU, 
in the future. With the liberalisation of telecommu-
nications markets, and with the improvement of the 
legal framework for e-commerce, the environment 
in which European ICT industry can grasp this 
chance has been improved considerably. 
The performance of the ICT-producing industry is in 
itself a very important element of the overall impact 
of ICT on the economy. This industry is not only one 
of the largest sectors of the economy, but also one 
of the most dynamic. Analysis carried out for the 
US" indicates that, while producing about 10% of 
total US output, US ICT industry accounted between 
1995 and 1999 for about 30% of total real eco-
nomic growth, as a result of very rapid growth and 
falling prices. 
In spite of the unquestionable technological and 
market leadership of the US ICT industry and firms, 
there are however more similarities than disparities 
between the structural role of the US and European 
ICT industries in the respective economies. Both 
economies have large deficits in trade of ICT goods: 
this was 31 billion Euro in the EU (1998), and nearly 
double in the US (59 billion Euro).'
2 For both 
economies, ICT services, typically produced and 
consumed in the same geographical area, represent 
the largest part - about two thirds of the total. There 
are nevertheless clear and strong differences in the 
dynamism of the ICT industry in Europe and in the 
US. Firstly, in terms of market, the level of ICT 
expenditure, both in absolute terms and as a per-
centage of GDP, is definitely lower in Europe. 
Secondly, the slower readiness of the EU market to 
accept new products and solutions results in time 
delay in grasping the benefits, both for the users 
and the ICT industry itself. Europe has the lead, 
though, in key areas like mobile telephony and has 
the potential to reduce or even close the gap with 
the US in the forthcoming years. 
11 US Department of Commerce, (2000). 
12 The technology trade balance has limitations as a measure of ICT performance. It 
fails to account for technology transfer through consulting services, labour mobility 
and foreign direct investment. Moreover, it does not consider within-corporation 
R&D nor production in affiliated companies abroad 
-ll European competitiveness report 2000 
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Annex 2 
Recent policy developments in the area 
of competitiveness 
The following chapter aims to offer the reader a 
means of keeping abreast of key policy develop­
ments at EU level that are expected to contribute 
towards enhancing European competitiveness. It 
covers the last twelve months, and is not, of course, 
a substitute for dedicated information instruments. 
The major policy event during this period was the 
special European Council in Lisbon
1 (23-24 March 
2000), which set the European Union a new strate­
gic goal for the next decade: to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based econ­
omy in the world, capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion. Community policies that have a bearing 
upon competitiveness have started adjusting to this 
goal, thereby gradually putting this strategy into 
practice. 
From this perspective, and having now mostly 
achieved a sound and robust macro-economic foun­
dation, the emphasis of economic policy is shifting 
towards breathing more dynamism into the 
European economy. Raising the Union's growth 
potential by pressing ahead with the reforms 
needed to build efficient and integrated markets 
became an important ingredient of economic strat­
egy, as expressed in this year's Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines
2. 
The past year also saw a number of policy develop­
ments aimed at accelerating Europe's transforma­
tion into an Information Society. The eEurope initia­
tive, launched in December 1999, proposed priority 
areas for joint action by the European Commission, 
Member States and industry, with ambitious targets, 
from education to transport and from healthcare to 
the disabled. 
In support of eEurope, the Commission adopted 
more detailed policy papers in other areas. 
"Strategies for Jobs in the Information Society"
3 pro­
posed strategies for fully exploiting the employment 
potential of the Information Society, based on best 
practices already in use across the Member States. 
The proposal adjusting the employment guidelines 
to the priorities agreed upon at the Lisbon Summit 
was adopted by the Commission in September 
2000". The eLearning
5 initiative, adopted in May, 
aims to adapt Europe's education and training sys­
tems to the use of new information and communi­
cation technologies. It set specific objectives in the 
area of infrastructures and of educational and train­
ing content. 
To address the main barriers to the achievement of 
the targets of the eEurope initiative, the 
Commission launched the eEurope 2002 Action 
Plan
6, endorsed by the European Council in Santa 
Maria da Feira (19-20 June 2000). Focused on the 
Internet, the thrust of the plan is to accelerate legis­
lation and to roll out infrastructure and services 
across Europe. 
Along the same line, the Commission issued a pack­
age of legislative proposals
7 in July designed to 
strengthen competition in the electronic communi-
1 The Conclusions of European Councils can be found in: 
http://ue.eu.lnt/en/lnfo/eurocouncil/index.htm. 
2 Council Recommendation of 19.6.2000 on the Broad Guidelines of the Economic 
Policies of the Member States and the Community (2000/517/EC), JO N°L210 of 
21.8.2000. 
3 Communication from the Commission, COM(2000) 48 final of 4.2.2000. 
4 Proposal for a Council Decision on Guidelines for Member States' employment poli­
cies for the year 2001 ; COM(2000)548 - 06.09.2000. 
5 Communication from the Commission "eLearning - Designing Tomorrow's 
Education" (COM/2000/318 final). 
6 "eEurope 2002 - An Information Society for All" - Draft Action Plan prepared by the 
European Commission for the European Council in Felra (COM/2000/330 final). 
7 Six draft Directives, one draft Regulation and one Decision. For a short description 
see Press Release ΝΊΡ/00/749 of 12.7.2000. 
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cations markets in the EU and to adapt existing reg-
ulations to the requirements of the Information 
Society. The package puts particular emphasis on 
the stimulation of affordable high speed Internet 
access and proposes a new, light-touch, regulatory 
framework for telecommunications in Europe. 
The final adoption by the European Parliament of 
the Electronic Commerce Legal Framework 
Directive
8 in May 2000 constituted another major 
development in Europe's transition towards a 
knowledge based economy. The Directive brings 
providers of Information Society services, both busi-
ness to business and business to consumer, under 
the Internal Market principles of the free movement 
of services and freedom of establishment. 
The establishment of a European Research Area will 
constitute a major contribution to the Lisbon strat-
egy. Proposals to this end were put forward by the 
Commission at the beginning of the year
9. The 
Council endorsed them in June
10. 
The Internal Market constitutes one of the main 
engines of economic reform in the EU. The Internal 
Market Strategy", endorsed at the Helsinki 
European Council, outlined the strategic objectives 
for the Internal Market over the next five years and 
set up mechanisms for tracking and updating target 
actions. Enhancing the efficiency of product and 
capital markets and improving the business environ-
ment were two of its four strategic objectives. The 
2000 Review
1
2 of that programme took it a step fur-
ther by targeting specific policies necessary to 
exploit, in particular, the benefits of new technology 
and innovation, such as reaching agreement over 
the Community Patent, further liberalisation of 
energy markets, acceleration of capital and service 
markets integration, further liberalisation of public 
procurement, regulatory simplification and elimina-
tion of tax distortions. 
In the wake of Lisbon, the European Commission 
adopted a Communication setting out how 
Enterprise policy will enable European enterprises 
and entrepreneurs to respond to the challenges they 
face in the new economy. The main elements of the 
new approach are encouraging entrepreneurship 
and risk taking, fostering innovation, stimulating 
new business models in the knowledge-driven econ-
omy, getting still more from the Internal Market and 
cutting red tape. At the same time, the Commission 
put forward a proposal for a new Multi-annual 
Programme for the period 2001-2005, in support of 
the objectives of the Communication, with empha-
sis on the specific needs of small and medium-sized 
enterprises and, especially, on improving their 
access to finance. The identification and dissemina-
tion of best practice constitutes an essential compo-
nent of the approach. The framework for Enterprise 
policy was further reinforced by the adoption of the 
European Charter for Small Enterprises by the 
Council.
1
3 
A separate Communication
1
4 by the Commission 
fleshed out the Innovation pillar of Enterprise policy. 
It proposes five priority objectives for public action: 
coherence of innovation policies, a regulatory 
framework conducive to innovation, encouraging 
the creation and growth of innovative enterprises, 
improving key interfaces in the innovation system 
and a society that is open to innovation. The 
Commission articulates these objectives via recom-
mendations addressed to the Member States and 
actions to be implemented under its own responsi-
bilities. 
8 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8.6.2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic com-
merce, in the Internal Market ("Directive on Electronic Commerce"), JO NT178 of 
17.7.2000. 
9 "Towards a European Research Area", Communication from the Commission, 
COM(2000) 6 final, Ì8.1.2000. 
10 Council (Research) Resolution of 15.6.2000, see Press Release N°9411/00 
11 "The Strategy for Europe's Internal Market", Communication from the Commission, 
COM(1999) 464 final of 5.10.1999. 
12 "2000 Review of the Internal Market Strategy", Communication from the 
Commission. COM(2000) 257 final of 3.5.2000. 
13 Adopted by the Council on 13.6.2000, annexed to the Conclusions of the European 
Council in Feira. 
14 "Innovation in a knowledge-driven economy", Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2000)567 final - 20.09.2000. 
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Structural change 
in the European economy 
Competitiveness depends crucially on the speed at 
which production reacts to changes in demand or 
to changes in the comparative advantages of a 
country. The 1999 Competitiveness Report pointed 
out that adaptability might be more important for 
growth than the degree of specialisation and its 
change over time. This chapter evaluates the ability 
of countries to adapt to new opportunities by meas­
uring the change in the production structure 
between 1980 and 1997. It also presents specific 
indicators that measure the importance of industry 
shifts across factor input classes, across skill classes 
and across service input classes.' 
1 This chapter is based on Aiginger (2000). 
Ί. Measuring structural 
change 
As is usual for complex processes, it is difficult to 
measure structural adaptability by simple indicators. 
An indicator of the overall structural change for each 
country has been constructed by summing the 
absolute changes in the value added shares of each 
sector. This indicator would be zero if no industry 
changed its share of total value added, and increases 
the more industries change their relative position. 
Clearly, this is but an imperfect indicator of adapt­
ability since, for instance, a high speed of change 
may be due to deterioration in a country's compet­
itiveness, (see Box 2.1). 
Box 2.1 Measuring structural change: the speed of change 
The sum of all the differences between shares in an aggregate between two given years (1980 and 1997) has been 
used as an indicator of structural change. Each change contributes to this indicator, independently of its direction (plus 
or minus) and independently of whether it originates from mature or dynamic industries. The variable used is nomi­
nal value added, and the shares are calculated as part of the total economy (macro speed of change) or of total man­
ufacturing (all other indicators). The shortcomings of this indicator should be borne in mind. Some problems relate to 
statistical issues, others to the economic content or its interpretation. 
Statistical caveats: 
• The sum of absolute changes in shares is sensitive to the degree of disaggregation. A classification with a larger 
number of classes yields a higher measured speed of change. The speed of change in Figure 2.2 has therefore been 
normalised so as to prevent the influence of differences in the number of sectors on the indicators. In particular, 
comparisons across countries have to be made for identically classified sectors. 
• A sector representing a small share of the total is bound to contribute less to the speed of change than a large sec­
tor. This has to be kept in mind when comparing contributions of sectors with very different sizes. For the same rea­
son, comparing contributions of a sector across countries may be misleading if the countries have very different sec­
toral structures. 
• Stochastic elements and errors in the variable give further scope for bias. Large countries will exhibit a lower value 
for this indicator than small countries, since a stochastic influence, such as the entry or exit of a firm of a given size, 
will change shares less in larger countries. Growing countries will tend to have somewhat larger stochastic changes 
than stagnating countries. 
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Economic caveats: 
• Changes in the share of an industry can have different causes and are of varying importance for long-term com­
petitiveness. Changes coming from firms that are losing competitiveness in a mature industry will have a different 
impact, compared to changes coming from firms that are switching into dynamic, innovative industries. While no 
direct distinction is made here between positive and destructive changes, a suggestion is nevertheless made as to 
the direction of change and its importance for long-term competitiveness by stressing changes according to factor 
inputs, skills and service content. 
• Adaptability is a complex process, where the speed of change of shares can highlight only one aspect. A more com­
prehensive picture would require an investigation of the entry and exit process and the financing of small, high-
risk, high-growth firms. Finally, any proof or hints that speed of change and competitiveness or growth are inter­
related - be it suggested by graphs or econometrically by correlations and regressions - involve problems. The main 
problem is that of causality, since we expect that growth needs adaptability but measured speed of change is higher 
if growth accelerates (two-way causality). With these reservations in mind, this indicator can still be used to provide 
information about an important characteristic of economies. 
2. Macro speed of change 
compared across Member 
States 
The first evaluation relates to structural change 
across 25 broad sectors, including agriculture, 
industry (manufacturing, construction and energy) 
and services (Table 2.1). The macro speed of change 
- as we call the dynamics of change at this rather 
aggregated level - was considerable between 1980 
and 1997. 
Figure 2.1 shows the contributions of the agricul­
ture, industry and services sectors to overall struc­
tural change. Approximately one half of the change 
occurred in the service sector, while the lion's share 
of the other half took place in industry. The change 
in agriculture - a decline in all countries - averaged 
less than one tenth of the total change, but with 
very large differences between countries. In Greece, 
the agricultural share contracted by 9 percentage 
points and in Ireland and Portugal by 6 percentage 
points each, although these three countries con-
Table 2.1 Macrc 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
EU 
Note: For the definition of ' 
ι speed of change 
Macro 
speed 
of change 
1980-1997 
22.6 
16.9 
27.1 
39.5 
24.3 
22.7 
37.8 
28.5 
46.5 
20.4 
25.3 
34.3 
29.4 
21.8 
29.5 
21.4 
'Macro speed of change", sei 
Source: WIFO calculations using National accounts ESA. 1 
1980-1997 
Agriculture 
1980 
2.2 
5.5 
2.1 
17.3 
6.9 
4.5 
11.7 
5.8 
2.4 
3.7 
4.6 
10.0 
9.7 
3.5 
1.7 
4.0 
: Box 2.1. 
iUROSTAT. 
1997 
1.2 
3.2 
1.0 
8.1 
3.3 
2.4 
4.5 
2.7 
0.8 
3.0 
1.4 
4.1 
4.1 
1.8 
1.5 
2.1 
Shares of CDP 
1980 
35.3 
28.7 
42.7 
30.4 
38.0 
35.5 
38.8 
39.6 
37.6 
34.0 
37.7 
37.8 
37.8 
31.7 
42.1 
38.7 
Industry 
1997 
28.8 
27.2 
31.8 
23.0 
31.1 
27.5 
40.9 
31.1 
21.1 
28.5 
32.3 
33.6 
31.6 
28.9 
31.6 
30.4 
1980 
62.5 
65.8 
55.2 
52.3 
55.1 
60.0 
49.5 
54.5 
60.0 
62.3 
57.7 
52.2 
52.5 
64.8 
56.2 
57.3 
Services 
1997 
70.0 
69.6 
67.2 
68.9 
65.6 
70.1 
54.6 
66.3 
78.1 
68.5 
66.3 
62.3 
64.2 
69.3 
66.9 
67.5 
Growth p.a. 
1980-1997 
Total 
economy 
nominal 
terms 
5.5 
6.7 
6.2 
6.7 
6.8 
5.7 
10.0 
6.9 
9.0 
5.8 
7.2 
9.3 
6.0 
4.8 
6.5 
6.3 
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Figure 2.1 Contributions to macro speed of 
change, 1980-1997 
α Services □ Industry ■ Agriculture 
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Source: WIFO calculations using National Accounts ESA, EUROSTAT. 
tinue to hold the largest shares of agriculture. In the 
Netherlands and Ireland, structural change in indus-
try is higher than that in services. In Austria, 
Portugal, Finland and Sweden, structural change in 
services is double that in industry. These are all small 
countries, with high growth, which are situated at 
the periphery of the EU. Austria, Finland and 
Sweden were not yet members at the beginning of 
the period analysed. 
The macro speed of change is highest in Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal, partly because of the large 
decrease in the share of agriculture. However, these 
countries are also amongst the top four in terms of 
speed of change in services. Ireland exhibits the 
highest speed of change within the industrial sector, 
while the slowest change occurred in France, Italy 
and the United Kingdom. Germany shows a rather 
large degree of change in broad sectors, with serv-
ices making a strong contribution, while the speed 
of change in industry (and specifically manufactur-
ing) has been lower. 
Among the 25 sectors, the greatest change is the 
increase in "market services", the share of which 
increased by about one quarter for the EU. In the 
industrial sector, the largest changes are the drop in 
the value added share of the construction industry, 
and, within manufacturing, that of the textile indus-
try. 
If competitiveness depends on the ability of produc-
tive systems to adapt to new opportunities, and if 
the speed of change indicator is a good measure of 
this ability, one should expect to find a positive link 
between growth rates and this indicator. Indeed, 
correlation analysis indicates that macro growth is 
significantly related to the macro speed of change. 
Growth is higher in countries where the industry 
share is larger and the service share is smaller, 
although this relation is not significant. Further-
more, the result is a corollary of the catching-up 
process. Growth is significantly related to the speed 
of change within industry, not to the speed of 
change within services.
2
 
3. Industrial change and input 
use 
Structural change within the industrial sector was 
evaluated by computing the speed of change at the 
level of 93 industries over the period 1985-1998. 
The absolute differences of value added shares 
between these years are summarised as the "indus-
try speed of change".
3
 
The industry speed of change is lower in Europe 
than in Japan and the US. The indicator is 17.9 for 
Europe, 19.1 for Japan and 19.3 for the US.
4 This 
suggests that structural change in Europe may be 
insufficient, a situation that has been analysed, with 
regard to specialisation and concentration patterns, 
in last year's report.
5
 
There are some limitations to assessing the level of 
structural change by a single indicator. A changing 
structure can be the result of firms' strategies to 
restructure into dynamic and promising industries 
or of a loss of competitiveness by existing firms. 
Assessing the adaptability of supply to demand 
requires a more comprehensive evaluation of eco-
nomic activity and a link to policy factors. This is 
done by investigating structural change according 
to the main input factor used, according to skill 
classes and according to the type of services used. 
These three additional indicators of structural 
change hint at the sources and directions of change. 
2 Correlation can reveal relations but cannot detect causalities. The rank correlation 
between the macro speed of change and the growth of value added for all sectors 
is 0.64. Growth is correlated closely with changes in agriculture (R= 0.60) and indus-
try (R=0.59), and less with changes in the service sectors (R=0.29). The first two 
relationships are statistically significant by usual statistical standards. 
3 This is calculated for manufacturing industries (NACE 15-36) excluding construction 
and energy. 
4 For Japan andtheUSthe data end in 1997. 
5 Alginger (1999), Alginger et al. (1999), European Commission (1999), Peneder 
(2000). 
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Figure 2.2 Speed of change according to the level of aggregation (normalised) 
El Macro speed of change 
D Industry speed of change 
^ Speed of change across factor inputs 
Speed of change across skill classes 
■ Speed of change across service input classes 
?..Q 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
S NL DK 
Note: Countries are ranked according to macro speed of change. Values are divided by the mean to allow comparability. 
Source: WIFO calculations, using EUROSTAT, National accounts ESA for macro speed of change, SBS for industry speed, WIFO typology for industry types. 
Figure 2.2 shows the position of each country with 
respect to each of the five structural change indica-
tors. The second column shows the speed of change 
in manufacturing. The third column shows the 
speed of change according to factor inputs.
6 The 
next column concentrates on change in skill classes' 
and the final bar shows how structure changed 
across service input classes.
8
 
These indicators are neutral between losses and 
gains in the specific sectors, nevertheless, in the 
examples mentioned below, the increased share of 
technology driven industries, of high skill industries 
and of industries relying on knowledge-based serv-
ices dominates the picture. Thus allowing, to some 
extent, to identify the speed of change with the 
changes most favourable for long term competitive-
ness.
9 
6 This indicator uses WIFO Industrial taxonomy I, which classifies industries into 5 
groups: advertising intensive (marketing driven), research intensive (technology 
driven), labour intensive, capital intensive and a fifth residual class (mainstream 
Industries) with no particular reliance on any of the previous input variables, see 
European Commission (1999). 
7 This indicator uses WIFO taxonomy II, which classifies industries according to their 
labour-skill requirements, see European Commission (1999). 
8 This indicator uses a new taxonomy developed for this year's Report, which classi-
fies Industries according to their demand Intensity of different service inputs. This 
taxonomy comprises 4 groups of Industries: transport services intensive, retail and 
advertising intensive, knowledge-based services intensive and a fourth residual 
group with no particular reliance on any type of services, see chapter 4. 
9 For information on the direction of change see Aiginger (2000). 
The industry speed of change is highest in Greece, 
followed by Ireland and Portugal. Finland is again 
very close to the top three. Germany, France and 
Italy exhibit the slowest speed of change. The rela-
tionship between "macro speed of change" and 
"industry speed of change" is fairly close; the great-
est differences are the slower speed of change for 
Germany and the higher ranks for Denmark and 
Austria at the industry level. 
Among the countries undergoing rapid change, 
Greece and Portugal still have a high share of 
labour intensive industries. Speed of change 
according to input factors and service types is lower 
than macro speed of change. Ireland is a long way 
ahead in terms of speed of change in industry 
types, since it has been shifting resources from 
labour intensive into research intensive industries. 
Portugal and Greece did change their share in 
broad sectors, but did not achieve a large increase 
in technology oriented industries. Sweden and 
Finland outperformed all other countries in their 
ability to increase their shares of technological 
industries, hinting at the importance of technology 
policy and successful firm clusters in the field of 
information technologies. Finland, Sweden, Ireland, 
and also the Netherlands shifted their structure 
towards industries that make intensive use of 
knowledge-based services. 
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Table 2.2 Speed of change in manufacturing according to industries and industry types, 
1985-1998 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
EU excl. Lux. 
Industry speed Speed of Speed of Speed of change Growth of 
of change change across change across across service manufacturing" 
(93 industries) factor inputs skill classes input classes 
26.3 
36.7 
23.7 
56.0 
29.6 
23.3 
46.3 
22.2 
29.8 
39.7 
44.3 
43.0 
34.6 
23.1 
34.2 
7.2 
8.9 
6.1 
16.0 
10.3 
4.7 
23.8 
6.2 
10.0 
11.0 
9.0 
23.3 
18.2 
11.0 
11.8 
11.9 
4.8 
5.3 
21.3 
13.8 
7.3 
34.1 
5.1 
11.6 
22.8 
15.4 
19.1 
11.9 
3.0 
13.4 
15.2 
8.8 
2.2 
11.0 
2.9 
7.9 
21.8 
1.4 
15.3 
6.8 
10.4 
19.5 
17.3 
7.5 
3.6 
4.2 
4.8 
3.9 
3.3 
4.7 
3.0 
7.9 
3.8 
4.9 
5.7 
8.2 
3.1 
0.9 
3.1 
3.8 
a Annual growth rate of nominal value added. 
Source: WIFO calculations using SBS, EUROSTAT. 
How is growth in manufacturing related to these 
indicators of specific industrial structure? Data 
analysis shows that growth is higher in countries 
with a large share of advertising intensive industries. 
It is also stronger in countries in which the share of 
low-skill industries decreased and higher where the 
share of high-skill industries increased (see 
Table 2.2). This could hint that part of the growth 
potential, as well as part of broad structural change, 
represents the catching-up process of countries with 
a formerly large share in the agricultural sector and 
reliance on less qualified labour. Furthermore, 
growth is related to changes in the skills of workers 
in manufacturing, and increases as the share of high 
skilled employees rises and the share of untrained 
workers declines. The highest speed of change in 
skill classes is observed in Ireland, followed by 
Austria. Both countries have experienced high rates 
of growth, indicating the close relationship between 
the quality of factor inputs and growth. 
4. Summary 
The economic environment affecting firms has 
changed dramatically over the past two decades. 
We have seen that growth is related to the speed of 
change, both at the macro-level and at the level of 
manufacturing. Growth is further stimulated if 
research intensity, skills and the use of knowledge 
intensive services are high and rising. The speed of 
adjustment to a changing economic environment, 
as well as the use of inputs specifically important for 
growth, are, therefore, crucial for competitiveness. 
Comparisons between Europe, the US and Japan 
have suggested that change in European manufac-
turing may not have been fast enough in relation to 
changes in demand and technology. This may be 
one factor explaining the deterioration in Europe's 
competitive position relative to the US. 
Adaptability, rather than structural change per se, is 
important for competitiveness. Policies generally 
believed to promote adaptability cover a large spec-
trum of fields such as access to finance, human 
resources and innovation. Mobilising financial 
resources for new, fast growing firms, fostering 
innovation in new technologies, intensifying train-
ing, retraining and education, upgrading quality 
and promoting knowledge-based services are 
among the policy measures most called for in this 
context. A prerequisite for the success of such meas-
ures is, however, an economic framework for busi-
ness that is conducive to innovation, change and 
growth. This implies, in particular, open markets for 
goods and services, flexible labour and capital mar-
kets, a regulatory framework that enhances innova-
tion and a system of taxes and social security contri-
butions that encourages entrepreneurship. 
51 European competitiveness report 2000 
References 
AIGINGER, K., "Do industrial structures converge? A 
survey on the empirical literature on specialisation 
and concentration of industries", WIFO Working 
Papers, No 116, 1999. 
AIGINGER, K., BOEHEIM, M., GUGLER, K., PFAFFERMAYR, M., 
WOLFMAYR-SCHNITZER, Y., "Specialisation and (geo­
graphic) concentration of European manufactur­
ing", Working Paper, No 1, European Commission, 
DG Enterprise, 1999. 
AIGINGER, K., Speed of change, Background report, 
European Commission, DG Enterprise, 2000. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, The competitiveness of 
European Industry: 1998 Report, Luxembourg, 1998. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, The competitiveness of 
European Industry: 1999 Report, Luxembourg, 1999. 
PENEDER, M., "Intangible assets and the competitive­
ness of European industries", in BUIGUES, P., 
JACQUEMIN, Α., AND MARCHIPONT, F. (eds), 
Competitiveness and the Value of Intangible Assets, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2000. 
52 Chapter 3 - Quality-based competitiveness 
Chapter 3 
Quality-based competitiveness 
This chapter investigates how European manufac-
turing is positioned in quality competition and 
analyses differences in strategies across countries. 
The data indicate that there is no immediate danger 
of European industries losing their mostly quality-
based competitive advantages in foreign trade vis-à-
vis low cost providers. Europe has a surplus in man-
ufacturing and a large trade surplus with the 
accession countries and many emerging economies. 
Much of this surplus can be attributed to Europe's 
ability to sell goods of a higher quality. Within the 
Triad in general, it is goods of high quality that are 
traded. Europe is making progress in selling high 
quality goods and is making inroads in important 
areas, although it still has a deficit in fast moving 
industries and productivity, and a slow speed of 
change. To increase income, Europe has to boost 
quality and productivity and increases its share of 
technology driven industries.' 
Ί. Why is quality competition 
important for the EU? 
The EU is a high wage region. A substantial portion 
of high wages, as well as of the costs of the social 
security system, education, health and the environ­
ment is balanced by high productivity. Cost 
increases have been successfully curbed by increas­
ing the efficiency of institutions and markets 
through the reduction of transport costs, trade bar­
riers and currency costs. Nevertheless, cost restraints 
have a limit, and - as far as factor rewards (wages, 
profits) are concerned - to a certain extent also con­
tradict the final goal of competitiveness, namely to 
increase the welfare of European citizens. In addi­
tion, new competitors with much lower costs are 
arriving, be it the emerging economies or the acces-
1 This chapter is based on Aiginger (2000). 
sion countries. These competitors have lower 
absolute costs, and, even after correcting for pro­
ductivity differences, also generally have lower unit 
labour costs. The consequence for a high wage 
country is the need to compete on quality. Here, 
pressure from the cost side is mitigated, since high 
wage countries have a competitive advantage. 
Demand for high quality goods depends on dispos­
able income and is therefore stronger in rich coun­
tries, providing them with a first mover advantage. 
In addition, resources in research and skilled labour 
support innovation. For firms, quality competition 
has the advantage that it enables firms to remain 
competitive while keeping the margins needed for 
innovation. For countries, high wages become com­
patible with competitiveness. 
What is quality? 
Quality is a complex notion and there exists no gen­
erally accepted definition that covers all the com­
plexities of real economies. For the purposes of this 
report, a high quality product is defined as one that 
possesses one or more additional characteristics that 
are valued by buyers. The characteristics that 
increase the willingness to pay may be either physi­
cally measurable, like speed, capacity, size and dura­
bility, or they may be intangible, like reliability, 
design, goodwill and trust. Quality may also arise 
simply through flexibility in use, compatibility, main­
tenance contracts, etc. Higher quality allows for a 
higher price without losing the market. 
Quality can be upgraded through research and 
development, more or better skilled labour, more 
sophisticated material inputs or superior organisa­
tion at the plant or firm level. Marketing may 
increase the willingness to pay by providing infor­
mation about the capabilities of the product or by 
changing the tastes of consumers. Adding a further 
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Figure 3.1 Quality competition: Preconditions, types and consequences 
Economic accelerators: 
High income 
Income dispersion 
Information (about quality) 
Certificates, quality classes 
Venture capital 
Entrepreneurship 
Inputs to upgrade quality: 
R&D 
Skilled labour 
Sophisticated capital 
Information, communication technology 
Extra stage of processing 
Knowledge service input 
Political accelerators: 
Education 
Vocational training 
Continuing education 
Open markets 
Liberalisation of markets 
Absence of entry and exit barriers 
ι i 
Product quality definition: 
Good with one additional 
characteristic 
Higher value for buyers 
Quality competition strategies: 
Upgrading quality 
Increasing willingness to pay 
Not focussing on low price 
Related strategies: 
Cost reduction through 
productivity increases 
High margins through market power 
Firm specific strategic advantages 
• I \ 
Types of quality: 
Durability 
Reliability 
Sophistication 
Compatibility 
Servicing 
User specificity 
Flexibility in use 
Marketing/goodwill 
Information content 
Indicators: 
High share of new products 
High unit value 
High income, low price elasticity 
High shares of R&D, skills, knowledge 
Consequence for market (structure): 
Low price sensitivity 
High profits (margins) 
High income elasticity 
Competitiveness of high wages producers 
Limited number of competitors 
stage of processing usually increases the quality of 
the product.
2 Submitting to certifications, setting 
standards and benchmarking are other techniques 
of upgrading the quality of processes and products. 
The inputs that help to upgrade quality, the eco­
nomic and political accelerators, the indicators that 
signal quality and the consequences for market 
structure are summarised in Figure 3.1. 
Quality and profitability are closely related, insofar 
as the quality of products will usually raise prof­
itability, both by decreasing the competitive pres­
sure and by increasing the willingness to pay. The 
quality of products should be reflected in the profits 
and specifically in the persistence of supernormal 
profits.
3 
A further stage of processing can result from combining hardware with software or 
a tangible product with a service or information. 
If the market is not regulated or characterised by entry barriers, each advantage of 
a specific firm will be contested rapidly by other firms. Only firms which can consis­
tently upgrade quality or which possess a specific non-imitable advantage can 
accrue higher profits in the long run. 
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Higher quality is a necessary precondition for high 
cost producers to stay competitive. It may be possi­
ble to cope with higher wages by increasing pro­
ductivity but, since technology and managerial skills 
are also spreading due to the investment of multi­
national firms, this strategy is not always feasible. 
Producing higher quality is an alternative as well as 
a complement to higher productivity. However, this 
strategy is easier in those industries, in which buyers 
differentiate between quality types while there are 
other markets in which price competition is the 
prime competitive mode. We define as "quality 
competition" a competitive environment in which 
upgrading quality, and increasing the willingness to 
pay, is important relative to competing at low 
prices. Quality sensitive industries are those in which 
quality upgrading rather than low prices defines the 
competitive edge. 
For the data used In this report, it is the gross value of exports or imports in Euro 
divided by kilogram. 
The advantages of the indicator, its limits, existing statistical problems and the rela­
tion of unit values to other concepts are discussed in Aiginger (2000). 
This analysis focus on manufacturing, since the methods used to differentiate 
between high quality and high costs rely on the ability to measure the product phys­
ically (by weight). 
This range of ten to one is much higher than that for per capita GDP, which differs 
by less than three to one between European countries. 
2. Is Europe a provider of 
quality? A contested quality 
premium 
The most comprehensive measure of quality avail­
able for empirical research is the "unit value". The 
unit value is defined as nominal value divided by 
physical volume.
4 Increases in unit values may be 
due to rising demand or to rising costs. But they also 
reflect changes in quality, shifts to higher price seg­
ments and to more specific value-enhancing fea­
tures. Unit values as indicators of quality have been 
widely used in industry studies for assessing qualita­
tive competitiveness and for discriminating between 
different components of intra-industry trade.
5 
Unit values differ widely across Europe 
Figure 3.2 shows that unit values of exports in man­
ufacturing
6 vary between 5.5 Euro/kg in Ireland and 
0.43 Euro/kg in Greece (for 1998).
7 This high ampli­
tude can be attributed to the combined result of the 
specialisation of countries in particular industries 
and the position of countries in price segments 
within the individual industries. Countries specialis­
ing in capital intensive industries and in less 
Figure 3.2 Export unit value in member countries, 1988 and 1998 
1988  '1998 
Greece 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Finland ι 
Ireland 
United Kingdom 
Germany 
^ France 
- i Italy 
Spain  Denmark 
Portugal  Austria 
Sweden 
Source: WIFO calculations using COMEXT, EUROSTAT. 
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processed goods have lower unit values than coun­
tries with high shares in technology driven industries 
and in upper price segments within industries. 
Ireland combines a high share of technology driven 
industries (60% of exports) with 78% positioning in 
the highest price segment (see section 4 for a defi­
nition of price segments). The UK achieves the sec­
ond highest export unit value, through concentra­
tion in engineering industries (technology driven 
industries and the machinery industry). Three other 
large countries follow, each having export unit val­
ues close to one another: Germany, France and Italy 
report unit values between 2.1 and 2.5 Euro/kg. 
Denmark, Austria and Sweden all hold moderate 
positions. Belgium/Luxembourg and the Nether­
lands had - together with Greece - unit values of 
about or below 2 Euro/kg in 1998. 
Greece is specialised in fairly heavy, capital intensive 
products, with lower unit values: basic metals, min­
eral products, petroleum and chemicals have unit 
values below 0.5 Euro/kg and amount to one third 
of Greek exports. In addition, 75% of these exports 
are in the medium and low price segments. The 
positions of the Netherlands and Belgium/ 
Luxembourg are also biased downward by chemi­
cals, petroleum and steel, although these countries 
have higher shares in the high price segments and 
in technology driven industries. 
In general, unit values increased over time. The 
largest increase was registered in Ireland, which was 
second to the UK in 1988 and is now the leader. 
Next in the dynamics of export unit value is 
Sweden, which doubled its export unit value, and 
shifted from the lower end of country rankings to a 
position in the middle. Greece and the Netherlands 
increased their unit values less than other countries, 
while Belgium/Luxembourg is the only area in 
which the unit value decreased in absolute terms. 
The standard deviation of unit value across countries 
also increased over the last ten years.
8 
If we compare changes in the unit value with the 
indicators of structural change from the previous 
chapter, we see that approximately the same speed 
of change between sectors (macro and industry 
speed of change) can, nevertheless, support differ­
ent strategies concerning quality position (Ireland 
vs. Greece). 
The quality premium in European exports 
European exports in manufacturing (extra-EU trade) 
amounted to 665 bn Euro in 1998 and imports to 
only 579 bn Euro. This resulted in an export surplus 
of 86 bn Euro, which is more than three times as 
high as ten years before (25 bn Euro). In 1998, the 
export surplus can be attributed to a quality 
premium in exports: the export unit value, 
2.25 Euro/kg, was 31% higher than the import unit 
8 Unit value is higher in the Northern countries as compared to the Southern coun­
tries, due to the positions of Ireland and the UK. It does not differ between the core 
and periphery or between high and low Income countries. This is the result of plac­
ing Ireland among the low-income countries and the fact that the positions of Spain 
and Portugal are more favourable in this indicator due to the importance of the tex­
tile industries. It is slightly higher In large countries than in small countries. 
Figure 3.3 Creation of quality premium by selected sectors and countries, 1998, bn Euro 
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Source: WIFO calculations using COMEXT, EUROSTAT. 
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Figure 3.4 Regional destination of exports and quality premium, 1998, bn Euro 
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Source: WIFO calculations using COMEXT, EUROSTAT. 
value. The quality premium can be assessed by a 
hypothetical calculation: if exports were priced as 
low as imports, European exports would have 
decrease by 161 bn Euro. 
Roughly, half of this "quality premium" in European 
trade comes from specialisation in high unit value 
industries while the other half is due to higher unit 
values within the same industries. The largest part of 
the quality premium accrues from the chemical 
industry (47.5 bn Euro), followed by machinery, 
food, motor vehicles and textiles (see Figure 3.3). 
The quality premium is highest in marketing driven 
and labour intensive industries. On the contrary, in 
technology driven industries,
9 exports are valued 
15% lower than imports. Seen from the national 
perspective, 11 of the 14 countries have higher 
export unit values (in extra-EU trade); the largest dif-
ferences are for Germany, Italy, France, the United 
Kingdom and Austria. 
The premium comes from trade with non-Triad 
countries (see Figure 3.4). Export unit values are 
twice as high as the import unit values in the trade 
with accession countries and are large in trade with 
emerging countries. In trade with the US, Europe 
has a surplus, but exports are priced 12% lower 
than imports. Half of this bilateral trade is in tech-
9 WIFO taxonomy, see European Commission (1999). 
nology driven industries where the unit value of 
European exports is 40% lower than that of imports 
from the US. In 47 out of 93 industries, European 
exports are more highly valued, specifically in labour 
intensive and marketing driven industries. However, 
these two groups account for only one fifth of 
exports. The export unit value for Europe as against 
Japan is only half of the import unit value. This is due 
to the extreme concentration of Japanese exports in 
industries with high unit values (e.g. engineering 
industries). 
Compared to 1988, the ratio of export unit value to 
import unit values for European manufacturing was 
lower in 1998, and hence the relative premium fell 
from 68% to 31%. This mirrors the catching- up 
process, for example, of the accession countries, 
whose export unit value is now about half of 
Europe's, while ten years earlier it was only one fifth. 
On the other side of the quality spectrum, the US 
has increased its unit value more than Europe in 
bilateral trade, while Europe has reduced a small 
part of its large trade gap with Japan. 
Unit values are a comprehensive primary indicator 
of quality but must be complemented with data on 
the structure of industries, the position within indus-
tries, the nature and quality of inputs, as well as 
patents, certificates or shares of differentiated prod-
ucts as indicators of the quality of outputs. The next 
sections deal with these issues. 
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3. Quality sensitivity 
The importance of quality competition differs across 
industries. In homogeneous markets, consumers 
and firms buy the goods from the cheapest source; 
any firm which undercuts the price will boost 
demand for its products (demand is price elastic). 
On the contrary, in heterogeneous markets, goods 
are differentiated by locations and product charac-
teristics. The heterogeneity may come from a variety 
of tastes or specific demand characteristics. If prices 
are important in an industry, countries with high 
prices should sell small quantities and those with 
low prices should sell large quantities. On the other 
hand, if countries charge high prices and are never-
theless able to sell large quantities, the product must 
have some specificities (design, service, reliability 
etc.) which create a willingness to pay. Here, this 
simple idea is applied to the existing trade data and 
industries are split into three groups: group one, in 
which quality is revealed to play an important role 
(high revealed quality elasticity, RQE); group two, 
with moderate quality elasticity and group three, in 
which price dominates (low RQE). For the method 
applied, see Box 3.1. 
In the majority of industries, price competition dom-
inates. The range of our indicator is between 25% in 
the cement industry and 53.5% in general purpose 
machinery (see Fig. 3.5). This means that in the 
cement industry 25% of bilateral relations in the 
reporting countries are not dominated by price. In 
general purpose machinery (a still heterogeneous 
sub-industry of the machinery sector), a slight 
majority of bilateral trade relations is dominated by 
quality. 
Many of the industries in which quality dominates 
are engineering industries, such as machinery, 
equipment, instruments, motor vehicles and others. 
Of the 11 technology driven industries, 8 fall into 
the high RQE category. RQE is 42.7% in this group. 
The three research-intensive industries not classified 
as quality elastic are computers, audio and video 
apparatus and electronic components. The com-
mon characteristic of these three industries is that 
they have reached the stage of development in 
which the production of standard products has, to a 
large extent, been shifted to low cost suppliers,
1
0 
and price competition increases for the best selling 
products. These industries are characterised by high 
globalisation and a fairly low share of intra-EU 
imports. Fourteen of the 23 marketing driven indus-
tries are revealed to be quality elastic, while only 
four are revealed to be price elastic. Quality is 
revealed to be of greatest importance in footwear, 
games and toys, tobacco and watches. 
At the bottom end of the list - industries revealed as 
price elastic - are capital intensive industries: con-
crete, cement, steel, mineral products and sawmills 
rank as the bottom five. Of the 11 capital-intensive 
industries, only one (motor vehicle parts) is revealed 
as quality elastic. 
10 This does not mean that the bulk of research and product development and the pro-
duction of new products do not remain in high-income countries. 
Box 3.1 Classifying industries according to Revealed Quality Elasticity (RQE) 
The following method has been used to gain information about the relative role of quality and prices. Industries in 
which higher prices (higher unit values in exports relative to imports) are associated with lower quantities (lower 
exported quantities relative to imported quantities) are revealed to be price elastic. Industries in which the signs of 
(net) prices and (net) quantities are the same are revealed to be quality elastic. The signs are calculated for the bilat-
eral trade of the EU Member States vis-å-vis thirty countries (including the EU members, the US, Japan, 8 emerging 
countries and 6 accession countries) in 1998. The share of identical signs indicates the importance of quality. The 
revealed quality elasticity (RQE) indicator can theoretically lie between 100 (all bilateral relations of prices and quanti-
ties have an identical sign) and 0 (all have opposite signs). Empirically, the indicator ranges from 53.5% to 25.0%. 
The indicator is fairly smooth, in the sense that there seems to be no critical value separating different modes. Exactly 
one third of the industries are grouped into a category which is called industries with "high Revealed Quality Elasticity" 
(high RQE, for short), one third into a middle category (medium RQE or moderately price elastic industries) and the 
last 31 industries into a price elastic group (low RQE). The cut-off points are 42.3% between high and medium and 
34.5% between medium and low. These cut-off points are determined according to the symmetry in the number of 
industries in each category and have no intrinsic interpretation. Subtracting the share of price elastic industries from 
that of quality elastic industries yields a balance indicator (net RQE = high RQE - low RQE). The indicator is derived 
from export data, but is used to characterise the competitive mode, typical for all sales. 
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Figure 3.5 The importance of quality in different industries: Revealed Quality Elasticity (RQE) 
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Note: For the definition of RQE, see Box 3.1. 
Source: WIFO calculations using COMEXT, EUROSTAT. 
For labour intensive industries, a slight majority is 
classified as price elastic. Of the 22 labour intensive 
industries, nine fall into the low RQE sector. Some of 
these are from the textile sector, and some from 
industries that produce building materials with high 
labour cost shares. Labour intensive industries that 
produce metal-based investment goods (machine 
tools, motor parts) are classified as high RQE 
industries.'
1 
Industry characteristics and the 
competitive mode (quality vs. price) 
Theory predicts that quality competition will be 
more important for more sophisticated products, for 
higher product differentiation, for industries with 
sunk costs and for industries under high pressure 
from globalisation. Rank correlations'
2 are used to 
show whether the industries revealed as quality sen-
sitive fit these expectations. 
The strongest correlation exists between RQE and 
the degree of product sophistication, as measured 
by unit value (see Figure 3.6). Also significant is the 
relationship to product differentiation.'
3 Quality 
competition is also positively related to the degree 
of globalisation.'
4 This is partly due to the fact that 
highly globalised industries are dominated by qual-
ity competition (games and toys, watches, instru-
ments), but even more to the fact that capital inten-
sive industries with high transport costs (like 
cement, bricks, glass, furniture and domestic appli-
ances) are dominated by price competition. 
Industries classified as sensitive to Internal Market 
effects are dominated by quality competition.'
5 
11 For a classification of industries according to competitive mode and taxonomy 
classes see Aiginger (2000), chapter 4 and European Commission (1998). 
12 Rank correlations are more robust since some variables are considerably skewed. 
It must be stressed that correlation reveals whether phenomena are related, but 
does not impose a direction of causality. 
13 Three Indicators of product differentiation were tested. The first indicator calculates 
the standard deviation of export unit values of each 3-dlgit industry across the 14 
member countries. This indicator represents the model according to which each 
country could be considered as one firm, each producing a different quality of, say, 
steel. This standard deviation measures the width of the vertical differentiation. The 
second indicator calculates the standard deviation across 6-digit products within an 
industry. This indicator assumes that the EU is one large region producing many dif-
ferent products in a specific industry, maybe in decentralised plants. The third indi-
cator combines both aspects and calculates the standard deviation across countries 
and product groups. It combines aspects of geographical and product specific het-
erogeneity. 
14 Globalisation or openness is defined as the share of imports plus exports to value 
added in the Triad (as a proxy for production). 
15 Beverages and pharmaceuticals are highly differentiated Industries and had lower 
trade volumes than typical capital intensive Industries like pulp and paper, and steel, 
in which trade surged during the first stage following the elimination of customs. 
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Figure 3.6 Determinants of the importance of quality competition (RQE) 
Unit value exports 
Product differentiation 1 
Product differentiation 2 
Product differentiation 3 
R&D intensity 
Advertising intensity 
Labour intensity 
Capital intensity 
High globalisation (Openness) 
Single market sensitivity 
High skill share 
Low skill share 
Productivity 
Wages/employee 
-0.4  -0.3  -0.2  -0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6 
Note: Rank correlations with RQE Indicators; R=0.1 73 (resp. 0.250) denotes 90% (resp. 95% ) degree of significance. 
Source: WIFO calculations using EUROSTAT. 
A positive relationship between quality competition 
and research and skill inputs exists, but is not 
significant.'
6 Price competition is higher than might 
be expected in capital intensive sectors. 
It is equally interesting to see which industry char-
acteristics are not related to the indicator on quality 
competition. First and foremost, there is no smooth 
relationship between the importance of quality and 
productivity or high wages. The reason for this is 
that quality is related to skills, particularly in research 
intensive industries. However, value added per hour 
and wages per employee are also high in capital 
intensive industries, in which price competition is of 
significant importance. Cement, steel and basic 
chemicals are industries with high wages, but which 
are classified as price elastic.
1
7 
16 As far as research is concerned, audio video apparatus, office machinery and 
valves are research Intensive but price elastic, while some textile products, as well 
as tobacco and pesticides, are revealed as quality elastic but have low research 
Inputs. High skill industries in which price competition is of great importance are 
office machinery and weapons and ammunition. Low skill Industries in which quality 
is of great importance are certain food industries and some textile industries (in 
which fashion, as well as reprocessing, plays a leading role). 
17 In addition, the - possibly misleading - classification of certain textile Industries as 
high quality industries prevents a closer relationship, since these products are pro-
duced on cheap wages In low productivity plants. 
Europe's trade surplus comes from quality 
sensitive industries 
The total trade surplus of the EU comes from the 
quality elastic sector. This total trade surplus was 
1 34 bn Euro in 1998. The sector of quality sensitive 
industries created a surplus of 149 bn Euro, while 
trade in moderately price elastic industries was 
balanced. In price elastic industries, the EU suffered 
a trade deficit of 18 bn Euro. Thus, the surplus in 
quality competition covered the deficit in price 
elastic industries and created a trade surplus 
(see Table 3.1). 
Differences across countries 
The positions of countries differ according to their 
individual income positions, competitive advantages 
and industry structures. 
Germany and France have an overall trade surplus, 
which is completely attributable to surpluses in the 
high RQE sectors, with deficits or balanced trade in 
the others. In both countries, the car industry makes 
a significant contribution to this surplus. In 
Germany, machinery is the next largest sector, dom-
inated by quality competition; aircraft and bever-
ages assume the corresponding position in France. 
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Table 3.1 Trade be 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
EU 
Source: WIFO calculations using 
ilance, mi 
High RQE 
3882.6 
291.7 
60300.3 
-2255.3 
-3733.7 
5481.6 
490.7 
13819.5 
-4027.1 
-3592.4 
-1902.6 
-794.2 
-2262.3 
-11 764.6 
53934.2 
o Euro 
Medium 
RQE 
-518.4 
2388.9 
16223.5 
-2793.9 
-3961.1 
-9221.3 
2994.5 
-623.0 
5227.4 
-1182.8 
-2038.4 
-2552.1 
-1688.3 
-10505.9 
-8250.9 
COMEXT, EUROSTAT. 
1988 
Low RQE 
1944.1 
-3493.4 
8794.8 
-1315.4 
-1032.7 
-8103.3 
-630.5 
-8211.7 
-546.8 
875.8 
-143.5 
3935.9 
6023.2 
-21754.9 
-23658.4 
Total 
balance 
5308.3 
-812.8 
85318.6 
-6364.5 
-8727.4 
-11842.9 
2854.7 
4984.8 
653.5 
-3899.4 
-4084.5 
589.7 
2072.6 
-44025.4 
22025.3 
High RQE 
3374.0 
297.5 
96192.9 
-7541.1 
-5059.4 
23573.5 
7341.8 
30686.8 
-590.1 
-2774.1 
-3922.2 
11380.7 
2678.8 
-7120.4 
148518.8 
1998 
Medium 
RQE 
3145.5 
3760.8 
-3055.9 
-3798.4 
-2756.6 
-1491.0 
6746.8 
17404.1 
6790.3 
-3088.3 
-3690.7 
-3400.2 
-1420.3 
-11832.4 
3313.8 
Low RQE 
5458.6 
-3995.0 
1111.1 
-2745.5 
-4384.3 
-8597.0 
3919.2 
-7128.8 
672.0 
-740.7 
-1104.0 
7275.8 
11773.4 
-19501.0 
-17986.1 
Total 
balance 
11978.0 
63.3 
94248.2 
-14085.0 
-12200.3 
13485.4 
18007.7 
40962.2 
6872.2 
-6603.0 
-8716.9 
15256.3 
13031.9 
-38453.7 
133846.4 
Ireland enjoys a surplus, which is roughly the same 
in high and medium quality industries. 
Belgium/Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Denmark had a trade surplus in 1998, but are spe-
cialised in industries with medium or high price elas-
ticity. The UK has a deficit in all three sectors, the 
smallest in the quality sensitive sector, the highest in 
the price sensitive sector. All four are thus specialised 
in quality sensitive industries. 
Spain, Portugal, Austria and Greece have deficits in 
all three sectors, with the highest deficit in industries 
in which quality competition is important (in the 
case of Austria, in the moderate price sensitive sec-
tor). 
Sweden and Finland enjoy surpluses in the high and 
low quality sectors, but have less favourable posi-
tions in the moderately price elastic industries. While 
Finland has its largest surplus in the price sensitive 
industries (due to its pulp and paper industries), 
Sweden has its greatest surplus in the quality sensi-
tive industries (telecom apparatus). 
Increasing surplus, slightly converging 
structure 
Between 1988 and 1998, Europe's overall trade 
surplus increased from 22 bn Euro to 1 34 bn Euro. 
The lion's share came from the increase in the 
surplus of the high RQE sector from 53.9 bn Euro to 
148 bn Euro. The deficit in the low RQE sector was 
reduced, and a small deficit in the medium RQE sec-
tor turned into a small surplus. The most significant 
switch towards the high quality sector occurred in 
Ireland and Spain, while the trade surplus in the 
quality sector decreased in Belgium/Luxembourg 
and Italy. Sweden decreased its specialisation in the 
price intensive sector most sharply, followed by 
Austria and Finland. All three contributed to a 
decline in the country differences according to this 
indicator. 
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4. Within-industry quality 
Upgrading quality within industries 
In the previous section, industries were classified 
according to their sensitivity to quality and price, as 
if the competitive mode were predetermined. 
According to this concept, quality upgrading 
requires a switch to other industries - inter-industry 
upgrading. An alternative strategy for firms is to 
move into the highest price segment within a given 
industry. This can be achieved through a further 
stage of processing, or by offering a service or a new 
design which makes the product distinguishable 
from that of competitors. This strategy of intra-
industry upgrading may involve lower costs and a 
lighter burden of structural change, since it can be 
performed within existing firms, often with the 
existing labour force, management and goodwill. 
The quality level of an industry is revealed by its 
position within price segments. 
This section considers whether countries are special-
ising in the high, medium or low price segments, 
and how specialisation in these segments has 
changed over time. The price segments are defined 
for very detailed industries, using import prices as 
proxies for demand prices. The boundaries between 
18 In contrast to the method of RQE, which fixes the competitive mode of industries 
and is Identical for all countries, this method highlights the possibility that firms and 
countries specialise in different price segments within an industry. A firm producing 
in an industry dominated by price competition may nevertheless assume a position 
In the high price segment. 
19 Spain Is the only country in which the HPS decreased, it was also able to reduce its 
share of low quality exports, switching into the middle quality category. In 3 coun-
tries - the new members Sweden, Finland, and Austria - data on unit values, and 
therefore on price position, are not available for 1988. 
the segments are different for 1988 and 1998, but 
identical for all countries (see Box 3.2).'
8 
Export specialisation in price segments 
More than half of EU exports (51.3%) are in the 
high price segment, 30.7% in the medium segment 
and 18% in the low segment (see Figure 3.7). 
Ireland and Germany enjoy the highest share of 
exports in high quality. 78.1% of Ireland's exports 
are in the high price segment; Germany is second 
with 61.8%. Both countries exported less than 10% 
in the low segment in 1998. Sweden, Denmark and 
the United Kingdom specialised more than other 
countries in high quality. At the other end of the 
scale, only one fourth of the exports from Spain and 
Greece were in the high price segment, while more 
than one third were in the low segment. 
Belgium/Luxembourg is the second area with a 
larger amount of exports in the low price segment, 
due to its large share of capital intensive industries. 
Portugal is a country with a relatively low net 
income, but it has a surplus of high price segments 
and is in 11 '
h position according to this ranking. One 
of the reasons for this is that its exports in labour 
intensive sectors are, to a large extent, in the high 
quality sector. 
Over the past 10 years, the EU increased its share of 
high price segments for exports by 4.5% and 
decreased its share of low quality exports by 1.7%. 
All countries participated in this upgrading.'
9 The 
largest jump into the high price segment was 
achieved by Ireland, with an increase of 20.5%, and 
Box 3.2 Position in Price Segments (PPS) 
The following method is used to classify industries with respect to different price segments. The unit values are calcu-
lated for EU imports from 30 different countries (one destination, the EU, 30 sources of imports). The countries are the 
same as for the calculation of the competitive mode in the previous section. If the imports from all countries are 
reported, this results in a total of 30 import prices for each 6-digit industry. These "EU import price vectors" - one vec-
tor for each 6-digit industry comprising 30 prices - is divided into three terciles. The boundaries of the terciles define 
the segments. For example, if all 30 unit values are reported, the boundary between the low and the medium price 
segment is the interpolated value of the 21" and 20
,
h highest prices. Note that these boundaries have been calculated 
at a very disaggregated level of 1400 6-digit product groups. 
Exports (or imports) of the 30 countries are summed up for each price category. These are aggregated firstly to the 3-
digit level - at which the bulk of analyses are made - to get the shares of exports (or imports) in the price segments 
for each 3-digit industry. Then the results are added at country level, and export shares (according to price segments) 
are determined for total manufacturing for each country. All of a country's exports that are in the high price segment 
at the disaggregated level of the 1400 industries are now High Price Segment exports (HPS); the others are Medium 
Price Segment exports (MPS) and Low Price Segment exports (LPS). A country's share in the HPS minus its share in 
the LPS is called the net Position in Price Segments (net PPS = HPS - LPS). 
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Figure 3.7 Export shares in price segments 
(countries ranked according to share in high quality segment in 1998) 
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Source: WIFO calculations using COMEXT, EUROSTAT. 
a decline in the low quality sector of 1 3%. Greece 
increased its HPS and decreased its low segment 
quite significantly, although it is still the country 
with the smallest HPS. 
There is a slight indication of convergence in the 
quality position. Of the three countries with the 
least favourable position in 1988, two improved 
considerably and the other performed below aver-
age. Of the three countries with the best position in 
1988, one further improved its advantageous posi-
tion (Ireland) while the other two performed below 
average (UK, Germany). 
5. Towards a better 
understanding of 
competition in quality 
Quality competition is the result of opportunities 
and challenges. The competitive environment 
depends on the inherited industrial structure, on the 
strategic choices of firms and on the socio-political 
environment. The three quality indicators intro-
duced in the previous sections (the size of quality 
sensitive industries, the position in the price seg-
ment and unit values), highlight different aspects of 
competition in quality. In this section, quality com-
petition is related to country characteristics, such as 
per capita GDP, skills and policy indicators. 
Quality and strategy 
The indicators for the share of quality elastic indus-
tries (RQE) and for the share of exports in the upper 
price segment (PPS) highlight different strategies for 
mitigating price competition. Defining the size of 
quality sensitive industries implicitly emphasises 
structural change away from industries relying on 
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Figure 3.8 Quality strategies, 1998 
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price towards those in which quality is important. 
Alternatively, calculating the share of country 
exports in the upper price segment emphasises 
intra-industry change. A comparison of export shifts 
according to the "inter-industry" and the "intra-
industry" strategy shows similarities as well as differ-
ences in the country rankings. 
Germany is among the leading countries in quality 
competition according to both strategies (rank 2 in 
net PPS, and 1 in net RQE); Greece has a large sec-
tor of price elastic exports and is positioned in the 
lower price segments (see Figure 3.8). The largest 
difference between the two indicators exists for 
Spain, Ireland and Sweden. 
Spain has a rather high share of industries in which 
quality is important, but in general its exports are in 
the low price segment of the individual industries. 
The driving force for this dichotomy is the motor 
vehicles industry, which supplies 25% of exports. 
The motor industry is classified as quality sensitive; 
however, motor vehicles as well as parts produced in 
Spain are in the lower price range. 
Ireland's exports are positioned in the highest price 
segment in all important export industries,
2
0 and it 
enjoys the highest share in the upper price segment 
(78% of exports). Ireland achieved only an average 
position in quality elastic industries, since the com-
puter industry and audio and video apparatus are 
classified as partly sensitive to prices, and electronic 
components as very sensitive. In each of these 
industries, Ireland is again positioned in the highest 
price segment; they amount to one third of exports. 
In general, Sweden supplies goods in the high price 
segment, but capital intensive industries like pulp 
and paper, wood, steel and basic chemicals (making 
up one quarter of Swedish exports) are price elastic. 
Besides Sweden and Ireland, Austria, Denmark and 
the Netherlands are leaning towards a strategy of 
upgrading within industries. In addition to Spain, 
large shares in quality intensive industries are also 
held by France, Italy and Portugal. 
20 The position of Ireland in the high price segment is far stronger than any effect that 
could come from transfer prices alone. 
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Figure 3.9 Change in the positions, 1988 to 1998 
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Focusing on change (Figure 3.9), one can see three Country characteristics and quality 
groups: indicators 
Two countries - Ireland and Greece - increased 
their position in the price spectrum by more 
than 25 percentage points, but did not increase 
(Greece) or only slightly increased (Ireland) the 
share of industries competing in quality. 
However, intra-industry upgrading started from 
very different positions. Greece is still the coun-
try with the highest share of the low price seg-
ment, whereas Ireland has the highest share in 
the upper price segment. 
In a second group, intra-industry change domi-
nates only slightly; in the Netherlands and 
Portugal there is considerable upgrading in both 
dimensions; in Italy and Denmark developments 
are less dynamic. 
Four countries increased substantially their 
shares of quality elastic industries but improved 
only moderately their position in price segments: 
Spain, Germany, the UK and France. These are all 
large countries, three of which already had a 
large quality elastic sector in 1988. The excep-
tion is Spain, which jumped level with the EU 
average. 
Figure 3.10 illustrates which country characteristics 
are related to the different indicators of quality and 
how these indicators relate to each other. 
The unit value summarises to some extent intra-
industry and inter-industry change. It increases if 
activities shift from low unit value industries to high 
unit value industries and if countries switch into the 
high price segment. It is therefore significantly cor-
related with each of the other quality indicators, 
while these indicators themselves are not too closely 
related to each other, since they focus on different 
aspects of quality competition. 
Endowments and demanded quality rise with 
income and productivity. Therefore, all three indica-
tors for the quality position are positively related to 
GDP per capita.
2' The closest correlation exists 
between the GDP per capita and the price position 
in segments; the weakest correlation is with the size 
of the quality sensitive sector.
2
2 Correlation of the 
quality indicators (specifically net PPS) with skills 
21 Wages per capita in manufacturing are also positively related to the guality position 
of countries, but not significantly. 
22 However, this Is greater between the change in GDP and net RQE. 
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Figure 3.10 Rank correlation of quality indicators with country characteristics 
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(measured by secondary education), the share of 
the information and communication technology 
(ICT) sectors and R&D ratios confirms the impor-
tance of endowments. Quality is-therefore related to 
those factors predicted by the theory, such as skills, 
research and information technologies, which pro-
vide opportunities to gain the competitive edge in 
quality. 
Countries in which the share of capital or labour 
intensive industries is large are placed lower in the 
quality ranking; the former is better reflected in the 
net RQE and unit value indicators, and the latter in 
the price position. Also, countries with high shares 
of industries that make intensive use of transport 
services as inputs (transport intensive) rank low in 
the three measures of quality. 
The share of technology driven industries correlates 
with the quality position (measured by unit value 
and the position in price segments), as does the 
share of industries that make intensive use of knowl-
edge-based services as inputs. 
Concerning policy variables, there is a strong corre-
lation between quality position and quality certifi-
cates. This may run in two directions: certification 
processes may increase quality and the ability to 
charge higher prices. Alternatively, countries supply-
ing high quality may want to prove this in a world 
of uncertain information. The regulation of product 
markets and of economic activity in general - as 
measured by OECD indicators - is negatively related 
to quality.
2
3
 
There is a surprisingly strong relationship between 
the share of industries with quality competition and 
absolute country size (measured by GDP). This 
could mean that large countries have industries with 
large research bases, high linkages and spillovers 
that permit specialisation in industries with quality 
competition, since knowledge research and 
spillovers are also the factors that allow a switch 
away from price competition. 
6. Comparing Europe to the 
US and Japan 
This section compares the EU to the US and Japan as 
a means of further revealing the underlying forces 
and competitive strength in quality upgrading. 
Figure 3.11 compares Europe's share of quality sen-
sitive industries to those of the US and Japan in 
terms of value added, exports and imports. 
Europe has the highest share in quality sensitive 
industries in production and exports. As far as pro-
duction is concerned, Europe attained this position 
over the last ten years by slowly extending its share 
in quality elastic industries and by reducing its share 
in price elastic industries. The net RQE is 1 3.5 for 
Europe vs. 2.8 for Japan and 11.7 for the US. 
However, within this generally positive picture, 
there are signs that change in Europe may be insuf-
ficient. The US has a lower share of price elastic 
23 All twelve correlations are positive (2 years, 2 indicators for regulation, 3 quality indi-
cators), indicating that the results are not products of chance. All rank correlations 
are univariate; there are no multivariate regressions, since, for most variables, one 
cannot expect one-sided causality. 
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industries in production, and is shifting its exports 7. Summary 
and imports more quickly from price to quality sen-
sitive sectors. 48% of US imports are in quality sen-
sitive industries, while only 41% of European 
imports and 35.9% of Japanese imports are in these 
industries. This indicates that demand in the US may 
be shifting to quality sensitive industries faster than 
in Europe and Japan. 
Furthermore, the favourable picture for quality com-
petition projected by the share of quality sensitive 
industries is in contrast to that drawn by the share of 
technology driven industries, where European 
imports from the US are higher than exports, and 
where unit values are shown to be unfavourable for 
Europe (see Figure 3.12).
2" 
The high shares of technology driven industries in 
the US, their high unit value and their increasing 
share in domestic demand may challenge the future 
competitiveness of Europe in the high quality sec-
tors. 
24 The difference comes from classifying several machinery and car industries as qual-
ity elastic. 
The ability of an economy to produce goods appre-
ciated for their quality determines, to a large extent, 
the potential for further increases in living standards 
and decreases the overall exposure to low cost pro-
ducers. The EU, being a high wage area, has to 
upgrade quality by shifting into less price sensitive 
industries - inter-industry upgrading - or into higher 
priced segments - intra-industry upgrading. Of 
importance for both strategies is the openness of 
economies as well as the functioning of input and 
output markets. 
Europe is a provider of high quality products with a 
trade surplus that originates in quality sensitive 
industries. However, its long-term position in quality 
competition is being contested at both ends of the 
quality spectrum: by economies that are catching 
up and by competitors at the technological cutting 
edge, in particular the US. 
Europe's position within the Triad, as seen from the 
quality indicators, is better than that seen from the 
Figure 3.11 Share of quality sensitive industries (RQE) in the Triad, 1998 
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perspective of productivity comparisons or from the 
share of high-tech industries. As expected, in tech-
nology driven industries, as well as in high skill 
industries, price competition has been mitigated. 
The change away from price sensitive sectors is, 
however, slower than in the US, specifically in 
imports, indicating that shifts in consumption may 
be faster in the US. This trend is stronger in tech-
nology driven industries. This chapter has shown 
that research, innovation, skilled labour, information 
and communication technologies and knowledge 
intensive services are all important factors in quality 
upgrading. 
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Chapter 4 
External services and 
industrial performance 
The rise of the service economy characterises the 
predominant pattern of structural change in the 20
l
h 
century. A major determinant of this process has 
been the increasing demand of producers for exter-
nal service inputs provided by specialised suppliers 
(as opposed to in-house activities). 
This chapter studies the evolution of the services 
sector and its relationship with other sectors in the 
economy. The main focus is on the input-output 
relationship of services with other industries within a 
given economic territory.' There is also an investiga-
tion into the process of tertiarisation, comparing 
growth across different services sectors. The conclu-
sion is that the general dynamics of structural 
change are particularly confined to a subgroup of 
knowledge and information-based services. In order 
to evaluate the impact of inputs from external serv-
ices on the competitive performance of European 
industries, the chapter contains an analysis of the 
extent to which the provision of specific classes of 
services is spread throughout the economic system 
and an appraisal of the competitive performance of 
manufacturing sectors as a function of their inten-
sive use of different service inputs.
2 
1 The next chapter will deal with the international dimension of services. 
2 This chapter is based on Peneder (2000). 
1. Evolution of the service 
sector 
Services lie at the heart of any economic process, 
and no material goods can be manufactured with-
out the combination of various services drawn from 
a company's disposable resources. The common 
distinction between services and material goods is 
nevertheless apparent in the general classification of 
economic branches, where activities with no clear 
relationship to material products are classified under 
the more or less residual category of services (terti-
ary sector). As a direct consequence, activities 
included in the tertiary sector are extremely hetero-
geneous. In order to arrange this vast and hetero-
geneous category more clearly, a proposal has been 
made to single out the comparatively new and fast 
growing branches of knowledge-based and infor-
mational services as a fourth class of activities, called 
the "quaternary sector" (see deBandt (1999)). 
Despite frequent exceptions, the distinction 
between service industries and manufacturing nev-
ertheless highlights an important difference 
between the organisation of the two markets: in 
manufacturing, the economic value which has been 
created can be appropriated through the exchange 
of material goods, most of which can be stored and 
spatially transferred. In contrast, services involve 
immaterial outcomes, characterised in terms of spe-
cific transformations of the tangible or intangible 
conditions of human life. These differences in the 
appropriability of the value produced have a deci-
sive impact on the modes of interaction between 
buyers and sellers on the market and affect the 
prevalent sources of competitive advantage. Due to 
the immaterial, non-storable and transient nature of 
supply, business success requires direct interaction 
with consumers and, consequently, a high degree of 
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coincidence of consumption and production, both 
in time and space. 
Mobility and organisation thus become key assets 
for successful customer relations and the quality and 
efficiency of the supply of services is highly affected 
by territorial barriers. Economic integration and the 
harmonisation of rules for market access are there-
fore an important means of overcoming such restric-
tions and establishing a supportive environment for 
service businesses. 
The historical record
3 
Measured in terms of labour force reallocations, the 
scope of structural change that has occurred 
throughout the 20
,
h century is impressive. According 
to estimates for 25 developed economies, at the 
turn of the century about half of total civil employ-
ment was in the agricultural sector, a quarter in 
manufacturing and only a quarter in services. Up to 
1950, structural change was mainly characterised by 
the rapid decline of the agricultural sector, in which 
employment fell by a half. New jobs were created in 
both manufacturing and services; employment in 
services grew slightly faster than in manufacturing. 
In the postwar period, this tendency continued to 
gain strength and until the early 1970s most of the 
ongoing decline in primary sector employment 
(13% in 1971) was absorbed by growth in services 
(49% in 1971 ). The structural shift in favour of man-
ufacturing industries was levelling off, increasing 
modestly to a share of 38% of total civil employ-
ment. From the 1970s onwards, the process of rer-
tiarisation in employment patterns accelerated; the 
share of service industries in total civil employment 
eventually reached 67.4% in 1998. In most devel-
oped nations, the share of manufacturing in total 
employment peaked between the years 1964 and 
1975. For the total sample of 25 OECD countries, 
the decline that followed resulted in an employment 
share for the secondary sector of 27.8% in 1998. 
At the same time, the primary sector contracted fur-
ther to a level of only 4.8%. 
Comparing long-term structural change in the 
countries which are now members of the EU with 
that of Japan and the US (Figure 4.1), one can 
observe that in the US the process of tertiarisation 
began much earlier than in the two other economic 
areas. In contrast to both, the service sector in the 
US had already gained a substantial lead in terms of 
employment share by the middle of the century. In 
Japan, the most pronounced differences appear in 
the agricultural sector, which did not lose its domi-
nant position until the postwar period. Although, by 
the end of the century, employment structure in the 
three economic areas has converged to more similar 
patterns of specialisation, in 1998 the US was still 
characterised by the highest employment share for 
the service sector (73.7%), followed by the 
European Union (65.7%) and Japan (62.7%). 
The overall picture is also consistent with a compar-
ison of the shares in value added, where compara-
ble data are available only from 1970 onwards. The 
size of the tertiary sector is again largest in the US 
(72.8% in 1997), followed by the EU (66.8% in 
1995) and Japan (61.8%). Among the individual 
Member States of the EU, the share of the service 
sector typically falls into a range between 65% and 
70%. With a share for the service sector well below 
the average for the EU, Ireland (where the data mir-
ror the remarkable expansion of manufacturing pro-
duction during the 1990s) and Portugal are the only 
pronounced exceptions to this rule. Within the EU, 
the value added shares of the service sector are 
highest in France and Belgium. 
Figures 4.1 Shares in total civil employment, 
percentage points 
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70 Chapter 4 - External services and industrial performance 
The sources of 
structural change 
As historical data have demonstrated, tertiarisation is 
a tremendously powerful process of structural 
change, characterised by the shift of economic 
activities away from such traditional areas as agri-
culture and manufacturing towards the tertiary sec-
tor. The underlying sources of this process can be 
revealed by the decomposition of output growth 
into its constitutive components, using input-output 
data. 
In general, there are three possible explanations of 
why, in developed economies, changes in industrial 
structures systematically favour services rather than 
manufactured goods. The first explanation focuses 
on effects from the demand side, the second on 
changes in technology, and the third on shifts in 
international patterns of comparative advantage: 
• Increasing demand for services 
Tertiarisation is often explained in terms of a general 
shift in tastes and preferences towards intangible 
components of consumer satisfaction, which 
become evident as income levels and standards of 
living rise. The income elasticity of demand is 
believed to be high for immaterial sources of well 
-being, often associated with increasing leisure, 
entertainment and luxury. Conversely, private 
expenditure on material goods is presumed to be 
more quickly affected by the saturation of markets. 
The argument is that raw materials and basic man-
ufactured products, which, by and large, are associ-
ated with their respective physical quantities, have 
fewer opportunities to raise demand in correspon-
dence with increases in disposable income per 
capita. 
• Technological and organisational change 
The second major force towards tertiarisation is a 
result of changes in technology and organisation. In 
contrast to the above argument, based upon differ-
ential shifts in the level of intermediary demand for 
various industries (i.e. holding constant the technol-
ogy coefficient in the matrix of intermediary inputs), 
the technology effect results from a change in the 
intermediary demand per unit of output. Positive 
impulses for tertiarisation would then correspond to 
the common observation of increasing differentia-
tion and "complexification" of production. Efficient 
organisation, innovation, brand creation and cus-
tomised services become the primary sources of 
competitive advantage, all of them exerting a cer-
tain tendency towards raising the level of required 
inputs from specialised services. Organisational 
change in terms of the contracting-out of activities 
previously carried out in-house is another source 
from which external service industries are arising. 
Organisational and technological changes are 
strongly intertwined, and both result in similar 
changes of coefficients in the matrix of intermediary 
inputs. 
• Shifts in the international patterns 
of comparative advantage 
It is sometimes argued that tertiarisation stems from 
a loss of competitiveness due to the increasing com-
petition of economically less developed, low wage 
countries, which benefit from the global integration 
of markets for manufactured products. Conversely, 
in those economies where high wages and free 
trade drive out price sensitive segments of produc-
tion, employment shifts towards the service indus-
tries. The underlying reason is presumed to be that, 
relative to manufacturing goods, most service indus-
tries are more closely tied to their locations and are 
therefore less exposed to the competitive pressures 
of global trade. Although this traditional explana-
tion emphasises only the negative impact of 
decreases in comparative advantage in manufac-
tured goods, one must also consider the role of pos-
itive shifts in comparative advantage in favour of (for 
example, ICT related) services which become 
increasingly tradable.
4 
• Decomposition of output growth 
The empirical investigation consists of a simple 
decomposition of the overall growth in output of 
five broad sectoral aggregates into their three con-
stitutive components: (i) changes in the technology 
coefficients (which give the amount of each category 
of intermediary inputs required per unit of output); 
(ii) changes in domestic demand, comprising public 
and private consumption as well as investment out-
lays (the latter reported separately and including 
variations in stock); and, finally, (iii) changes in net 
exports, reflecting shifts in demand which become 
effective through foreign trade relationships. For a 
more detailed discussion of the method used, 
see Box 4.1. 
4 This increased tradabllity Is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Box 4.1 Decomposition of output growth 
Input-output tables attempt to provide a complete record of all transactions of goods and services in the economy, 
including separate matrices for intermediary demand (X) and the various components of final demand (Y). Gross out-
put (Q) is the sum of these two components. Final demand (net of imports) consists of private and public consump-
tion (C), investments (I) (here also including changes in stocks), and net exports (F); hence, Y=C+I+F. For the purpose 
of this decomposition, the basic relationship, X+Y=Q, can be converted into (E-A)-' * Y = Q, with Q representing gross 
output, A the direct input coefficients of the matrix for intermediary demand and £ the identity matrix. The term (E-
A)' is called the Leontief-inverse matrix (L). Thus, we get the relationship Q=LY=L(C+I+F). Growth of gross output 
between two points in time (t and t-z years) can now be decomposed into its technological component, i.e. growth 
due to changes in the Leontief-inverse matrix of technology coefficients (holding final demand V, constant); and 
changes resulting from shifts in any of the individual components of final demand, i.e. domestic consumption, invest-
ment and net exports (while holding the matrix of technology coefficients Lt.z constant): 
Q, - Q,.z _ (L, - L,.Z)Y, + L,.Z(C, - C,.z) + L,.z(l, - I,.z) + L,.Z(F, - F,.z)  zQ,.: zQ,.z zQ,.z zQ,.z zQ,.z 
In the tables, the first column gives average annual output growth and the four other columns express the contribu-
tion to output growth of each individual component. The contribution of the individual components sums up to out-
put growth. 
Industries are aggregated into five broad sectors: manufacturing (ISIC 3), distributive services (wholesale and retail trade, 
transport; ISIC 61, 62, 71), knowledge-based services (communications, financial services, real estate and business serv-
ices; ISIC 72, 81, 82, 83), personal and social services (restaurants and hotels, community services, etc.; ISIC 9 and 63), 
and other sectors (agriculture, mining, construction, utilities; ISIC 1, 2, 4, 5). 
The data have been collected from national statistical offices, as well as a set of harmonised input-output tables pro-
vided by the OECD. The OECD data cover the period from the early 1970s up to 1990 and are available, in constant 
and current national currencies, for the following five European countries: Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom, as well as for the US and Japan. The government sector (including public investment) is gen-
erally treated as a part of final consumption. Data from 1990 onwards stem from national statistical offices and are not 
harmonised. In most cases, they are only available in current prices. 
Conclusions must be drawn with care, as the methods of data generation and classification, as well as the construc-
tion of input-output tables, vary between countries and can introduce considerable distortions with respect to the 
sources of tertiarisation. Consequently, an interpretation should put less emphasis on specific numbers and concen-
trate more on the general picture, which is revealed by the decomposition. 
The data presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that: 
• Since the 1970s, the process of tertiarisation has 
been driven primarily by the growth of knowledge-
based services. Apart from a few minor excep-
tions, knowledge-based services (comprising 
financial services, business related services
5 and 
communications) have consistently been the 
fastest growing sector of all five aggregates, out-
performing manufacturing growth in every sin-
gle observation available. In many cases, the 
growth differential is substantial. However, the 
same cannot be said of the other service cate-
gories, in which average annual growth of gross 
output differs much less from that of the manu-
facturing sector and in some cases even falls 
behind. 
• Among the sources of structural development, the 
increase of domestic demand has had the most 
pronounced impact on growth in the five broad 
5 In the OECD and many national data bases this also comprises real estate. 
sectors. Besides knowledge-based services, per-
sonal and social services benefited most from 
this rise in consumption. In France, the UK and 
the US, the negative contributions of net exports 
to average annual output growth suggest that 
comparative advantage has shifted away from 
manufacturing towards service industries. This 
effect was most pronounced in the UK before the 
1990s. This tendency, however, cannot be char-
acterised as a general trend for developed 
economies; manufacturing growth in other 
nations, such as Germany, the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Japan, has consistently enjoyed 
positive impulses generated by foreign trade. In 
France and the US, an improving foreign trade 
position has contributed positively to output 
growth in distribution related services (compris-
ing transport as well as wholesale and retail 
trade). In the UK, at least from 1992 onwards, a 
similar shift in comparative advantage appears to 
have favoured the growth in knowledge-based 
services. 
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Table 4.1 Decomposition of average annual 
Cross output 
output growth: percentage points, constant prices 
Technology Consumption Investment Net exports 
Denmark 1972-1990 (prices 1980) 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other Sectors 
France 1972-1990 (prices 1980) 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
Germany 1978-1990 (prices 1985) 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
Netherlands 1972-1986 (prices 1980) 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
United Kingdom 1968-1990 (prices 1980) 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
Japan 1970-1990 (prices 1985) 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
US 1972-1990 (prices 1982) 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
1.38 
1.87 
2.64 
1.40 
1.48 
1.44 
2.25 
3.49 
2.65 
1.69 
1.84 
2.31 
3.82 
1.88 
1.21 
2.47 
2.24 
3.90 
2.47 
2.39 
1.03 
2.18 
3.50 
3.56 
1.80 
2.79 
2.99 
3.29 
2.72 
2.30 
1.56 
2.81 
2.74 
2.68 
0.87 
-0.61 
-0.23 
0.87 
-0.06 
-0.18 
-0.28 
0.27 
1.75 
0.21 
-0.45 
0.00 
0.11 
1.79 
0.26 
-0.65 
0.16 
-0.07 
1.18 
-0.05 
0.48 
1.46 
0.86 
3.11 
0.57 
0.90 
-0.37 
0.13 
0.80 
-0.31 
-1.52 
-0.38 
0.33 
0.51 
0.03 
-0.59 
0.83 
0.63 
1.50 
1.27 
1.43 
1.69 
1.71 
1.78 
2.40 
2.13 
1.01 
1.57 
1.80 
1.43 
1.38 
1.15 
0.83 
2.11 
2.37 
1.49 
1.24 
1.86 
0.81 
3.26 
0.73 
1.86 
2.17 
2.06 
2.79 
2.08 
1.58 
2.03 
2.00 
2.57 
1.54 
0.44 
0.16 
0.05 
0.02 
-0.34 
0.51 
0.09 
-0.02 
0.02 
-0.16 
0.79 
0.28 
0.21 
0.11 
0.50 
0.49 
0.23 
0.29 
0.04 
0.25 
0.60 
0.27 
-0.11 
0.04 
0.52 
1.22 
0.73 
0.47 
0.38 
1.86 
0.64 
0.24 
0.17 
0.06 
0.38 
0.73 
1.32 
0.22 
0.16 
0.57 
-0.47 
0.18 
-0.02 
0.03 
0.17 
0.04 
0.35 
0.02 
0.08 
-0.03 
0.67 
1.25 
0.31 
0.12 
0.17 
-2.28 
-0.81 
-0.30 
-0.31 
-0.35 
0.08 
-0.04 
-0.04 
-0.13 
-0.12 
-0.27 
0.21 
0.06 
0.03 
-0.47 
Sources: WIFO calculations using OECD, national statistical offices. 
The technology effect (as revealed by the change 
of coefficients in the matrix of intermediary 
inputs) has been most pronounced in knowledge-
based services. When measured at constant 
prices, from the early 1970s to the 1990s, the 
technological component accounted for about 
half of the output growth in France and 
Germany, or about one third in Denmark and 
the Netherlands. For the UK, the technological 
component was unusually high, whereas in 
Japan and the US the growth of knowledge-
based services appears to have been driven more 
strongly by domestic demand. 
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Table 4.2 Decomposition 
Denmark 1972-1990 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
France 1972-1990 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
Germany 1978-1990 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
Germany 1991-1995 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
Netherlands 1972-1986 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
Netherlands 1986-1990 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
Netherlands 1990-1993 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
Netherlands 1993-1995 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
Netherlands 1995-1998 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
of average annua 
Gross output 
4.39 
4.48 
4.87 
4.55 
4.42 
4.51 
4.78 
5.08 
4.93 
4.87 
3.54 
3.84 
5.19 
4.10 
3.35 
0.40 
3.32 
9.50 
5.95 
7.91 
4.32 
4.49 
5.42 
4.93 
4.56 
4.77 
5.71 
7.61 
3.67 
1.49 
0.54 
6.58 
8.15 
5.93 
1.50 
5.12 
4.63 
8.06 
3.65 
3.33 
4.16 
6.98 
11.83 
3.87 
3.86 
1 output g 
Technology 
-0.37 
0.08 
0.99 
0.23 
-0.21 
-1.14 
-0.11 
1.63 
0.26 
-0.75 
-0.37 
0.05 
1.87 
0.43 
-0.86 
-2.15 
0.35 
-0.43 
0.96 
1.45 
-0.04 
0.03 
1.06 
0.08 
0.41 
-0.11 
1.06 
2.14 
0.13 
-1.48 
-0.90 
-0.11 
0.79 
0.16 
-0.65 
-0.50 
0.31 
1.59 
0.01 
-0.95 
-0.24 
1.76 
3.69 
-0.10 
-0.45 
rowth: percentage 
Consumption 
3.38 
2.41 
3.50 
4.10 
3.60 
4.45 
4.26 
3.14 
4.55 
4.62 
2.16 
2.79 
2.88 
3.32 
2.85 
1.47 
2.88 
9.74 
4.83 
3.17 
2.87 
2.26 
3.48 
4.63 
2.77 
0.99 
3.06 
3.74 
3.52 
0.18 
1.88 
4.29 
6.20 
5.74 
1.65 
1.20 
3.11 
5.03 
2.48 
1.34 
1.57 
4.84 
5.06 
3.92 
1.97 
points, current 
Investment 
1.34 
0.44 
0.25 
0.11 
0.98 
1.45 
0.41 
0.29 
0.09 
1.08 
1.20 
0.45 
0.35 
0.16 
1.30 
-0.04 
-0.25 
0.20 
0.16 
2.96 
1.11 
0.49 
0.50 
0.07 
0.92 
0.83 
0.51 
0.64 
0.06 
2.46 
-1.55 
0.26 
0.45 
0.04 
0.02 
1.50 
0.32 
0.77 
0.34 
1.74 
0.42 
0.47 
2.07 
0.17 
2.19 
prices 
Net exports 
0.05 
1.55 
0.13 
0.11 
0.05 
-0.25 
0.22 
0.03 
0.04 
-0.08 
0.55 
0.54 
0.10 
0.19 
0.06 
1.11 
0.34 
-0.02 
0.00 
0.32 
0.37 
1.72 
0.37 
0.15 
0.46 
3.05 
1.08 
1.09 
-0.03 
0.34 
1.11 
2.14 
0.71 
-0.02 
0.49 
2.92 
0.90 
0.67 
0.82 
1.19 
2.41 
-0.08 
1.00 
-0.13 
0.15 
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United Kingdom 1968-1990 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
United Kingdom 1992-1997 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
Japan 1970-1990 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
US 1972-1990 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
US 1992-1996 
Manufacturing industries 
Distributive services 
Knowledge-based services 
Personal and social services 
Other sectors 
4.02 
4.22 
4.37 
4.43 
4.18 
7.33 
9.19 
9.61 
8.47 
4.38 
3.84 
4.20 
4.45 
4.29 
3.98 
4.07 
4.45 
4.61 
4.69 
4.17 
6.08 
7.68 
8.72 
6.62 
5.69 
-0.15 
0.38 
2.75 
0.48 
0.44 
0.32 
2.48 
2.36 
3.07 
-1.02 
-0.91 
0.24 
1.21 
0.17 
-1.15 
-0.39 
0.21 
0.59 
0.13 
-0.07 
0.88 
0.80 
1.09 
0.22 
-0.56 
3.58 
3.53 
1.36 
3.99 
2.57 
5.11 
5.86 
5.38 
5.24 
2.65 
2.80 
2.89 
2.77 
3.87 
2.64 
3.77 
3.54 
3.64 
4.44 
3.52 
3.41 
4.98 
5.15 
6.12 
3.39 
1.36 
0.47 
0.25 
0.08 
1.29 
1.94 
0.62 
0.86 
0.16 
2.46 
1.72 
0.96 
0.49 
0.37 
2.68 
1.02 
0.42 
0.28 
0.08 
1.11 
3.08 
1.62 
2.31 
0.28 
3.60 
-0.77 
-0.16 
0.02 
-0.13 
-0.12 
-0.04 
0.22 
1.02 
0.00 
0.28 
0.23 
0.10 
-0.02 
-0.12 
-0.19 
-0.33 
0.27 
0.09 
0.04 
-0.40 
-1.29 
0.29 
0.16 
0.01 
-0.74 
Sources: WIFO calculations using OECD, national statistical offices. 
3. What follows tertiarisation? 
The penetration of 
knowledge-based services 
Measured in terms of gross output, the general shift 
of economic activities away from the primary and 
secondary sectors, in favour of the tertiary sector, 
has not occurred uniformly across industries. As has 
been seen, there is the particular group of knowl-
edge-based services, which has benefited most from 
technological change and general increases in 
demand. If tertiarisation was the dominant pattern 
of structural development, which began in the early 
1900s and dominated most of the 20
l
h century, we 
are now in the midst of what one might call a 
process of quaternarisation, distinctly defined by the 
steady rise of information and knowledge-based 
services. 
The essential difference from traditional growth in 
services is the specific role knowledge-based services 
can play as sources of innovation, product differen-
tiation and productivity growth for the rest of the 
economy.
6 The general fear regarding the so-called 
"cost disease"
7 in services appears primarily to be 
the story of "old" tertiarisation. This assumes that, 
because of the limited potential to increase labour 
productivity through technological progress and the 
cumulation of complementary inputs to production, 
industries - including most of the traditional per-
sonal, social and public services - cannot compen-
sate for the rise in aggregate wage levels that is 
forced upon them by the more progressive indus-
tries with high productivity growth. This view proj-
ects, as a consequence, diminishing growth in pro-
ductivity and income as the general long-term 
perspective for the economically most developed 
economies, which are characterised by high shares 
of service industries. 
6 See Tomlinson (1997). 
7 See Baumöl (1967). 
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Figure 4.2 Share of knowledge-based services in total intermediary inputs (current prices) 
Germany  France 
Manufacturing 
80%-
Personal & social services  Knowledge based services Personal & social services  Knowledge based services 
■1990 "1985 αϊ 980 αϊ 977 αϊ 972 
United Kingdom 
■1990 «1988 αϊ 986 αϊ 978 
Manufacturing 
80%-
Denmark 
Personal & social services  Knowledge based services Personal & social services  Knowledge based services 
■ 1997 «1990 αϊ 984 nl979 ni 968 
Manufacturing 
Netherlands (1) /*\ 
Π1995 "1990 "1985 αϊ 980 ni 977 ol 972 
Manufacturing 
Netherlands (2)
 8(!^ 
Personal & social services Knowledge based services Personal & social services Knowledge based services 
■ 1986 »1981 αϊ 977 αϊ 972 "1998 «1995 α1993 α1990 
japan  US 
Manufacturing 
80%· 
Personal & social services Knowledge based services 
■1990 »1985 a1980 al 975 al 970 
Personal & social services Knowledge based services 
αϊ 996 B1990 «1985 αϊ 982 α1977 αϊ 972 
Sources: WIFO calculations using OECD, national statistical offices. 
However, the observed increase in knowledge-
based, primarily business-related services, together 
with the vigorous and long-lasting economic 
upturn, which occurred in the US during the 1990s, 
suggests a different story. Knowledge-based services 
contribute to economic development not only 
through their own growth in employment and 
income, but also through their potential to improve 
performance in the economic system via "knowl­
edge transfer and progressive specialisation". They 
are capable of stimulating productivity growth 
through various sources of competitive advantage
8: 
8 See Rubalcaba-Bermejo (1999). 
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(i) technological innovation (e.g. engineering serv-
ices, computing, testing, RScD labs); (ii) organisa-
tion, as well as corporate finance and strategy (man-
agement consulting, audits, manpower services); 
and, (¡ii) marketing (market research, advertising, 
public relations, design services, fairs & exhibitions). 
In addition, external knowledge-based services offer 
flexible access to specialised expertise at more oper-
ational levels of business (e.g. linguistic or legal serv-
ices). Hence, in contrast to the gloomy forecasts on 
productivity and income envisaged by many with 
respect to the traditional process of tertiarisation, 
the label "quaternarisation" attaches to a distinct 
process, in which the cumulative nature of informa-
tion and knowledge as complementary factors of 
production raise the general prospects for entrepre-
neurial discovery and productivity growth.
9 
The numbers extracted from input-output tables 
leave no doubt that the rise of the knowledge-based 
economy is underway. For instance, in France the 
share of knowledge-based services in the intermedi-
ary inputs of the total economy has risen from 1 7% 
in 1970 to a level of 34% in 1990, which is the high-
est among the countries compared. Corresponding 
figures for the Netherlands are 9% (1972) and 33% 
(1997); United Kingdom: 5% (1968) and 30% 
(1997); US: 19% (1972) and 31 % (1996); Denmark: 
11% (1972) and 29% (1995); Germany: 16% 
(1978) and 26% (1990); and Japan: 8% (1970) and 
1 7% (1990). 
Compiled from input-output data, Figure 4.2 shows 
the importance and the evolution of the share of 
knowledge-based services in total intermediary 
inputs for the 5 broad sectors.
1
0 
Even if one abstains from comparisons of absolute 
levels between individual countries, the general pic-
ture is clear and surprisingly consistent, showing a 
steady increase in the share of knowledge-based serv-
ices, measured as a percentage of total intermediary 
inputs. Another robust observation is that most of 
the intermediary demand for knowledge-based 
services originates in knowledge-based services 
themselves. Conversely, the demand for knowledge-
based services is lowest in manufacturing and in the 
aggregate of "other" industries. 
9 Still, one cannot preclude the possibility that, In some progressive services, high 
growth rates will only be of a transitory nature. See Baumol et al. (1985). 
10 Comparability of input-output data both between countries and over the course of 
time Is limited, as the methods used In compiling the tables might differ. One might 
also suspect that the rising share of knowledge-based services is partly due to 
improved statistics (although this In itself has been motivated by the growing aware-
ness of their Importance). 
4. External service inputs and 
competitive performance 
It is also interesting to look at whether any regular-
ity can be observed in the relationship between dif-
ferences in the intermediary demand for external 
services and the competitive performance of manu-
facturing industries. To this end, manufacturing 
industries are classified according to their relative 
dependence on different kinds of external service 
inputs (see Box 4.2) and divided into four mutually 
exclusive categories: 
• IKBS - industries with high shares of inputs from 
knowledge based services (KBS), such as various 
business-related services, communications or 
financial intermediation (examples are publish-
ing, electronic components, medical equipment, 
air- and spacecraft; see Box 4.3 at the end of this 
chapter); 
• IRAS - industries with high shares of inputs from 
retail and advertising services (e.g. the manufac-
turing of food and beverages, pharmaceuticals, 
computers, sports goods); 
• ITRS - industries with high shares of inputs from 
transport services (most basic goods industries, 
such as sawmilling, construction material or 
basic metals, but also motor vehicle bodies); 
• OTHER industries - residual category, where the 
combination of external service inputs does not 
deviate in any pronounced way from the average 
of total manufacturing (various, from meat 
products to footwear, metal products and motor 
vehicles). 
In what follows, the relative performance of these 
four groups of industries in terms of labour produc-
tivity, value added growth, employment growth and 
export unit values is ascertained, and the pattern in 
the EU is contrasted with those in the US and Japan. 
• Labour productivity 
Beginning with relative differences in labour pro-
ductivity, industries with a high demand for inputs 
from external knowledge-based services appear at 
the top of the rankings in the European Union as 
well as in Japan and the US (Figure 4.3). Industries 
with high inputs from retail and advertising ranked 
second followed by transport intensive industries. 
The overall patterns for the European Union are 
largely consistent with the ones for Japan and the 
US, but the differences are somewhat less pro-
nounced. 
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Box 4.2 The new taxonomy 
This new industry classification ("taxonomy 3") complements the taxonomies 1 and 2 developed in previous reports, 
established in order to investigate industrial performance with respect to the intangible sources of competitive advan­
tage (see Peneder (2000 and forthcoming)). This new classification concentrates on the differentiation of industries 
according to the varying degrees of demand for external service inputs, as extracted from input-output tables. 
Statistical cluster analysis classifies individual observations, depending on their relative similarity with respect to an 
array of chosen variables. Its purpose is to divide a specific data profile into separate and mutually exclusive segments 
by creating maximum homogeneity within and maximum distance between groups. For the current analysis, one hun­
dred NACE 3-digit manufacturing industries were taken as observations, while the vectors representing intermediary 
demand for external service inputs were used as discriminating variables. Due to the importance of a sufficiently high 
level of disaggregation in the initial data, US input-output tables were used (available for 1992) in a matrix disaggre­
gated to 498 industries times products. The high level of disaggregation does not just allow for a refined differentia­
tion of service inputs, it also enables a sufficiently accurate transformation of the respective service intensities into 
NACE 3-digit industries. Besides this technical need, the US is an attractive source of reference due to: (i) its status as 
one of the economically most advanced nations, whose general patterns in the division of labour constitute a good 
benchmark; and (ii) being a large economy, it accordingly presents lower risks of distortions in the data, accruing from 
highly particular local patterns of specialisation. 
The classification was produced using a sequence of four analytical steps. Firstly, inputs from the various service indus­
tries were aggregated into 6 variables: (i) "transportation"(all of them related to the spatial transformation of goods 
and people; e.g. railroads, motor freight, air transport, etc. but also including pipelines and postal services); (ii) "trade" 
(wholesale- and retail); (iii) "financial services" (including insurance and real estate); (iv) "advertising"; (v) "datcom" 
(comprising data processing, communications and electronic broadcasting); and (vi) "techserv" (legal, engineering 
and accounting services, plus testing and research labs. Personal services (hotels, restaurants, theatres, laundry, clean­
ing, barber shops, etc.), social services (e.g. health and education), as well as very special sectors such as public admin­
istration, the defence sector or social security were not included. Among the remaining variables, correlation was still 
high, so in a second step, a principal component analysis was applied, leading to a 3-factor solution of uncorrelated 
variables, which were linear composites of the original vectors. The factor loadings of variable 1 were highest for inputs 
from "financial services", "datcom" and "techserv". In contrast, variable 2 captured the dimensions of the initial vari­
ables "trade" and "advertising", which appeared to be highly correlated. Variable 3 was determined by "transporta­
tion" and to a lesser degree by the initial variable labelled "techserv". In a third step, a non-hierarchical algorithm pro­
duced a first partition of the data profile into ten broad clusters, which, in a fourth step, was further aggregated by 
means of hierarchical clustering, relying on the cosine of the vectors as a measure of distance and the average linkage 
between groups as a method of agglomeration. 
Analogous to the use of other classifications, one must remain aware of the fact that much heterogeneity within each 
individual category can still be found. In addition, one cannot assume complete consistency between different eco­
nomic areas with respect to the typical combinations of external service inputs, especially since the latter can be much 
affected by national differences in the regulation of service markets. It is one of the advantages of the taxonomie 
approach that the latter is not a necessary assumption for international comparisons. It only requires consistency as far 
as membership within the broad boundaries of the final classification is concerned. This obviously is a much weaker 
assumption, and generally allows for more robust results. 
Taking all three areas together, labour productivity · Value added 
in 1997 amounted to an average of 91,635 Euro per 
capita, far ahead and growing faster (+5.9% p.a.  In Japan and the US, the value added of industries 
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turing and was outperformed only by retail and 
advertising intensive industries with an average of 
3.4% (Figure 4.4). 
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• Employment 
In the European Union, as well as in Japan, industries 
with high shares of knowledge-based services 
achieved their good productivity performance 
mostly by means of above average growth in value 
added, whereas the decline in employment was the 
lowest of all four categories. In contrast, the pattern 
is entirely different in the US, where productivity 
growth results from two simultaneous movements: 
high growth in value added and large-scale reduc-
tions of the labour force, which, at the same time, 
are not observed in other industry groups (Figure 
4.5).'
1 
11 A possible explanation for the large-scale reduction of the labour force In the KBS 
Intensive industry In the US could be the refocusing In core competencies in these 
industries and the consequent tendency to outsource some of the activities previ-
ously carried out in-house. Arguably, In the period under consideration, outsourcing 
in the US was facilitated by the existence of developed service markets. 
In Europe, industries characterised by high levels of 
knowledge-based and retail and advertising services 
appear to be less exposed to pressure for further job 
losses than the group of other industries, with no 
pronounced intermediary demand for any kind of 
external services, or transport intensive industries. 
• Unit values 
Regarding unit values in foreign trade, these are by 
far the highest in the group of industries, which are 
characterised by large external inputs from retail 
and advertising (Figure 4.6). An obvious reason is 
the generally low physical weight of final consumer 
goods. Turning to the degree of quality differentia-
tion, as opposed to mere price competition, the 
standard deviation of unit values is highest in indus-
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tries with high shares of inputs from knowledge-
based services while industries with a high level of 
inputs from retail and advertising still come in 
second. 
Corresponding to the findings on the European 
quality premium, unit values of exports are consis-
tently higher than those of imported goods. In addi-
tion, the quality differential of exports relative to 
imports is most pronounced in the group of indus-
tries with shares of knowledge-based services. 
5. Specialisation within the 
Triad 
• Production 
Applying this classification of industries to a com-
parison of the overall patterns of specialisation 
within the Triad, the general picture for the 
European Union reveals a pronounced structural 
imbalance, which has grown further between 1988 
and 1997. In manufacturing industries with a par-
ticularly high level of inputs from knowledge-based 
services, the share of the EU in total value added of 
the Triad has fallen from 28.5% in 1988 to 25.2% in 
1997. This share is by far the lowest of all the four 
categories. In the same year, the share was 31.1% 
for industries with a high level of inputs from retail 
and advertising, 31.7% for transport intensive 
industries and 35.6% in the group of "other" man-
ufacturing (Figure 4.7). In contrast, the US enjoys 
precisely the reverse patterns of specialisation, with 
the highest share in the value added of the Triad in 
the group of industries with large inputs from 
knowledge-based services (57.2% in 1997, up from 
51.2 in 1988), followed by industries with high 
intermediary demand for retail and advertising 
(45.3% in 1997), transport intensive production 
(44.3%), and the lowest specialisation in "other" 
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manufacturing (39.2%). Similarly to the European 
Union, Japan is characterised by comparatively low 
shares in industries classified as having high inter-
mediary demand for knowledge-based services 
(1 7.6%), but its value added shares are more evenly 
distributed (between 23.6% and 25.2%) in the 
three other categories. 
• Exports 
The same structural weaknesses in European manu-
facturing also come to the surface with reference to 
its shares in the Triad's total exports. In 1998 the 
export share of the EU were again lowest in indus-
tries with a particularly high level of inputs from 
knowledge-based services (Figure 4.8). Their share 
of 35.6% is rather modest, when compared to the 
50.8% for industries with large inputs from retail 
and advertising, the 47.8% in transport intensive 
production and the 45.5% for the group of "other" 
manufacturing. 
Analogously to the situation in terms of value 
added, the US pattern of export specialisation con-
sistently mirrors the European pattern: industries 
with high shares of inputs from knowledge-based 
services rank highest (44.1 %), and the export shares 
of all other types of industry are rather evenly dis-
tributed (between 28% and 33%). Japanese shares 
in the total exports of the Triad generally do not dif-
fer much between these categories (ca. 20%), 
except for the above average performance of the 
group of "other" manufacturing (ca. 25%). 
These results can be briefly summarised as follows: 
the US is strongest in industries characterised by 
high shares of inputs from external knowledge-
based services. This is precisely the group of indus-
tries, which tends to exhibit the highest levels of 
labour productivity and product differentiation. In 
contrast, the European Union is more specialised in 
the group of "other" industries, characterised not 
only by the lack of a pronounced reliance on exter-
nal service inputs, but also - as has been seen in the 
figures above - by the lowest potential for product 
differentiation, the most severe decline in employ-
ment, below average growth of value added and 
the lowest level of labour productivity. 
In order to overcome the structural deficit in indus-
tries that typically rely heavily on external inputs 
from knowledge-based services, the European Union 
must face concerns about the regulatory environ-
ment affecting the supply of these services. Although 
further research would be needed in order to claim a 
clear causal relationship, one might nevertheless sus-
pect that the strength of the US in those industries is 
related to its earlier and more advanced develop-
ment of the corresponding markets for services. 
In the EU, service industries are in general highly 
affected by specific regulations, and "in many coun-
tries services are subject to more government inter-
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ventions than most other activities".'
2 Indeed, 6. Summary 
progress in the functioning of markets through the 
implementation of structural reforms has been 
slower in service markets.
1
3 
This chapter presents the evolution of the services 
sector and investigates its role in the economy. 
The analysis presented in this chapter provides fur-
ther rationale for the economic policy recommen-
dations concerning the measures to be taken in 
order to liberalise and improve the functioning of 
services markets. Clearly, due to the more local 
nature of competition and the heterogeneous regu-
latory approaches of individual Member States, the 
task of lifting existing restrictions and enabling effec-
tive competition in services markets amounts to a 
complex agenda. 
Due to its context, specificity and highly customised 
nature, in many cases the quality of services is diffi-
cult to ascertain even after consumption. 
Consequently, information problems tend to be 
more severe in the exchange of services than on the 
more tangible, and therefore more transparent, 
goods markets. In their extreme form, such infor-
mation problems can effectively hinder the emer-
gence of certain markets for high-quality services. 
Various specific institutional arrangements have 
arisen, which are intended to mitigate the economic 
effects of the uncertain provision of quality (e.g. 
guarantees and legal liabilities, quality controls or 
occupational licensing and certification). However, 
viewed from a dynamic perspective, some state 
interventions may obstruct private entrepreneurial 
initiative. 
As a general rule, in competitive markets charac-
terised by frequent interaction between buyers and 
sellers, one should not underestimate the scope of 
private solutions and creative entrepreneurial 
responses to problems posed by asymmetric infor-
mation. The revision of the largely fragmented field 
of national regulations and restrictions to market 
access should acknowledge the private capacity of 
response to these information problems. 
Due to their nature as intermediary inputs, the effi-
cient supply of specialised external services fulfils 
important functions enabling and affecting the 
competitive performance of many other industries. 
Redesigning an effectively streamlined and coordi-
nated regulatory environment would not only lift 
entrepreneurship and increase competition within 
the sector, but also would generate positive 
impulses for competitive performance and growth 
in the overall economy. 
Data show that: 
• Since the 1970s, the process of tertiarisation has 
been driven primarily by the growth of knowl-
edge-based services. 
• Among the sources of structural development, 
the increase of domestic demand has had the 
most pronounced impact on growth. 
Knowledge-based services and personal and 
social services benefited the most from this rise 
in consumption. 
• The technology effect (as revealed by the change 
of coefficients in the matrix of intermediary 
inputs) has been, in general, most pronounced 
in knowledge-based services. Exceptions are 
Japan and the US where the growth of knowl-
edge-based services appears to have been driven 
more strongly by domestic demand. 
• The share of knowledge-based services, meas-
ured as a percentage of total intermediary 
inputs, has steadily increased. 
These findings point to a process of quaternarisation, 
defined by the steady rise of information and knowl-
edge-based services. The essential difference from 
traditional growth in services is the specific role 
knowledge-based services can play as sources of 
innovation, product differentiation and productivity 
growth for the rest of the economy. 
Concerning the impact of differences in the inten-
sity of input demand of different types of external 
services on the competitive performance of manu-
facturing industries, the analysis for the EU the US 
and Japan shows that: 
• In terms of labour productivity, industries with a 
high demand for inputs from external knowl-
edge-based services appear at the top of the 
rankings in both the European Union and in 
Japan and the US. Industries with high inputs 
from retail and advertising rank second followed 
by transport intensive industries. 
• In terms of value added, industries with high 
shares of inputs from knowledge based services 
grew above the average for total manufacturing 
and were outperformed only by retail and adver-
tising intensive industries, in the EU. In the US 
12 See Sapir et al. (1993). 
13 Broad guidelines of economic policies (2000) 
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and Japan, these industries grew the most and 
well above the average for total manufacturing. 
• In terms of employment, industries with high 
shares of inputs from knowledge based services 
had the lowest decline in the EU and in Japan. 
The US experienced large scale reductions of the 
labour force in these industries, which are not 
observed in other industry groups. 
• In terms of degree of quality differentiation, 
industries with high shares of inputs from knowl-
edge-based services rank first while industries 
with a high level of inputs from retail and adver-
tising still come in second in the EU. 
Comparison of patterns of production and export 
specialisation within the Triad reveals a pronounced 
and increasing structural deficit of the EU in indus-
tries with high level of inputs from knowledge-based 
service, and the highest specialisation in industries 
with no particular reliance on any kind of external 
services ("other"). The US enjoys the reverse pat-
terns of specialisation, with the highest share in the 
value added of the Triad in this group of industries 
and the lowest specialisation in "other" industries. 
Japan has a pattern of specialisation similar to the EU 
but with less pronounced differences across industry 
types. In short, the US is strongest in industries char-
acterised by high shares of inputs from external 
knowledge-based services, which exhibit the high-
est levels of labour productivity and product differ-
entiation. In contrast, the EU is more specialised in 
the group of industries with a lack of pronounced 
reliance on external service inputs, which exhibit the 
lowest potential for product differentiation, the 
nhost severe decline in employment, below average 
growth of value added and the lowest level of 
labour productivity. 
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Box 4.3 WIFO taxonomy: industries clustered by intensity of external service inputs 
Industries characterised by high level of inputs from... 
...transport services (ITRS) 
1530 Fruits and vegetables 
2010 Sawmilling, planing and impregnation of wood 
2020 Panels and boards of wood 
2030 Builders' carpentry and joinery 
2040 Wooden containers 
2110 Pulp, paper and paperboard 
2120 Articles of paper and paperboard 
2220 Printing 
2420 Pesticides, other agro-chemical products 
2430 Paints, coatings, printing ink 
2460 Other chemical products 
2510 Rubber products 
2520 Plastic products 
2610 Class and glass products 
2620 Ceramic goods 
2630 Ceramic tiles and flags 
2640 Bricks, tiles and construction products 
2650 Cement, lime and plaster 
2660 Articles of concret, plaster and cement 
2680 Other non-metallic mineral products 
2710 Basic iron and steel, ferro-alloys (ECSC) 
2720 Tubes 
2730 Other first processing of iron and steel 
2740 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 
2750 Casting of metals 
3420 Bodies for motor vehicles, trailers 
...retail and advertising (IR&S) 
1560 Grain mill products and starches 
1580 Other food products 
1590 Beverages 
1600 Tobacco products 
2050 Other products of wood; articles of cork etc. 
2440 Pharmaceuticals 
2450 Detergents, cleaning and polishing, perfumes 
2920 Other general purpose machinery 
2930 Agricultural and forestry machinery 
2940 Machine-tools 
2950 Other special purpose machinery 
3000 Office machinery and computers 
3120 Electricity distribution and control apparatus 
3140 Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 
3150 Lighting equipment and electric lamps 
3160 Electrical equipment n. e. c. 
3350 Watches and clocks 
3540 Motorcycles and bicycles 
3610 Furniture 
3620 Jewellery and related articles 
3630 Musical instruments 
3640 Sports goods 
3650 Games and toys 
3660 Miscellaneous manufacturing n. e. c. 
...knowledge based services (IKBS) 
2210 Publishing 
2230 Reproduction of recorded media 
2410 Basic chemicals 
2470 Man-made fibres 
2670 Cutting, shaping, finishing of stone 
2840 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal 
2850 Treatment and coating of metals 
2860 Cutlery, tools and general hardware 
2960 Weapons and ammunition 
3210 Electronic valves and tubes, other electronic comp. 
3220 TV, and radio transmitters, apparatus for line telephony 
3310 Medical equipment 
3320 Instruments for measuring, checking, testing, navigating 
3330 Industrial process control equipment 
3340 Optical instruments and photographic equipment 
3510 Ships and boats 
3530 Aircraft and spacecraft 
3550 Other transport equipment n. e. c. 
...other industries 
1510 Meat products 
1520 Fish and fish products 
1540 Vegetable and animal oils and fats 
1550 Dairy products; ice cream 
1570 Prepared animal feed 
1710 Textile fibres 
1720 Textile weaving 
1730 Finishing of textiles 
1 740 Made-up textile articles 
1 750 Other textiles 
1 760 Knitted and crocheted fabrics 
1 770 Knitted and crocheted articles 
1810 Leather clothes 
1820 Other wearing apparel and accessories 
1830 Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur 
1910 Tanning and dressing of leather 
1920 Luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness 
1930 Footwear 
2320 Refined petroleum products 
2810 Structural metal products 
2820 Tanks, reservoirs, central heating radiators and boilers 
2830 Steam generators 
2870 Other fabricated metal products 
2910 Machinery for production, use of mech. power 
2970 Domestic appliances n. e. c. 
3110 Electric motors, generators and transformers 
31 30 Isolated wire and cable 
3230 TV, radio and recording apparatus 
3410 Motor vehicles 
3430 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
3520 Railway locomotives and rolling stock 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Chapter 5 
The internationalisation 
of European services 
This chapter provides an assessment of the extent of 
internationalisation in the European services sector. 
Analysis of services in Europe has to be set against 
the background of the ongoing liberalisation of 
service markets, the creation of the Internal Market 
and, more recently, the introduction of the single 
currency. A primary aim of the liberalisation of serv­
ice sectors has been to introduce competition into 
these markets and, hence, to promote competitive­
ness; more open markets for services may be 
expected a priori to encourage quality improve­
ments and product and process innovation. 
Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
many of the sectors subject to reform represent 
essential elements of the economic infrastructure 
and can have a significant impact on growth and 
efficiency across a wide range of other sectors of the 
economy and on overall economic performance. 
Liberalisation and initiatives towards the creation of 
the Internal Market bring an added international 
aspect to competition in service sectors through the 
removal of barriers to cross-border trade and foreign 
investment. As a consequence, potential market size 
is increased, as are opportunities to realise 
economies of scale and scope. Combined with the 
globalisation of client industries, these changes have 
the potential to boost growth in services trade and 
investment on a world scale. 
Ί. Factors promoting an 
international environment 
for services: the role of 
deregulation and ICTs 
Deregulation in sectors such as financial services, air 
transport and telecommunications has both pro­
moted the international expansion of firms within 
these sectors and helped provide the necessary 
infrastructure for the globalisation of other indus­
tries. Regional initiatives towards the liberalisation 
and deregulation of service sectors have come from 
the EU's Internal Market programme and, else­
where, from other new multilateral structures like 
North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
Mercosur. On a broader scale, negotiations at the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) regarding the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) aim 
to liberalise markets further and to promote compe­
tition in services. 
The harmonisation of EU regulations is concerned 
with setting a minimum level of rules on some 
important features of the behaviour of service 
providers and on the control systems of Member 
States. Apart from this minimum set of rules, there 
is no market regulation policy for services at EU 
level, other than the general rules of EU competition 
Table 5.1 Market structure in services 
Determinants 
Concentration Sunk costs  Regulation 
Degree of competition 
Before After 
Distribution 
Hotels 
Telecommunications 
Banking, Insurance 
Business services 
low 
low 
high 
medium 
low 
low 
low 
high 
medium 
medium 
medium 
low 
high 
high 
low 
medium 
high 
low 
low 
medium 
high 
high 
medium/ high 
medium 
high 
Source: European Commission (1993, 1996). 
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policy. However, national programmes aimed at fur-
ther liberalisation have taken place or are underway, 
though the overall picture is less than unified with 
respect to the degree and speed of liberalisation. 
Nonetheless, the overall degree of openness of serv-
ice markets has increased and opportunities for 
internationalisation have been created. 
An indication of the market structure and level of 
competition prevailing prior to the Internal Market 
programme ("before" column) and an evaluation of 
the current situation ("after" column) is provided in 
Table 5.1. The first three columns show indicators of 
the importance of factors limiting the mobility of 
services across markets and firms within markets. 
Concentration refers to natural determinants of con-
centration such as economies of scale and scope; 
sunk costs may be either tangible (e.g. buildings or 
network infrastructures) or intangible (e.g. reputa-
tion); regulations may either affect the structure of 
the industry (e.g. entry of new firms) or impinge 
upon the conduct of existing firms. As a result of the 
completion of the Internal Market, competition has 
increased in all the branches identified. 
A second impetus for internationalisation (globalisa-
tion) has been provided by new information and 
communication technologies (ICTs). In many cases, 
ICTs have made services more tradable by enabling 
new forms of storage and transmission of services 
and new means of producer-consumer interaction. 
The growth of the Internet has, for example, pro-
vided a vehicle for rapid and wide reaching delivery 
of certain services. Thus, for services for which the 
achievement of a critical mass in a foreign market 
required either the establishment of a network of 
branches or the acquisition of an existing local net-
work, the Internet now provides a realistic alterna-
tive (e.g. banking, retail distribution, online news 
and entertainment services). The impact of elec-
tronic commerce can be seen as even more far 
reaching for some services than for goods.' ICTs not 
only have an impact on information flows but may 
also lead to the increased "commoditisation" or 
"standardisation" of certain types of services. Where 
ICTs increase the possibility for standardisation, they 
may also serve to increase the tradability of services. 
At the same time, standardisation points to the 
increased importance of economies of scale and 
potentially more price-based competition. This in 
turn suggests greater incentives for firms to expand 
their markets and, hence, to internationalise their 
activities. For network services (e.g. banks, insurance 
and telecommunications), as opposed to scale-
intensive services (transport, wholesale trade and 
distribution), ICTs have facilitated the precision and 
quality of services and may actually increase the 
possibility for customisation. 
Thus, the changes to the international environment 
brought about by deregulation and new ICTs pro-
vide a basis for explaining the acceleration of the 
process of internationalisation of services. 
2. International services 
transactions: 
modes of supply 
Many services are, by their very nature, intangible 
and, hence, non-tradable in a conventional sense. A 
defining feature of services that is frequently identi-
fied as determining their lack of "tradability" is the 
need for interaction between producer and con-
sumer for a service transaction to take place. Cross-
border supply alone is, generally speaking, only an 
option where the required level of supplier-cus-
tomer interaction is low. The need for proximity 
between supplier and customer suggests a strong 
presumption in favour of local production of serv-
ices (i.e. commercial presence) over exports of serv-
ices. This presumption is strengthened by the exis-
tence of other forms of barriers to trade; these may 
be legal or regulatory but can also relate to natural 
or social factors and are generally recognised as 
being more important for services than for goods. 
Nonetheless, cross-border trade is important for 
some service sectors, which has led to various 
attempts to characterise international service trans-
actions.
2 Essentially, these characterisations make a 
distinction between services that may be traded in a 
conventional sense (i.e. cross-border supply) and 
those that require factor movements (i.e. movement 
of the supplier, either temporarily or permanently, 
to the location of the client). 
The importance of non-conventional modes of trade 
for services is reflected in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Recognising the greater 
diversity of modes of service "trade" compared to 
that of goods, GATS developed a four-part typology 
(modes) of how producers and consumers may 
interact internationally: 
1 Other specific attributes of e-commerce that may promote the Internationalisation of 
services include the replacement of traditional Intermediary functions (I.e. local rep-
resentation may become less important) and the possibility for 24 hour trading (i.e. 
time-related geographical boundaries are eroded). 
2 See for example: Sampson and Snape (1985), Vandermerwe and Chadwick (1989), 
and Sapir and Winter (1994). 
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• cross-border supply (mode 1), covers flows of 
services from the territory of one country to 
another (e.g. banking or architectural services 
transmitted via telecommunications or mail). 
• consumption abroad (mode 2), refers to situa-
tions where a service consumer or his property 
moves into another country's territory to obtain 
a service (e.g. tourism, ship repair or aircraft 
maintenance). 
• commercial presence (mode 3), implies that a 
service supplier of one country establishes a ter-
ritorial presence, including through ownership 
or lease of premises, in another country in order 
to provide a service (e.g. insurance companies or 
hotel chains).
3 
• presence of natural persons (mode 4), consists 
of persons of one country entering the territory 
of another country to supply a service (e.g. 
accountants, doctors or teachers). 
Karsenty (1999) gives an indication of the relative 
importance of the different modes of supply. 
Although the estimates should be treated with cau-
tion given the data sources used, they provide a 
rough indication of the value of trade in services. 
Karsenty's estimates indicate that trade in services 
amounted to roughly 30% of world trade, and that 
modes 1 and 2 (which represent the part of total 
trade in services covered by conventional trade sta-
tistics) account for roughly 60% of trade in services. 
Two conclusions emerge: firstly, conventional trade 
in services (i.e. modes 1 and 2) is important; sec-
ondly, conventional trade significantly underesti-
mates the importance of overall trade in services. 
One obvious question that arises is to what extent 
recorded conventional trade in services is in fact 
conditional on the pre-establishment of commercial 
presence. In other words, does cross-border supply 
of services reflect ¡ntra-firm transactions, the result 
of franchising and other third party mechanisms or 
is it direct supply by the service provider to the final 
client? For many of the services that are widely 
traded (e.g. ICT services, banking, insurance etc.) 
¡ntra-firm trade is often involved. Although a num-
ber of empirical studies have examined the general 
relationship between exports and foreign direct 
investment (FDI),
4 it would appear that this issue has 
not been addressed specifically for services. 
Nonetheless, given the nature of service transac-
tions it seems reasonable to suppose greater com-
plementarity, or at least conditionally, of trade and 
FDI in services than in goods. 
The levels of FDI required to establish a viable for-
eign commercial presence vary across service sec-
tors. While in sectors such as finance they may be 
considerable, for other services, that are not capital 
intensive and where firms' assets are mainly incor-
porated in their personnel, the cost of setting up a 
commercial presence may be low; in which case, the 
level of "exports" necessary to offset the costs of 
establishing a presence in a foreign market may also 
be low. For this reason, the relationship between 
cross-border trade and FDI, whether they are com-
plements or substitutes, is even less well defined 
than for manufacturing. 
Furthermore, relationships between FDI and trade 
are not limited to service-to-service interactions. 
There is, for example, a clear relationship between 
FDI in wholesaling services and trade in goods. The 
establishment of a foreign wholesaling affiliate for 
the product distribution of the parent company is a 
key mechanism for providing the parent with access 
to a foreign market, allowing economies of scale in 
both production and distribution.
5 One of the 
achievements of the Internal Market, through the 
reduction in intra-EU customs barriers, has been to 
greatly facilitate the achievement of such economies. 
Client demand for service providers with an interna-
tional reach, or the competitive advantage that is 
bestowed, for example, by economies of scale or 
scope, can explain why service firms seek to inter-
nationalise their activities. An alternative motivation 
for internationalisation, particularly of production 
processes, may stem from other positive externali-
ties in foreign locations (e.g. highly skilled man-
power, access to technology and knowledge or 
access to financial or physical infrastructure). It 
should not, however, be assumed that an increase in 
the international activities of firms is an unambigu-
ous indicator of a high degree of competitiveness. 
Firms may adopt internationalisation as a defensive 
strategy in the face of a decline in their domestic 
market share resulting from their failure to compete 
with other domestic firms or foreign suppliers. 
Alternatively, international expansion may be 
prompted by unfavourable domestic factors such as 
skill and technology shortages or lack of access to 
complementary goods and services. 
With regard to commercial presence (mode 3), this need not necessarily Imply the 
need for foreign direct investment (FDI) by service providers. Commercial presence 
may also be achieved through third party methods such as franchising, licensing 
and joint-ventures. 
See Fontagné (1999) for a recent summary. 
In trade statistics, wholesale trade services that are Incidental to the wholesaling of 
merchandise are Indistinguishable from merchandise (goods) trade data. As a result 
the importance of trade in wholesale services Is underestimated. 
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Within this general context, the wide heterogeneity 
of service activities and providers suggests that the 
process of internationalisation will differ consider-
ably across sectors and firms. Moreover, the adop-
tion of flexible strategies that is at the heart of the 
globalisation of industry may be even more impor-
tant for service providers than goods producing 
firms. As noted before, the "non-tradability" of 
many service activities leads to the use of alterna-
tives to the traditional mechanism of international 
delivery, namely exports. 
Hence, foreign direct investment or the adoption of 
third party arrangements (e.g. franchising, licensing 
etc.) can be a prerequisite for service firms to inter-
nationalise their activities. The adoption of flexible 
firm strategies can be observed in service sectors 
such as telecommunications and air transport, 
where an international presence may be achieved 
through direct investment (especially mergers and 
acquisitions) and where, at the same time, interna-
tional alliances are prominent. 
3. Theoretical implications 
of internationalisation 
for growth and 
competitiveness 
From a broad perspective, internationalisation can 
be seen not only as a phenomenon that affects indi-
vidual firms or sectors, but also as one that has wider 
reaching implications for regions and countries. 
Success in internationalisation, and in turn the eco-
nomic growth that it engenders, depends not only 
on the collective ability of firms to compete interna-
tionally, but also on their ability to attract interna-
tionally successful firms or to forge partnerships with 
them. Thus, the potential benefits, and risks, for 
countries and regions may result from either, or 
both, outward internationalisation (i.e. by home 
based firms) and inward internationalisation (i.e. by 
foreign based firms). 
A considerable amount of economic literature exists 
on the benefits of trade and foreign direct invest-
ment, but services are treated explicitly* to a much 
i-ssc- extent. The degree to which theories devel-
oped in the context of trade in goods are applicable 
to services is debatable. Nonetheless, it is broadly 
accepted that the application of the concept of 
comparative advantage is essentially limited to serv-
ices that can be readily standardised and traded as 
identifiably separate units. The fundamental ques-
tion appears, therefore, to be to determine the 
extent to which the characteristics of a given service 
are sufficiently close to those of goods for the same 
theoretical considerations to apply. For many serv-
ices, their characteristics are such that greater 
importance is likely to attach to commercial pres-
ence and, hence, to FDI than to conventional cross-
border trade. Here it is possible to draw on more 
general arguments of the implications of FDI for 
both host and source economies. 
FDI, whether through mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) or through green-field investments has 
important implications for both source and host 
economies, particularly for the latter as it affects 
both the control and characteristics of economic 
activity in a way that is different from cross-border 
trade. Typically, a distinction is made between pro-
duction and financial implications of FDI.' The main 
financial implications of FDI relate to possible substi-
tution between foreign and domestic investments, 
either because investing abroad may reduce invest-
ment in a firm's home location or because foreign 
investment crowds out domestic investment in the 
host location. Thus, in either location, there is a risk 
that internationalisation may reduce domestic 
investment and potentially have negative long-term 
impacts on competitiveness. Alternatively, for the 
host country, foreign investment may encourage 
matching or complementary investments by local 
suppliers and partners, or stimulate investment by 
domestic or other foreign incumbent firms in 
response to increased competition. 
The main direct production related implication of 
FDI, as with conventional trade, is through the effect 
of intensified competition on domestic firms. New 
entrants will challenge the market power of existing 
firms and hence force them to improve their com-
petitiveness through, for example, lower prices, 
higher quality and innovation or improved capital 
and labour productivity. 
Inward investment by foreign firms, or international 
partnerships, may also result in beneficial spillovers, 
with either inter- or intra-industry effects. Because of 
market failures, spillovers brought about by knowl-
edge and technology transfers between parent 
companies and their affiliates may represent an effi-
cient means for filling technological gaps. The 
nature of many service activities suggests that where 
knowledge and technology gaps do occur, they 
6 See lor example: Hindley and Smith ( 1984). Deardorff (1985), Sampson and Snape 
(1985), and Francois (1990). 
7 See Stevens and Upsey 0 992). 
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Box 5.1 Data and measurement issues 
The analysis of the internationalisation and competitiveness of services is subject to severe limitations, both practical 
and conceptual. 
Conceptual limitations relate to the definition of appropriate indicators of internationalisation and competitiveness. 
Given the interdependence of trade and investment for services, it is clear that analysis of competitiveness should not 
be limited to conventional cross-border trade. Observed patterns of (cross-border) trade can no longer be seen as the 
over-riding or all encompassing indicator of competitiveness in an environment in which globalisation leads to more 
complex patterns of international relations and organisation of firms. For services, this problem can be seen as even 
more acute than for goods given the variety of forms of international transactions in services and the fact that the pre-
sumed predominance of cross-border trade is even less well established for services. Furthermore, it is unclear whether 
a high presence of foreign affiliates should be read as a positive or negative indicator of domestic competitiveness"'. 
Practical limitations relate primarily to the lack of harmonised data allowing for quantifiable and internationally com-
parable measures. Available statistical sources do not clearly identify nor precisely measure the different modes of serv-
ices supply. In this chapter, four basic sources of statistical data are used: conventional trade statistics for services; 
foreign direct investment (FDI) data; foreign affiliates trade statistics (FATS) and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) data. 
These data can only provide a partial picture of international transactions, they provide partial information on modes 
1, 2 and 3 of trade in services but do not help to identify third-party means of obtaining commercial presence nor do 
they indicate the importance of mode 4 (movement of personnel). 
The approach has been to treat what data is available in a pragmatic manner, noting in the tables the most important 
disparities in data coverage. 
Data on trade in services are taken from the Eurostat NewCronos Database. Two items listed as service sectors in the 
NewCronos Database are excluded from the analysis in this chapter: "government services, not included elsewhere" 
(its exclusion implies that only commercial services are under consideration) and "royalties and license fees" (excluded 
because they do not relate to a specific service activity). Transactions in the "travel" and "construction services" sec-
tors, which can incorporate elements of trade in goods and are not "purely" services, are not excluded from the analy-
sis, because they both contain important service activities. 
With regard to commercial presence (mode 3), there is a distinction between statistics on foreign direct investment, 
those on mergers and acquisitions and those on the activities of foreign affiliates. 
Foreign affiliates trade statistics relate to the activities of foreign companies and cover a wide variety of indicators on 
the domestic and foreign operations of multinational companies. The data used in this chapter are drawn from pilot 
studies initiated as part of a joint Eurostat/OECD project. They cover inward activities only, that is, activities of foreign 
affiliates in the domestic economy of the reporting country, but do not cover outward activities (i.e. activities of 
domestic enterprises of the country studied in foreign markets). An important distinction between FDI data and FATS 
relates to the population of enterprises covered. For FDI statistics, a minimum of 10% of foreign ownership is used as 
a cut-off point, while for FATS a minimum of 50% is used. 
Availability of data on FDI in services is limited. This holds for services categories, Member States and partners. Data 
on FDI are taken from the Eurostat NewCronos Database. Direct investment flows (outflows and inflows) are defined 
as a sum of equity capital, other capital and re-invested earnings. However, since data on re-invested earnings are avail-
able only since 1995, they have been excluded from the FDI flows presented in this report. 
It should be noted that both trade and FDI data are subject to asymmetry (e.g. what country A declares as outflows 
to country Β differs from what country Β declares as inflows from country A). Data asymmetries are noticeably appar-
ent when considering ¡ntra-EU trade and FDI data. Also, due to revaluation, the FDI position differs from accumulated 
flows. 
Data on M&A provide a further source of information on FDI equity investments. Data are taken from the AMDATA 
database, which mainly deals with acquisitions, including pending deals, and only covers operations that result in a 
change of control over an enterprise''. AMDATA data cover a wider range of companies, as defined by level of own-
ership, than FATS data, but are narrower in the sense that FATS data also cover affiliates that are not created via merg-
ers and acquisitions. AMDATA tends to underreport domestic M&A operations and operations in the service sector. 
aj Ewn ¡if Í iis Maipretetl as a fign of weak aterweííe competition. polenfiel spillovers from foreign affiliate· may lead lo improvements in fufure eompelilivensss and growth In 
tuil A 3SWi raitf-af «lie fe aseé. Mergers arm) aetjuMtar» are («corded in *e sector (activity) e) the farge! company. Il is to be noted that for 1998 dera ers avallatile only fer lhe 
ftst üwsenfítsásm ad ite yœar, Esumate» uñaste by ile Drestofate Qetmsl· Economies and Finance (European Commission) ere used lo provide aggregali» fer 1998 
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may only be overcome via the presence of owners of 
the technology concerned.
8 
Technology and knowledge related spillovers associ­
ated with foreign direct investment or other forms 
of collaboration, have the potential to stimulate 
endogenous growth in the host economy. 
Moreover, where economies of scale and scope in 
the production of technology and knowledge are 
important, the potential for technology gaps to 
occur may be greater for small economies. For this 
reason, small countries able to attract foreign invest­
ment or to trade intensively may benefit relatively 
more from spillovers.
9 
θ Many of the characteristics that are common to a range of service activities relate 
essentially to intangible and often non-codifiable assets (like reputation, human cap­
ital or the ability to access and analyse Information). Despite the efforts of firms to 
protect their knowledge-based advantages, the fact that knowledge is only partially 
excludable suggests that spillovers will eventually occur. 
9 Ireland is, for example, a case In point. 
10 Owing to the year on year volatility of FDI flows, expansion rates are used rather 
than growth rates. For information, the approximate annualised values of the expan­
sion rates shown In Table 4 are as follows: extra-EU services outflows 17%; extra-
EU services inflows and Intra-EU services outflows and inflows 14%; extra and Intra-
EU manufacturing outflows 14%; extra and Intra-EU manufacturing inflows 9%. 
4. Overview of service 
transactions for the EU 
The relative importance of cross-border trade and 
FDI may be compared for goods and services. As 
discussed earlier, commercial presence for services 
can be expected a priori to be more important than 
for goods. Indeed, aggregate data confirm this con­
jecture. As shown in Table 5.2, cross-border trade is 
undoubtedly less important for services than for 
goods, while FDI is more important for services than 
for manufacturing. Moreover, over recent years, 
trade in services has been increasing more rapidly 
than in goods (with the exception of recorded intra-
EU imports) and the expansion rate for FDI in serv­
ices has been higher than for manufacturing 
(see Table 5.3).'° 
From the perspective of the EU as a whole, two 
dimensions of the international integration of serv­
ices can be seen as relevant. Firstly, the integration 
of service markets within the EU and, secondly, the 
integration of the EU in world-wide markets for serv-
Table 5.2 
Trade 
Goods 
Services" 
FDI flows 
Manufacturing 
Services 
FDI stocks" 
Manufacturing 
Services 
EU t  rade and 
Credits 
702 
220 
56 
70 
283 
305 
FDI,  1998, Billions 
Extra EU 
Debits 
675 
202 
28 
55 
171 
277 
of E uro 
Credits 
1205 
264 
43 
83 
250 
395 
Intra EU 
Debits 
1108 
258 
22 
76 
194 
374 
Credits 
1912 
487 
99 
153 
532 
700 
Total 
Debits 
1789 
462 
50 
131 
365 
651 
Credits: exports. FDI outflows, FDI assets of residents of the reporting economy held abroad. 
Debits: imports, FDI inflows, FDI assets (liabilities) of non-residents held in the reporting economy. 
a Excluding royalties and license payments, and government services n.i.e. 
b 1997 values. 
Source: NEI calculations using NewCronos, EUROSTAT. 
Table 5.3 EU trade and FDI growth, 1996-1998, percentage points 
Extra EU 
Credits  Debits 
Intra EU 
Credits Debits 
Total 
Credits 
Notes: 
Credits: exports, FDI outflows. 
Debits: imports, FDI inflows. ι 
a Excluding royalties and license payments, and government services n.i.e. 
b Growth rates for FDI are given by the expansion rate, calculated as the sum of FDI flows for 1996 to 1998 as a share of FDI stocks in 1996. 
Source: NEI calculations using NewCronos, EUROSTAT. 
Debits 
Trade 
Goods 
Services" 
FDI flows" 
Manufacturing 
Services 
8.9 
10.2 
44.0 
61.1 
8.3 
10.6 
30.0 
44.9 
6.9 
7.9 
43.9 
45.0 
7.0 
6.4 
31.0 
43.9 
7.5 
8.9 
43.9 
51.3 
7.6 
8.2 
30.5 
44.3 
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ices. The growing importance of both intra- and 
extra-EU trade and, in particular, investment flows in 
services relative to CDP (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2) 
provides evidence that both dimensions of integra-
tion are at play. Furthermore, in both the intra- and 
extra-EU case, FDI is growing more quickly than 
cross-border trade in services. This may provide an 
indication of the increasing importance of commer-
cial presence for international service delivery and 
the possible gradual substitution of trade by FDI, 
with commercial presence becoming the preferred 
mode of international expansion. 
Turning to the relative importance of European inte-
gration as compared to the integration of Europe 
into world-wide markets for services, analysis of 
aggregate trade and FDI flows data provides a 
mixed message. As shown in Table 5.2, trade in 
services is much less important than trade in goods. 
At less than 20% of total trade, the share of services 
in total intra-EU trade has changed little during the 
1990s (see Table 5.4). Similarly, the share of intra-EU 
imports in total service imports and the share of 
intra-EU exports in total services exports are largely 
unchanged. Thus, although trade in services is 
growing, the Internal Market has not resulted in 
faster growth in trade within the EU than is the case 
for EU trade with the rest of the world. 
In contrast, the share of services in total intra-EU FDI 
inflows has risen considerably, from 63.5% in 1992 
to 74.7% in 1998. The increased importance of FDI 
in services provides an indication that integration in 
services within the EU may be increasing more rap-
idly than in other sectors. In fact, this is an encour-
aging sign, given that FDI flows provide an indicator 
of the establishment and strengthening of commer-
cial presence in foreign markets, and that this is a 
potentially more important component of integra-
tion of services sectors than for goods producing 
sectors. At the same time, comparisons of intra- and 
extra-EU flows point to an increasingly outward ori-
entation of EU FDI. Although the share of intra-EU 
flows has remained relatively stable, at around 60% 
of total FDI inflows for services, the share of intra-EU 
flows in total outflows for services has declined quite 
dramatically. In 1992 intra-EU FDI accounted for 
75% of total FDI in services (outflows) by EU enter-
prises but fell to only 55% in 1998. Therefore, 
although integration of EU service markets through 
FDI is growing rapidly, there is an increasing empha-
sis on investment outside the EU by European 
investors. 
Mergers and acquisitions represent the main com-
ponent of FDI flows, and so a greater insight into 
the evolution of FDI in services can be obtained by 
examining mergers and acquisitions data. Here it is 
possible to distinguish four types of operations: 
national operations involving firms from the same 
Member State; community operations involving 
companies from different Member States; and two 
forms of "international" transactions, those where 
an EU company is the target for a bid from a com-
pany from outside the EU (international EU target) 
and those where an EU company is the bidder for a 
company from outside the EU (international EU 
bidder). Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the evolution of 
the different forms of operations for services and 
industry respectively. Data are presented in indices 
with the average number of operations for the 
period between 1984 and 1986 taken as a base. 
Although the number of national M&A operations 
for services has remained fairly stable over recent 
years, there has been an increase in all other forms 
Table 5.4 Services vs. goods transactions and intra-EU vs. extra-EU transactions in services, 
percentage points 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Services as a share of 
total intra-EU imports 
Intra-EU imports as a share 
of total services imports 
Intra-EU exports as a share of 
total services exports 
Services as a share of total 
intra-EU FDI inflows 
Intra-EU FDI inflows as a share 
of total services inflows 
Intra-EU FDI outflows as a share 
of total services outflows 
Note: Trade data exclude royalties and licence 
19.6 
57.7 
54.8 
63.5 
62.7 
75.9 
fees, and 
Source: NEI calculations using NewCronos, EUROSTAT. 
21.5 
57.7 
55.5 
58.9 
61.7 
66.7 
government services 
20.6 
57.9 
55.7 
64.2 
63.1 
87.0 
in the definition of 
19.1 
58.7 
55.8 
68.7 
61.9 
63.6 
services 
19.3 
57.3 
54.9 
72.2 
57.7 
58.3 
19.2 
55.6 
53.0 
71.8 
63.9 
48.7 
18.9 
55.8 
54.2 
74.7 
58.3 
54.5 
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Figure 5.1 Intra-EU trade and FDI flows in services as a percentage of CDP 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
■ Exports α FDI Outflows 
1997 1998 
Source: NEI calculations using NewCronos, EUROSTAT. 
Figure 5.2 Extra-EU trade and FDI flows in services as a percentage of CDP 
6.0 
5.0 
4.0 
3.0 
2.0 -l-l_l.l-l.lil 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
■ Exports nlmports "FDI Outflows "FDI Inflows 
Source: NEI calculations using NewCronos, EUROSTAT. 
of operations, and these are now above the levels 
observed during the pre- Internal Market boom wit-
nessed between 1988 and 1991. Compared to 
industry, the increase in the number of cross-border 
operations in recent years has been more pro-
nounced, particularly for community operations. 
This points to an increasing importance of the inter-
national dimension of restructuring in services sec-
tors. Moreover, even though the increase in the 
number of community operations has been impres-
sive, it should be noted that the number of interna-
tional operations, particularly where an EU company 
is the target, has been growing more quickly over 
the last couple of years for which data is available. 
This seems to point to an increasing extra-EU 
dimension in the internationalisation of EU services. 
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Table 5.5 
Shares" 
US 
Canada 
japan 
EFTA 
Geog 
Other Countries 
Tot. value 
(Euro bn)
d 
raph  cal com  position 
Trade" (1998) 
Exports 
32.5 
2.3 
5.9 
15.8 
43.5 
220.3 
Imports 
32.5 
2.4 
3.7 
14.5 
47.0 
202.0 
of extra-EU transactions 
FDI flows (1998) 
Outflows 
29.1 
2.1 
0.2 
19.8 
48.7 
69.5 
Inflows 
59.9 
0.7 
3.1 
21.6 
14.7 
54.8 
in servi  ces 
FDI stocks (1997) 
Assets 
45.7 
3.9 
1.6 
11.4 
37.4 
305.4 
Liabilities 
45.2 
1.7 
10.1 
25.6 
17.5 
277.0 
M&A's (1996-98) 
EU bidder 
34.0 
3.9 
1.2 
11.7 
49.2 
1389 
EU target 
55.9 
3.3 
2.7 
11.0 
27.0 
1792 
Notes: 
a Excluding royalties and license fees and government services n.i.e. 
b Due to rounding, some columns may not add up to 1 00. 
c For M&A, only Norway and Switzerland. 
d For M&A, number of operations. 
Source: NEI calculations using NewCronos (EUROSTAT) and AMDATA. 
Figure 5.3 The evolution of services M&A's by type (average 1984-86 = 100) 
2000 
1750 
1500 
1250 
1000 
750 
500 
250 
0 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
National Community — Int-EU target " " Int-EU bidder 
Source: NEI calculations using AMDATA, European Commission. 
The geographical composition of EU services trans-
actions with the rest of the world is shown in 
Table 5.5. As can be seen, the US is the single most 
important partner, most notably with respect to 
inward foreign direct investment, both for mergers 
and acquisitions (i.e. operations where an EU com-
pany is the target), and flows and stocks of FDI 
assets (i.e. EU liabilities). Certainly, the composition 
of inward transactions (including FDI stocks) indi-
cate that developed countries/regions account for 
the vast majority of international activities of non-EU 
service providers within the EU. In contrast, the 
higher shares of other countries/regions for outward 
indicators point to a more diversified composition of 
the international activities of EU service providers. 
This points to an increasingly "global" dimension in 
the outward development of EU service sectors, 
which can largely be explained by the growing 
importance of EU relations with Central and Eastern 
European countries and also other industrialising 
regions (e.g. Latin America and South East Asia). 
Services transactions by Member State 
The discussion of the implications of internationali-
sation for growth and competitiveness suggested 
that there may be strong motivations for firms in 
smaller countries to trade more intensively and 
undertake proportionally higher levels of FDI, and 
for the governments of these countries to create 
incentives, either financial or through the creation of 
positive externalities, to encourage flows in FDI. 
95 European competitiveness report 2000 
Figure 5.4 The evolution of industry M&A's by type (average 1984-86 = 100) 
1600 
1200 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
National Community -~ Int-EU target - - Int-EU bidder 
Source: NEI calculations using AMDATA, European Commission. 
Table 5.6 The importance of trade in services in individual Member States, percentage points 
Trade in services/GDP 
1992 1995  1998 
Service trade/ 
total trade 
1998 
18.5 
16.3 
41.1 
23.7 
19.5 
15.9 
22.0 
22.3 
32.0 
18.8 
15.7 
19.8 
21.8 
20.6 
Intra-EU service 
trade/total 
service trade 
1998 
66.8 
54.7 
59.6 
68.0 
49.6 
n.a. 
52.2 
60.1 
63.9 
72.9 
60.5 
n.a. 
41.2 
54.4 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
EU 
24.1 
7.4 
15.6 
8.7 
11.7 
18.1 
8.9 
21.4 
23.5 
10.1 
10.2 
12.9 
9.6 
11.3 
21.9 
7.8 
13.8 
10.2 
9.2 
20.0 
10.5 
20.8 
24.9 
13.4 
12.9 
12.8 
11.4 
11.4 
25.3 
9.1 
15.1 
12.7 
10.0 
23.7 
10.7 
23.7 
28.8 
13.6 
10.8 
15.8 
11.5 
12.6 
Note: excluding trade in royalties and license fees, and government services n.i.e. 
Source: NEI calculations using NewCronos, EUROSTAT. 
Analysis of the relative importance of trade in serv-
ices for EU Member States supports the hypothesis 
that smaller countries will trade more intensively. For 
trade in services, it is the smaller Member States that 
reveal the highest trade (exports plus imports) to 
CDP ratios (see Table 5.6). There would appear to 
be a distinct group of five Member States - Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Belgium/Luxembourg and Austria, 
- with particularly high trade to GDP ratios. 
It would also appear that there is a relationship 
between the size of the domestic economy and the 
ratio of intra-EU trade to total trade. The share of 
intra-EU trade is noticeably lower for the four largest 
European economies, indicating a greater orienta-
tion outside Europe. Spain and Portugal, by con-
trast, reveal the greatest orientation of trade in serv-
ices within the EU. 
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Table 5.7 The importance of FDI flows in services in individual Member States, percentage points 
FDI flows in services/GDP 
1992  1995  1998 
Service 
FDI/total FDI 
1998 
63.9 
49.9 
63.7 
71.4 
62.5 
54.7 
73.0 
71.0 
60.1 
64.1 
35.2 
55.5 
Intra-EU service 
FDI/total service 
FDI 
1998 
40.5 
60.0 
43.0 
59.2 
49.9 
58.0 
n.a. 
49.9 
97.6 
89.1 
14.0 
56.2 
Denmark·
1 
Germany
1
3 
Spain 
France 
Italy' 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
EU 
0.9 
0.7 
0.7 
1.6 
0.5 
3.4 
n.a. 
1.8 
0.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.2 
3.1 
1.4 
1.0 
0.9 
0.5 
4.8 
n.a. 
0.4 
0.1 
0.7 
1.9 
1.7 
3.8 
2.4 
3.3 
3.2 
0.8 
10.0 
2.3 
2.5 
14.9 
8.8 
3.6 
3.7 
a Excluding: hotels and restaurants for 1 998; excluding real estate and business activities, and other services for 1992. 
b Excluding hotels and restaurants. 
c Excluding real estate and business activities for 1998 and 1995. 
Source: NEI calculations using NewCronos, EUROSTAT. 
On the basis of the two indicators (trade to GDP and 
intra-EU to total trade), three groupings of countries 
appear to arise:'
1 
• Major economies, characterised by low trade to 
GDP ratios and a balanced orientation between 
extra and intra-EU trade: Germany, France, Italy 
and the UK. 
• Small/central economies, characterised by high 
trade to GDP ratios and a medium orientation 
towards intra-EU trade: the Netherlands, 
Belgium/Luxembourg and Austria. 
• Small/peripheral economies, characterised by 
medium trade to GDP ratios and a high orienta-
tion towards intra-EU trade: Spain, Portugal and 
Greece. 
The lack of available harmonised data limits the pos-
sibility of examining the relationship between FDI in 
services and the size of the domestic economy. 
Nonetheless, it would appear that geographical and 
cultural factors may be influential, as FDI flows tend 
to be proportionally more important for Nordic 
countries, the UK and, especially, the Netherlands, 
but low for Latin countries, Germany and Austria 
(see Table 5.7). However, the relatively low shares of 
services in total FDI indicates that it is not services 
that are specifically important for these countries 
but rather that they have high aggregate levels of 
FDI relative to CDP. 
Evidence that country size is important in determin-
ing the relative importance of FDI and its orientation 
is provided by data on mergers and acquisitions of 
services firms.
1
2 Although absolute values and num-
bers of cross-border operations are, unsurprisingly, 
greater for large economies, the value of cross-bor-
der M&A operations relative to GDP is higher for 
smaller Member States.
1
3 Moreover, the share of 
cross border M&A operations in total (i.e. national 
plus cross-border) operations is higher for smaller 
countries (Luxembourg, Portugal, Ireland, Belgium, 
Denmark and Austria) and less important for the 
larger economies (UK, Italy, France and Germany), 
but also for Greece and Finland. 
Community (i.e. intra-EU) operations are more 
important (in numbers) than international 
(i.e. extra-EU) operations for most countries, but 
generally large economies have a lower share of 
Community operations in total cross-border opera-
tions. More detailed examination of bilateral M&A 
relationships between Member States indicates that 
most Community operations are between neigh-
bouring countries or involve one of the "big four" 
investing countries (the UK, the Netherlands, France 
and Germany). 
Overall, the evidence from trade, FDI and M&A data 
tends to suggest that economies of scale are impor-
11 Unfortunately, data on the intra/extra-EU split Is unavailable for Ireland and Sweden. 
12 For more detailed Information, see Baker (2000). 
13 On this basis the UK has a disproportionately high ratio. 
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tant for services and, thus, services sectors in 
smaller countries with correspondingly small 
domestic markets are more "open" to internation-
alisation. However, at the same time, service sectors 
in the larger economies are more outwardly (i.e. 
extra-EU) orientated. This, most probably, is a 
reflection of two factors. Firstly, the larger Member 
States are home to the EU's largest multinational 
service firms and, in turn, these firms have the 
greatest world-wide reach. In other words, the 
domestic market size may be influential in deter-
mining the extent of the geographical projection of 
service sectors. Secondly, the size of the domestic 
market within Member States may still be influen-
tial in determining its attractiveness as a location for 
foreign company affiliates (whether they are 
acquired through mergers and acquisitions or result 
from green-field investments), especially by firms 
from outside the EU. 
5. The sectoral dimension of 
international service 
transactions for the EU 
The heterogeneous nature of service activities sug-
gests that patterns of international transactions will 
vary considerably both in terms of the modes of 
supply and the importance of international activities 
relative to overall activity levels of sectors. 
Table 5.8 considers two measures of the importance 
of nonnational enterprises, the share of turnover 
and of employment, by sector.
1
4 These data indicate 
that there are large differences in the importance of 
nonnational enterprises across service sectors. 
In terms of their share of turnover, nonnational 
enterprises are particularly important, for example, 
in the wholesale trade, especially for the wholesale 
of non-food and non-household goods. For this lat-
ter sub-category, non-EU enterprises have a far 
greater share of turnover than EU enterprises, 
which account for only a third of turnover of all 
nonnational enterprises. A number of "knowledge 
intensive" service sectors, such as computer and 
related activities, advertising and architectural, 
engineering and technical testing services, exhibit a 
relatively large commercial presence of non-
national companies.
1
5 
Generally, shares of nonnational enterprises in the 
services sector in employment are positively corre-
lated with shares in turnover, albeit the importance 
of nonnational enterprises in employment is gener-
ally lower than for turnover. There are some excep-
tions to this general rule, especially in the case of 
sectors where the share of nonnational enterprises 
in turnover is considerably greater than their share 
of employment. This is true, for example, in the 
motor trade, auxiliary transport and several other 
business services. This would tend to suggest that 
nonnational enterprises in these sectors have, on 
average, higher productivity and/or are active in 
higher value segments than national enterprises. 
Table 5.9 provides an indication of the importance 
of trade in services to overall economic activity in 
services sectors in the EU.
1
6 For the purpose of meas-
uring activity in service sectors, data on turnover 
have been used. This choice avoids some of the 
inherent problems associated with the use of pro-
duction values for service activities. As more recent 
comparable data for turnover is unavailable, 1996 
has been chosen as a base year. 
The ratio of total exports to turnover provides a very 
approximate measure of the share of EU production 
of services that is traded.
1
7 With the exception of a 
few sectors, the figures do not exceed 10% and the 
same is true for imports. This finding tends to con-
firm the a priori expectation that conventional trade 
for most service activities is low relative to produc-
tion. 
To the extent that it is possible to make comparisons 
between Table 5.8 and Table 5.9, it is interesting to 
contrast the share of nonnational enterprises in 
turnover by sector and the ratio of imports of serv-
ices to turnover. For sectors such as computer activ-
ities, renting of machinery and equipment and 
other business services (such as legal, architectural, 
and advertising services), imports as a share of 
turnover are generally revealed to be less important 
than the share of turnover of nonnational enter-
prises. This provides cautious support for the a priori 
expectation that commercial presence is a more 
14 FATS on inward commercial presence are available on the basis of pilot studies cov-
ering a limited number of Member States; In Table 5.8 data are reported only where 
available from at least four Member States. 
15 More recent information published by Eurostat (2000) for five Member States 
(Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) covering 
1996, confirms the finding of the importance of foreign affiliates In the wholesale 
sector, In computer and related activities and In advertising. 
16 The calculations are based on data only for those Member States where values for 
both turnover and trade are available. The sum of intra- and extra-EU figures do not 
necessarily equal those for total trade, due to differences in coverage of Member 
States. 
17 These data are drawn from a variety of sources and are typically drawn from enter-
prise surveys; they are based on concepts and measurement methodologies that 
differ from those used for national accounts and balance of payments data. For 
these reasons, the ratios of trade to turnover presented here should be treated only 
as Indicative of relative magnitudes and not as accurate estimates. 
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Table 5.8 Share of turnover and em 
or controlled enterprises, 
NACE Rev.1 
Activity code Description 
50 + 
52 
50 
501 to 
504 
505 
52 
51 
51 excl. 
513 
and 514 
513 + 
514 
55 
63 
71 
72 
742 + 
743 
744 
746 + 
747 
748 
Retail and motor trades 
Motor trade; retail sale 
of automotive fuels 
Motor trade 
Retail sale of automotive fuels 
Retail trade (except motor trade] 
repair of personal and 
household goods 
Wholesale trade 
Wholesale trade except 
of food and household goods 
Wholesale trade of 
food and household goods 
Hotels and restaurants 
Auxiliary transport activities; 
travel agencies 
Renting of machinery 
and equipment 
Computer and related activities 
Architectural and engineering 
activities; technical testing 
and analysis 
Advertising 
Investigation and security 
activities; industrial cleaning 
Miscellaneous business 
activities n.e.c. 
ployment of nonnationally owned 
1994, 1995 
Share of nonnational Share of EU enterprises in total 
enterprises (%) nonnational enterprises (%) 
Turnover Employment Turnover Employment 
11.1 
19.7 
20.0 
5.9 
I; 6.8 
25.1 
28.4 
17.3 
6.0 
33.2 
18.6 
21.4 
20.6 
21.8 
9.5 
16.1 
6.3 
8.0 
9.5 
8.7 
5.8 
18.3 
18.2 
17.1 
5.1 
12.0 
16.6 
18.1 
9.2 
12.3 
7.9 
3.8 
59.7 
62.5 
53.6 
39.2 
32.7 
51.8 
45.4 
32.1 
49.4 
42.2 
41.5 
51.5 
53.9 
47.9 
51.8 
51.3 
53.3 
54.4 
49.5 
30.5 
35.8 
29.8 
Countries covered 
DK, F, IRL, I, NL, 
S, UK 
F, I, NL, S, UK 
NL, S, FIN, UK 
NL, S, FIN, UK 
F, IRL, I, NL, 
S, UK 
DK, F, IRL, I, NL, 
S, UK 
DK, F, NL, FIN, 
S, UK 
DK, F, FIN, 
S, UK 
DK, E, NL, S, UK 
DK", NL, FIN, S, 
UK 
E, NL, S, UK 
DK
a, E, NL, S, UK 
DK, NL, S, UK 
DK
a, E, NL, FIN, 
S, UK 
E (747 only)«, 
NL, S, UK 
DK, NL, S, UK 
Notes: 
Due to the use of different reference years, different country groupings and the combination of various concepts and populations these statistics should only be 
taken as a rough Indication of foreign ownership in the sectors. Data for the Netherlands is restricted to the largest 500 enterprise groups. Data for Italy and Ireland 
are, respectively, for companies with over 50 and 30 persons employed. Data use the ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) concept, except for Spain, the Netherlands 
and Ireland, where an immediate owner or first shot concept is used. 
a Not included in the calculation of the split between Intra and extra-EU shares. 
Source: NEI calculations using EUROSTAT. 
important mode for undertaking international trans-
actions for these services than is conventional trade. 
The distribution of the number of M&A by sector 
and type for the periods 1993-1995 and 1996-1998 
shows that the share of national operations in the 
number of total operations has declined for most 
sectors. Also, for a few sectors this has been accom-
panied by a decline in the share of Community 
operations, notably for advertising, insurance and 
research and development. Figure 5.5 provides a 
description of the "orientation" of M&A operations 
for sectors based on the data for the period 1996-
1998.
1
8 
Air transport and wholesale distribution are found to 
have both a high share of cross-border operations 
and, within these, a high share of Community oper-
ations. This would tend to indicate that internation-
18 Although the data refer to the number and not the value of transactions they do pro-
vide some indication of the relative importance across sectors of the different forms 
of cross-border M&A operations. 
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Table 5.9 Trade in services relative to turnover, 1996, percentage points 
Intra-EU Extra-EU 
Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Mercantile and other trade-related services" 
Transportation 
Other transport" 
Sea transport 
Air transport 
Communications services 
Financial services' 
Insurance services'
1 
Computer and information services 
Operational leasing services' 
Research and development services 
Other business services 
Legal, accounting, management 
and public relations services 
Architectural, engineering 
and other technical consultancy 
Advertising, market research 
and public opinion polling 
Other miscellaneous business, professional 
and technical services 
6.0 
10.4 
4.5 
55.2 
21.4 
1.8 
0.7 
0.7 
3.6 
2.4 
45.5 
2.7 
1.3 
4.9 
3.8 
3.1 
7.6 
10.8 
3.7 
66.8 
23.7 
1.8 
0.5 
0.9 
3.2 
3.1 
35.9 
3.2 
2.2 
5.8 
5.7 
1.6 
6.7 
10.6 
1.6 
62.3 
31.1 
1.9 
0.7 
1.1 
3.1 
1.8 
26.0 
2.0 
1.1 
4.3 
1.3 
5.5 
10.7 
1.5 
74.9 
29.9 
2.1 
0.3 
0.5 
2.6 
2.1 
24.3 
2.0 
1.9 
3.2 
3.5 
Total trade 
Exports 
13.6 
20.6 
5.8 
112.3 
51.8 
3.6 
1.4 
1.8 
6.4 
4.6 
66.4 
4.8 
2.4 
8.8 
5.1 
Imports 
14.7 
21.1 
5.1 
132.9 
53.2 
3.9 
0.8 
1.4 
5.8 
5.4 
56.7 
5.4 
4.2 
8.9 
9.4 
2.7  1.1  5.9  3.1 
Notes: 
In general, for total trade figures and for the major categories the data cover all Member States with the exception of Greece. For mercantile and other trade-related 
services, research and development, as well as many of the sub-categories of other business services, the calculations exclude Spain, the Netherlands, Austria and the 
UK. For transport sub-categories, the calculations exclude Germany and Spain for sea transport and other transport, and Belgium/Luxembourg and the Netherlands 
for air transport. Finally, for the breakdown between intra- and extra-EU trade, no data are available for Ireland and Sweden. 
a Turnover relates to wholesale on a fee or contract basis (Nace 511 ). 
b Turnover relates to land transport (Nace 60) and support and auxiliary services (Nace 63). 
c Turnover relates to interest and commissions received. 
d Turnover relates to gross premiums written. 
e Turnover relates to renting of machinery and equipment without an operator (Nace 71). 
Source: NEI calculations using NewCronos (SBS), EUROSTAT. 
Figure 5.5 Orientation of cross-border M&A for EU services sectors 
Share of 
international 
operations 
in total 
cross-border 
operations 
High 
Medium 
Low 
Share of cross-border operations in total operations (1996-98) 
High 
Advertising 
Sea transport 
Research and development 
Communication services 
Insurance 
Other business activities 
Air transport 
Wholesale distribution 
Medium 
Supporting transport 
services 
Banking and finance 
Domestic retail 
distribution 
Repairs of personal 
and household goods 
Renting of moveables 
Inland transport 
Other transport 
and storage 
Low 
Legal services 
Accountants, 
auditors and 
tax experts 
Hotels and catering 
Recreational and 
cultural services 
Real estate 
Retail distribution of 
motor vehicles and 
fuel 
Other retail 
distribution 
Source: NEI using AMDATA. 
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alisation is important for these sectors but, at the 
same time, restructuring is currently focussed on the 
integration of markets within the EU, rather than 
being more outwardly orientated. To a lesser extent, 
the same is true for other distribution activities in 
the retail segment (domestic retail distribution, 
repairs, renting of moveables). Extra-EU interna-
tional operations appear to be most important for 
advertising, sea transport and research and develop-
ment. International M&A operations are also impor-
tant for legal services and accounting and related 
services, although cross-border operations, overall, 
account for only a low proportion of total opera-
tions. 
In the period 1996-1998 and in most sectors, EU 
companies have been more important, in numbers, 
as a target than as a bidder for international 
(i.e. extra-EU) operations. Exceptions are domestic 
retail distribution, transport support services, bank-
ing and finance and insurance. This indicates that, 
on the whole, non-EU companies have expanded 
their presence in European markets more rapidly 
than European companies expanded their presence 
outside Europe.
1
9 Nevertheless, the large net-out-
flow of investment capital from the EU over the past 
year and a half suggests the possibility of a shift in 
this pattern. 
19 This is particularly the case for real estate, accounting and auditing, air transport, 
research and development and retail distribution (except domestic retail) and 
repairs. 
20 In this section we discuss the sector financial services, which can be split Into insur-
ance services and other financial services. Other financial services include non-
insurance services (financial intermediation and auxiliary services) provided by 
banks, stock exchanges, factoring enterprises, credit-card enterprises, etc. 
6. Selected sectors 
Financial services (including insurance) 
The financial services
2
0 sector accounts for roughly 
two-fifths of total services FDI stocks and for a simi-
lar proportion of FDI flows (see Table 5.10 and 
5.11). The strong presence of EU insurers in markets 
outside the EU relative to that of non-EU companies 
within the EU is reflected by a positive net extra-EU 
FDI stock (i.e. assets less liabilities) of over 33 billion 
Euro. Although Eurostat estimates indicate a large 
disinvestment for the insurance sector in 1998, this 
is counter to previous years for which the data indi-
cates a strengthening of the position of EU compa-
nies in markets outside the EU. By contrast, net FDI 
stocks for the financial services were negative in 
1997 reflecting the importance of EU financial mar-
kets for companies from outside the EU. 
By comparison to its overall importance in FDI, the 
share of financial services in total services trade is 
small, at around 6 percent of total services trade, 
but nonetheless far from insignificant (the financial 
services sector contributed a net surplus of 8.8 bil-
lion Euro in 1998). When compared to indicators of 
overall business conducted in the sector, interna-
tional trade in financial services also appears to 
account for only a small proportion of total activities 
relative to many other services sectors. This would 
tend to indicate that trade in financial service is 
much less important than commercial presence for 
the internationalisation of the sector and accords 
Table 5.10 Trade and FDI in insurance services 
Trade 
Extra-EU Intra-EU 
FDI flows 
Extra-EU Intra-EU 
Share of Total Services'
1 
1996 -1998 (%) 
Credits 3.0 
Debits 1.7 
Growth rate 1996-1998 (%)
c 
Credits 6.5 
Debits 17.2 
1.8 
2.5 
-1.0 
2.6 
2.8 
5.1 
10.8 
51.0 
11.9 
1.7 
42.1 
10.8 
FDI stocks' 
Extra-EU Intra-EU 
Value 1998 (Euro bn.) 
Credits'
5 
Debits' 
5.8 
3.2 
4.4 
6.3 
-8.6 
1.8 
18.5 
0.9 
52.7 
19.1 
50.0 
24.7 
17.4 
6.9 
12.7 
6.6 
Notes: 
a FDI stocks in 1997. 
b Credits: exports, FDI outflows, stock of FDI assets. 
c Debits: imports, FDI inflows, stock of FDI liabilities. 
d Excluding royalties and licence fees, and government services n.i.e. for trade. 
e Growth rates for export and imports are calculated as the annual average growth rate for 1995-1998. Growth rates for FDI are given by the expansion rates, 
calculated as the sum of flows for 1996-98 as a share of FDI stocks in 1996. 
Source: NEI calculations using NewCronos, EUROSTAT. 
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Table 5.11 Trade and FDI in banking services 
Value 1998 (Euro bn.) 
Credits
b 
Debits' 
Extra-EU 
12.0 
5.7 
Trade 
Intra-EU 
12.5 
7.5 
FDI f 
Extra-EU 
37.2 
22.1 
lows 
Intra-EU 
30.6 
23.5 
FDI stocks 
Extra-EU 
74.6 
90.9 
Intra-EU 
129.7 
79.5 
Share of Total Services'
1 
1996 -1998 (%) 
Credits 
Debits 
5.4 
2.9 
Growth rate 1996-1998 (%)' 
Credits 14.2 
Debits 9.3 
4.7 
3.0 
12.9 
6.8 
39.6 
33.0 
96.6 
40.8 
34.1 
24.2 
44.8 
44.2 
Notes: see notes in Table 5.10. 
Source: NEI calculations, using NewCronos, EUROSTAT. 
24.6 
32.7 
32.8 
21.3 
with a priori presumptions relating, for example, to 
the high degree of producer-consumer interaction 
in some segments, the need to acquire country-spe-
cific information, security reasons and regulatory 
issues. 
Growth rates for trade and, to a lesser extent, FDI 
indicate a relatively subdued development of intra-
EU transactions in the insurance sector. The situation 
with regard to extra-EU imports and FDI inflows is 
more dynamic - a possible indication that more 
open European insurance markets are becoming 
increasingly attractive to non-EU providers. For the 
other financial services category, the expansion of 
extra-EU exports and outflows is proceeding more 
rapidly than that of inward transactions. This is also 
the case when comparing extra-EU versus intra-EU 
outflows. Mergers and acquisitions operations fur-
ther suggest an increasing importance for the out-
ward international dimension of the financial serv-
ices sector. Over the last decade, the share of 
cross-border operations in total mergers and acqui-
sitions operations involving EU companies in the 
financial services sector has increased significantly. 
This increase is largely attributable to an increasing 
number of operations where an EU company is the 
bidder for a company from outside the EU but there 
has also been a less pronounced increase in the 
number of such operations where an EU company is 
the target. Merger activity and other FDI underlie 
the significant increase in the size of the largest EU 
firms that has been seen over the last decade, with 
some EU firms now ranked among the world leaders 
in the industry (e.g. AXA (F), Allianz (D), ING/BBL 
(NL)). 
Increased internationalisation of the financial serv-
ices sector is an expected outcome of regulatory 
reform in the financial services sector that has, in 
principle, increased the possibility of establishment 
of foreign bank subsidiaries and other financial insti-
tutions in a number of countries. Moreover, 
advances in information technology increase the 
possibilities of providing new and more efficient 
services in the sector, leading some commentators 
to speak of a "virtual banking revolution".
2
1 These 
technological changes also increase the possibilities 
of remote transactions and thus of cross-border 
trade. However, despite regulatory reform, the 
financial services sector remains one of the most 
heavily regulated services sectors, especially since 
"re-regulation" has brought about stronger pruden-
tial and transparency rules and competition policy. 
Telecommunications services 
Stimulated by the liberalisation of telecommunica-
tions markets and rapidly growing demand for inter-
national services, growth in international trade and 
FDI reflects the underlying dynamism of the 
telecommunications sector (see Table 5.12). It is the 
second fastest growing sector for EU trade, after 
computer services, and the leading sector in terms 
of the expansion of FDI, most notably for foreign 
investments by EU companies outside of the EU. The 
expansion of FDI reflects both regulatory reforms 
that have dismantled the previously protected posi-
tions of (mainly state owned) national monopolies 
and the impact of new technologies that have made 
21 WTO (1998). 
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Table 5.12 Trade and 
Value 1998 (Euro bn.) 
Credits" 
Debits' 
Share of Total Services
4 
1996 -1998 (%) 
Credits 
Debits 
FDI 
Growth rate 1996-1998 (%)
c 
Credits 
Debits 
in telecommunication 
Trade* 
Extra-EU 
4.2 
5.4 
1.8 
2.4 
11.3 
14.9 
Intra-EU 
4.8 
5.7 
1.7 
2.0 
15.1 
19.2 
services 
FDI flows 
Extra-EU 
5.1 
4.4 
8.4 
5.1 
561.2 
209.0 
Intra-EU 
1.6 
3.2 
3.6 
1.7 
167.5 
98.4 
FDI stocks 
Extra-EU 
4.4 
3.1 
1.5 
1.1 
-
-
Intra-EU 
4.8 
7.1 
1.2 
1.9 
-
-
Notes: see notes in Table 5.10. 
* All communication services, i.e. including postal and courier services. 
Source: NEI calculations, using NewCronos, EUROSTAT. 
it possible to deliver telecommunications without 
using fixed networks. 
The above factors have led to a dramatic rise in the 
number of mergers and acquisition operations in 
the sector involving EU companies. Over recent 
years the majority of operations have been interna-
tional and, of these, around 60 percent have 
involved companies from outside the EU. This activ-
ity reflects the increasing struggle of companies to 
become major players at the world level. Incumbent 
suppliers, which remain the major players on the EU 
market, have started to buy-up or acquire significant 
holdings in companies in countries other than their 
home market (e.g. the acquisition of One2one (UK) 
and SIRIS (F) by Deutsche Telecom (D); Airtouch 
(US) and Mannesmann (D) by Vodaphone (UK); 
Orange (UK) by France Telecom (F)). Although there 
has not as yet been a merger between incumbents 
from the bigger Member States, a movement 
between smaller ones has started (e.g. Telenor (NO) 
and Telia (S); and the now aborted talks between 
Telefonica (E) and KPN (NL)). Against the back-
ground of regulatory change, fast growing demand, 
and rapidly changing technology, the high level of 
M&A activity, combined with the search for strate-
gic partners, can be expected to continue. 
The rapidity with which the market dominance of 
incumbent national suppliers has been eroded in the 
telecommunications sector illustrates the impact that 
deregulation and the creation of a competitive envi-
ronment can have in fast growing markets. Ten years 
ago, monopoly structures were the norm in most 
communications markets in EU and other developed 
countries. Full infrastructure and service competition 
is now the general rule in Member States' national 
markets; at the end of 1998 only Greece and 
Portugal maintained monopolies in some areas. Even 
so, limitations on foreign ownership exist in some 
Member States, with governments holding "golden 
shares" or similar provisions to ensure that the dom-
inant operator does not come under the control of a 
single investor (foreign or domestic). 
Computer and information services 
Computer and information services
2
2 represent the 
fastest growing segment of recorded trade in serv-
ices. It should be noted, moreover, that data on 
trade flows significantly underestimates the impor-
tance of international transactions of both embod-
ied and non-embodied computer and information 
services.
2
3 
In recent years there has been an exceptional 
expansion rate of extra-EU FDI by EU companies; in 
1998, over 90 percent of recorded FDI originating 
from the EU went to regions outside the EU. Despite 
this increase, the value of holdings of FDI assets by 
non-EU companies within the EU (i.e. EU liabilities) 
exceed assets held by EU companies outside the EU 
(see Table 5.1 3). 
22 Trade data on computer services covers: computer consultancy, management, 
design and programming, customised software, maintenance and technical support, 
etc. Information services covers database services, online data dissemination and 
via magnetic media, news agency services, etc. 
23 Cross border transactions of embodied computer services (e.g. software supplied 
on CD-ROM, diskettes etc.) are valued according to the physical support and not 
the content; trade statistics do not measure the value of copyrighted works sold in 
foreign markets; trade statistics do not measure the value of software electronically 
transmitted and subsequently sold by foreign affiliates (OECD, 2000). For example, 
US exports of computer and information services (i.e. excluding software) amounted 
to USD 3 billion in 1997 but this may be compared to sales of USD 28 billion by affil-
iates of US companies in 1996, a substantial part (around three-quarters) made 
within Europe. 
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Table 5.1 3 Trade and 
Value 1998 (Euro bn.) 
Credits-
Debits 
Share of Total Services' 
199Ó -1998 (%) 
Credits 
Debas 
Growth rate 1996-1998 
Credits 
Debits 
Notes: see notes In Table 5.10 
Source: NEI calculations, using Nev 
FDI 
(%)' 
^Cronos 
in  computer and related 
Trade 
Extra-EU 
5.7 
4.3 
2.2 
1.9 
24.4 
9.3 
, EUROSTAT. 
Intra-EU 
6.0 
6.2 
2.0 
2.1 
23.4 
21.1 
services 
FDI fl 
Extra-EU 
2.8 
1.1 
2.6 
1.6 
649.9 
65.2 
3WS 
Intra-EU 
0.2 
0.5 
0.7 
0.6 
82.0 
86.3 
Ext 
FDI stocks 
ra-EU 1 
2.3 
2.7 
0.8 
1.0 
-
-
ntra-EU 
3.7 
2.7 
1.0 
0.7 
-
-
The situation for FDI, which is increasingly "out-
warcly" orientated, contrasts with data on trade 
that shows an increasing share of EU trade (imports) 
of computer services is being sourced within the EU. 
However, production by affiliates of non-EU compa-
nies located within the EU may partly explaining the 
apparent increase in the share of intra-EU imports in 
total EU imports of computer and information serv-
ices. It may well be the case that these affiliates are 
producing services for the EU market rather than 
purely local (I.e. Member State) markets and hence 
generating additional intra-EU trade. In this respect, 
the computer and information services sector within 
the EU appears to be characterised by a relatively 
large commercial presence of foreign companies. 
Data on nonnational enterprises (FATS) indicate that 
foreign affiliates account for around 20 percent of 
turnover and employment within the EU, of which 
maybe about a half Is accounted for by non-EU 
enterprises (see Table 5.8). 
The Increasing importance of the Internet is leading 
in a shift towards services by IT hardware and 
telecommunications companies and some of the 
large media groups that are also entering the mar-
ket. Consequently, the typically small IT service 
companies potentially face greatly Increased com-
petition from these much larger rivals. Restructuring 
has led to Increasing M&A activity, especially by 
hardware companies eager to buy-up innovative 
firms providing Web-based or e-business services. 
However, the value of M&A activity involving firms 
from the computer services sector remains low 
when compared to other IT-related segments. 
Finally, It should be mentioned that international 
alliances are an increasingly common feature of the 
computer services sector, especially where software 
providers seek out systems integrators, software 
developers, consultants and Internet or other on-
line service providers. Here analogies can be drawn 
between manufacturing companies' relationships with 
R&D providers (I.e. for software development) and 
wholesaling or complementary distribution mecha-
nisms (e.g. systems integrators, consultants, on-line 
service providers). Alliances of these types reflect the 
essential importance that proximity to the customer 
still retains the computer services sector, as is also 
the case with foreign affiliates. 
Research and Development Services
2
4 
The internationalisation of R&D activities is a key 
component of the process of globalisation and is 
reflected In a rising trend, particularly among larger 
multinational companies, to locate R&D laboratories 
abroad. At the same time firms are increasingly will-
ing to enter into (international) R&D alliances and 
co-operation agreements. These developments 
reflect factors such as the high costs of develop-
ment, the adoption of international technical stan-
dards and the need to access complementary tech-
nologies. Internationalisation of R&D services also 
reflects a broader process of outsourcing of R&D 
activities, which has stemmed from a variety of fac-
tors (e.g. changing organisational focus of compa-
nies, lack of resources, increasing specialisation and 
expertise of R&D services). 
For the reasons noted above, one would expected a 
priori the R&D services sector (and the R&D activi-
ties of firms classified in other sectors) to be highly 
24 The research and development services sector covers the provision of basic and 
applied research, experimental development of new products and processes, and 
the development of operating systems that represent technological advances. 
104 Chapter 5 - The internationalisation of European services 
Table 5.14 Trade and FDI in research an 
Trade 
Extra-EU 
Value 1998 (Euro bn.) 
Credits" 6.1 
Debits' 4.3 
d devei 
Intra-EU 
6.7 
7.8 
opment  services 
FDI flows 
Extra-EU Intra-EU 
0.0 
0.4 
0.1 
0.2 
FDI stocks 
Extra-EU 
0.5 
1.1 
Intra-EU 
0.9 
0.3 
Share of Total Services" 
1996 -1998 (%) 
Credits 
Debits 
Growth rate 1996-1998 (%)
e 
Credits 
Debits 
2.5 
1.9 
27.4 
28.6 
2.6 
3.0 
8.7 
9.7 
0.2 
1.0 
44.9 
164.4 
0.2 
0.2 
76.4 
92.6 
0.2 
0.4 
-
. 
0.2 
0.1 
-
. 
Notes: see notes in Table 5.10. 
Source: NEI calculations, using NewCronos, EUROSTAT. 
internationalised in terms of both foreign direct 
investment and intensity of trade. The use of FDI 
(and trade) is one reason why relatively small indus-
trialised countries (e.g. Sweden, Switzerland, 
Finland and the Netherlands) are able to place 
themselves among the most R&D intensive coun-
tries in the world. 
Both the importance of trade relative to the level of 
activity of the R&D services sector and overall levels 
of FDI in R&D are, however, difficult to evaluate on 
the basis of conventional trade and FDI statistics. 
Data inconsistencies may lead, on the one hand, to 
the importance of trade in R&D services relative to 
R&D effort to be overstated and, on the other hand, 
to the importance of FDI to be understated.
2
5 
What the data do indicate is that trade in R&D serv-
ices is one of the fastest growing segments of over-
all EU trade in services, particularly for extra-EU 
transactions (see Table 5.14). This points to an 
increasingly outward geographical orientation for 
the sector. Even though, at around one-third of total 
imports of R&D services, the share of extra-EU 
imports is relatively low when compared to many 
other services sectors, this share has been increas-
ing. At the same time, the share of extra-EU exports 
has reached nearly half of total EU exports of R&D 
services. Net extra-EU FDI flows and stocks are both 
negative, indicating that foreign non-EU companies 
25 TypicaJJy only firms and organisations whose primary activity is in BSD services are 
covered by enterprises data of economic indicators for the sector, thus significanti/ 
underestimating tfie overall value of R&D activities. By contrast,, trade data on BSD 
services ¡include trade between firms wtiose prieipafl activity is not in BSD,. 
Consequently; trade io R&D services appears to be ver/ high when compared to the 
size of the RÆD services sector. Conversely, data far FDf iin BSD services only cover 
transactions where,, according to its principal activity, tile direct Investment enter-
prise fie., [tie enterprise irto which an investment is made; is classified within the 
RAD serajes sector. 
are investing more in EU R&D services markets than 
EU companies are investing outside the EU. This 
points to the attractiveness to non-EU investors of 
the EU R&D services sector. This is supported by 
mergers and acquisition data that indicate a marked 
increase over recent years in the number of opera-
tions where EU companies have been the target for 
bids from companies from outside the EU, although 
the overall number of operations in this sector is 
relatively small. 
7. Summary 
This chapter provides a description of international 
transactions in market service sectors. 
The theoretical discussion of the internationalisation 
of service activities stresses the importance of com-
mercial presence as a means of undertaking interna-
tional trade in services. Indeed data show that: 
• Conventional trade is less important for services 
than for goods, while FDI is more important for 
services than for manufacturing. 
• FDI in services is expanding more rapidly than 
conventional trade and both are increasing faster 
than GDP. 
• Compared to conventional trade in goods and 
FDI in manufacturing, services are growing more 
quickly and, in particular, the share of services in 
total FDI flows and positions is increasing sub-
stantially. 
These findings point to an increasing internationali-
sation of European services, with commercial pres-
ence becoming the preferred mode of international 
expansion. 
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Concerning the importance of European integration 
relative to the integration of Europe in world-wide 
service markets (intra-EU versus extra-EU), data on 
trade and FDI convey a mixed message: 
• Data on conventional trade show that the share 
of services in total intra-EU trade has changed lit-
tle during the 1990s, and the share of intra-EU 
trade in total services trade (both imports and 
exports) has been fairly stable. 
Thus, although trade in services is growing, the 
Internal Market does not seem to have resulted in 
faster growth of services than goods or in higher 
service trade growth within the EU than with the 
rest of the world. 
• By contrast, the share of services in total intra-EU 
FDI inflows has risen considerably, showing that 
commercial presence in services within the EU is 
expanding more rapidly than in other sectors. 
This is an encouraging sign of service integration 
within Europe, since commercial presence is a 
potentially more important component of integra-
tion in services than in goods producing sectors. 
• At the same time, data point to an increasingly 
outward orientation of European FDI, with the 
share of intra-EU outflows in total services out-
flows declining from three quarters to a half 
between 1992 and 1998 and the share of intra-
EU inflows in total services inflows remaining 
fairly stable. 
Thus, although integration of EU service markets 
through FDI is growing rapidly, there is an increas-
ing emphasis on investment outside the EU by 
European investors. 
Concerning the geographical composition of extra-
EU transactions, the US is undoubtedly the most 
important partner in transactions in services (both 
inward and outward). On the basis of current 
trends, this situation looks set to continue in the 
future. Nonetheless, EU FDI outflows to regions 
other that the US and EFTA, a traditionally important 
partner, are the fastest growing regional component 
of total FDI outflows for services, pointing to an 
increasingly global dimension in the development of 
EU services providers. 
Analysis of the relative importance of service trade 
for EU Member States indicates that smaller coun-
tries tend to trade more intensively and to have 
higher ratios of intra-EU trade to total trade. 
Overall, the evidence from trade, FDI and M&A data 
suggests that economies of scale are important for 
services and, thus, services sectors in smaller coun-
tries with correspondingly small domestic markets 
are more "open" to internationalisation. At the 
same time, however, service sectors in the larger 
economies are more outwardly (i.e. extra-EU) orien-
tated. Should the argument that larger economies 
are more outwardly oriented be true, it could be 
important for determining the long-term implica-
tions of the Internal Market. To the extent that 
European service markets become integrated and, 
hence, location within the EU becomes less impor-
tant for defining a firm's "home" market, the ability 
of firms from smaller Member States to increase 
their geographical reach may be enhanced. 
Across sectors, patterns of international transactions 
vary considerably both in terms of modes of supply 
and in terms of the importance of international 
activities relative to overall activity levels. 
In communication services and computer and infor-
mation services, conventional trade is growing 
extremely rapidly, both inside and outside the EU, 
with the share of intra-EU trade in total trade rising, 
thus hinting at greater integration of EU services in 
these sectors. 
The wholesale trade sector as well as a number of 
"knowledge intensive" service sectors (such as com-
puter and related activities, advertising and archi-
tectural, engineering and technical testing services) 
display a relatively large commercial presence of 
nonnational companies. Air transport and wholesale 
distribution are found to be sectors with both a high 
share of cross-border M&A operations and, within 
these, a high share of Community operations. This 
indicates that internationalisation is important for 
these sectors, and that restructuring is currently 
focussed on the integration of markets within the 
EU, rather than being more outwardly orientated. 
Extra-EU international operations appear most 
important for advertising, sea transport and research 
and development. International M&A operations 
are also important for legal services and accounting 
and related services, although cross-border opera-
tions, overall, account for only a low proportion of 
total operations. 
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Supplement 
B2B e-commerce: 
recent market developments 
and future challenges 
It is in the business to business domain (B2B) that 
the real e-commerce revolution is happening, in 
contrast with the business to consumer field (B2C), 
which may follow a more evolutionary path. B2B is 
the core of the "e-market", the most important in 
economic terms, with more than 80% of total e-
commerce activities. It is the fastest growing and 
most rapidly evolving area of e-commerce. 
Beyond its direct impact, B2B e-commerce has 
broad indirect effects that reach far beyond the total 
amount of trade. B2B impacts company and market 
structures. It affects the competitiveness of individ­
ual firms and of entire sectors of the economy. B2B 
is changing traditional patterns of economic behav­
iour and shaping a new business culture. Most 
importantly, B2B - combined with the Euro - repre­
sents a powerful catalyst for the Internal Market. 
Therefore, for policy makers, B2B is clearly a strate­
gic area and a clear understanding of B2B is crucial. 
New challenges are emerging as electronic markets 
develop. Competitive imbalances may appear 
between the "offline" and "online" environments, 
between new and established players. The main pol­
icy challenge is to manage the change towards the 
digital economy. 
This supplement gives an account of the recent mar­
ket developments and discusses the economic and 
organisational impacts of B2B e-commerce. 
Ί. B2B: 
concepts and measures 
Defining B2B 
Multiple definitions of e-commerce exist, none of 
them fully satisfactory.
1 The same applies to B2B. 
• A positive definition is difficult. B2B encompasses 
a complex and fast evolving set of activities car­
ried out electronically inside companies and 
between companies. Certainly, B2B is not limited 
to "electronic transactions" or to "electronic 
trading" - it also concerns broader structural 
aspects, both between and within companies. 
• A negative definition may be easier. B2B can be 
described as encompassing all e-commerce 
activities that do not address either a final indi­
vidual consumer (B2C) or public authorities 
(B2G). This is not only a functional difference. It 
also entails a major difference in legal regime. 
In general, legal and regulatory issues are simpler in 
B2B than in B2C, particularly for cross-border activ­
ities. Complex, often contradictory, regulations (e.g. 
privacy, consumer protection, jurisdiction, commer­
cial communication, and consumption taxes) are 
hampering the development of global B2C. 
In contrast, B2B builds largely on established laws 
and practices (e.g. private international law, free­
dom of contract, contractual choice of court, well 
established and effective arbitration procedures). In 
B2B, regulatory issues (e.g. electronic contracts) 
tend to be more straightforward - and less politi­
cally sensitive - than when final, individual 
consumers are involved. 
However, borders between B2B and B2C are  1 "... In a loose sense [e-commerce] means doing business over the Internet, selling 
goods and services which are delivered offline as well as products which can be 
"digitised" and delivered online, such as computer software", see OECD becoming blurred, as many companies engage 
(2000b) p. 194. 
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Box 1 Blurring boundaries, examples 
• B2C companies ("e-taiiers" such as book distributors or e-supermarkets) almost always engage "upstream" in B2B 
as they source from other companies. 
• Conversely, many manufacturers (e.g. car and pharmaceutical companies in the US) seek to use their e-commerce 
expertise "downstream" in retail activities to reach the final consumer (implementation of e-commerce, once 
started, rarely stops at the supply chain). 
• Additionally, pivotal wholesaling activities are under pressure both from "above" and from "below". Powerful retail-
ers move up the distribution chain into wholesaling, while manufacturers move down the chain into "new inter-
mediary" or "market maker" position. 
simultaneously in a number of different activities. B2B estimates 
The growing convergence into a continuum of 
related activities - where B2B merges with B2C into 
"e-business" - may challenge such differences in 
legal regimes in the future (see Box 1). 
Even where surveys claim to measure the same indi-
cators, discrepancies occur, ranging from 200% to 
500%. However, most surveys agree that B2B will 
grow exponentially in the next years (see Figures 1 
and 2). Some analysts believe that the so-called "e-
Measuring B2B hype" of excessively optimistic forecasts will soon 
give way to more realistic expectations based on 
actual experience in the market. 
According to all estimates, B2B is already big -
according to Goldman Sachs (2000) it reached 
135.3 billion USD in 1999 and it is growing fast, Nevertheless, the picture is still rather incomplete 
expected to reach 1304 billion USD in 2002. and sometimes divergent (see Box 3). Opinions dif-
However, gauging the true size of B2B is fraught fer as to when and where B2B will become the 
with severe measurement problems (see Box 2). norm. They also vary on who will drive e-commerce 
Box 2 Official statistics vs. private sector estimates 
There is a lack of official statistics. The US is the only country to have published official figures - and that only for very 
specific sectors (US Department of Commerce, 2000). In Europe, no official statistics are available yet at Community 
level. 
However, a number of OECD Member Countries (US, Canada, Australia, Denmark) are leading the way. These coun-
tries are addressing B2B measurement problems either through ad hoc surveys (e.g. Nordic Countries joint e-com-
merce survey), or by adding specific "new economy" indicators to existing surveys (e.g. small business census in 
Canada). A model survey, including a set of basic "new economy" indicators, is being developed (see OECD, 2000a). 
This includes e-readiness as well as e-intensity indicators. The last phase of the proposed OECD methodology concerns 
the measurement of "impact", which includes measures of the degree of business transformation. The aim of such a 
model survey, to be adopted by all OECD members, is to ensure international comparability, as well as to assess the 
specific added value of B2B. OECD-defined indicators are thus forming the basis of recent Eurostat proposals. 
Additionally, Member States and the Commission services, in particular DG ENTR, have worked together to develop a 
normalised questionnaire that can support a harmonised survey of enterprises on e-commerce readiness and intensity 
at European level. The survey is planned to be carried out during the first quarter of 2001. 
Private sector estimates offer a less uniform picture. Their purpose differs from official data collection - they aim at facil-
itating strategic decisions by companies, rather than assessing long-term trends in support of policy developments. 
Methodologies differ widely (sample surveys, proprietary modelling), as does the choice of indicators. For instance, 
Forrester Research measures "transactions in which the final order is placed on the Internet", IDC estimates "transac-
tions initiated on the Internet", Goldman Sachs tracks "transactions which are both initiated and completed on the 
Internet". Some estimates include Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) thus drastically enlarging the B2B universe; oth-
ers only measure Internet-only companies. 
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- the dotcom businesses or the "net-enabled" seem to play a much stronger role in this transfor-
incumbents. In Europe, "old-economy" companies mation process than in the US. 
Figure 1 Business to business e-commerce world revenues 
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8000 
7000 
6000 
5000 
4000 
3000 
2000 
1000 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
—"—Gartner —· —IDC ■ eStats/eMarketer M Goldman Sachs 
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Figure 2 Regional business to business electronic commerce forecast 
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Box 3  B2B, some key trends 
B2B will grow at a compound rate of 92% a year over the period 2000-2003 (OECD,2000b). 
B2B will reach $ 7,000 billion world-wide in 2003 in the US (Forrester, 1999, Gartner, 2000). 
B2B will represent more than 7% of total world GDP in 2003 (OECD, 2000b). 
The relative share of B2B vs. B2C will continue to increase - from 80% in 2000 to 90% in 2003 (IDC, 2000). 
The ratio of B2B to traditional transactions is growing rapidly. However B2B e-commerce will remain a fraction of 
all business transactions -19% in the US by 2003, 11% in Japan (OECD, 2000). 
The share of US B2B in world-wide B2B is expected to decline rapidly - from 80% in 2000 to 50% in 2003 (OECD, 
2000). 
Ε-exchanges and e-marketplaces are exploding from 1000 in 2000 to 3000 by 2003 (Gartner); e-market places rev­
enues will grow from 7.5% of world-wide B2B revenues in 2000 to 55% in 2004 (IDC, 2000). 
SMEs still tend to concentrate primarily on B2C. In the US, a large proportion of SMEs (44%) are focusing prima­
rily on the B2C market. Only 24% focus primarily on B2B. The same seems to apply in the European Union. 
2. B2B, a contrasted picture: 
sectoral, geographical and 
company size 
Across countries 
The take-up of B2B varies considerably from country 
to country. In this respect, the sectoral composition 
of the economy in various Member States may 
explain the very different dynamics of development 
of B2B (see Box 4). 
2 See US Department of Commerce (2000). 
Across sectors 
B2B take-up varies also considerably across sectors. 
In general, take-up is faster in sectors with a strong 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
2 tradition - e.g. 
motor vehicles, European retail. It is also increasing 
faster in industries, which are traditionally informa­
tion dependent - e.g. ICT and logistics. 
Other factors include the presence of a diffuse sup­
ply chain (e.g. fishery industries, chemicals), and/or 
strong technology innovators (e.g. ICT). B2B take-
up is also strong in industries where processes rep­
resent more than 20% of total costs (e.g. transport), 
where products exhibit complex configurations 
(e.g. aerospace), and where expense pressure is 
intense (e.g. consumer electronics) (see Table 1). 
Box 4  B2B take-up, a contrasted geography 
Business use of the Internet reaches very high rates in "leading countries" (Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands) 
where Internet connectivity reaches "saturation point" (89% and 95% of businesses connected). However, what­
ever the degree of development, there is a contrast between "Internet connectivity" and the ability to engage in 
full, end-to-end, e-commerce. 
Other Member States are far less advanced (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal). Starting from low use, countries show 
however important growth differentials. 
There seems to be a direct relation between local access costs and use of Internet (OECD, 2000b). 
Table 1 B2B take-up, the leading sectors (% of B2B sales in 2003) 
Aerospace 
ICT 
Chemicals 
Automobile vehicles and parts 
Medical equipment 
Transport 
35% 
25% 
20% 
18% 
17% 
17% 
Source: Gartner Group,2000. 
112 Supplement - B2B e-commerce: recent market developments and future challenges 
Across company size 
In B2B, size seems to matter. B2B is taking off faster 
in large companies than in SMEs - reflecting the fact 
that larger companies are well placed to exploit 
economies of scale in logistics, administrative costs, 
stock management, and marketing. Recent EU-wide 
polls (see MORI, 2000) indicate that only 66% of 
SMEs have Internet access as opposed to 76% of 
large companies. Far fewer SMEs are actually using 
the Net at this stage to generate sales in one way or 
another (30% in retailing, 1 7% in manufacturing). 
Figures are still smallerfor fully-fledged e-commerce 
- only 6% can carry end-to-end transactions. 
Figures for the US indicate that 31 % of SMEs use the 
Internet to "source" electronically, and 11% to sell.
3 
In general, however, it can be argued that SMEs are 
likely to experience higher growth than large com-
panies. This, of course, should be qualified by the 
fact that SMEs are starting from a lower level, and 
that the whole market is growing very rapidly. 
3 See Goldman Sachs (1999). 
4 See Goldman Sachs (1999). 
3. Assessing the B2B 
revolution 
Though quantitative measurements remain impre-
cise, qualitative assessments of the B2B revolution 
are more reliable. The shift in investor interest from 
B2C to B2B, as well as the growth of new market-
places, has prompted further analysis both by pri-
vate consultants and academic institutions. Taken 
together with earlier assessments of supply chain 
management and "extended enterprise" phenom-
ena, these studies reveal complex and accelerating 
structural changes in companies and marketplaces 
(see Box 5). 
From cutting costs to shaping 
marketplaces 
Cutting costs has been a powerful initial driver of 
B2B. Cost savings represent up to 40% on purchas-
ing and procurement (e.g. 29%-39% in electronic 
components, 22% in machining/metals).
4 This has a 
measurable impact on individual companies, and on 
the economy as a whole. However, the macroeco-
nomic impact of such cost reductions still needs fur-
ther analysis. These may either result in higher prof-
its or in lower prices - thus channelling growth 
through different mechanisms and with a different 
sectoral impact. 
The real e-commerce revolution goes beyond cost 
savings. B2B not only reduces the time it takes to 
get a product to market; it also speeds up processes, 
improves quality and ensures better service. In this 
highly competitive environment, usually charac-
terised by increased price transparency, better exe-
cution is often more important in ensuring success 
Box 5  B2B revolution, from streamlining the supply chain to building "value constellations" 
From the "first generation" e-commerce model based on "ERP" ("enterprise resource planning"), dominant in the 
1980s and early 90s, which is an approach centred on the individual company and concentrating on the internal 
use of IT to improve productivity and cut costs, B2B evolved to 
The "extended enterprise" model, which is still the rule in many industries. This is a more open but still limited 
vision of e-commerce where large companies trade with a limited number of known smaller firms (the so-called 
"hub and spoke" or "one to many" structure of EDI "clubs"). This approach mainly focuses on streamlining the 
supply chain. 
The "collaborative commerce" model is now emerging in a number of industries. This model is characterised by 
more fluid and complex relationships, conducted on open global electronic market. It involves potentially large 
numbers of known and unknown partners. It also entails much more complex processes of information exchange 
and value creation between partners (e.g. "specificator software" for collaborative design between manufacturer 
and client). Such multidimensional ("many to many") relationships between suppliers, customers and intermedi-
aries are often described as "value constellations". 
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Figure 3 When will e-commerce become the norm? 
Penetration In % 
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70% 
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0% 
43  44 
^B 
Marketing  Sales Post-Sales 
11998-1999 »2000-2001 Β 2002 
Purchasing 
Sources: EITO Report (1999), IDC (2000). 
than the advantage of being the first to market a 
product. The edge goes to firms who are better able 
to "execute", in particular through more efficient 
integration of internal ("back end") processes and 
external ("front end") activities. 
From closed to open markets, from linear 
to multidimensional relationships 
The Internet - a "network of networks" based on 
open, interoperable protocols - represents a funda­
mental shift from closed, proprietary networks using 
proprietary protocols (as in EDI) to open global net­
works. From being a mere conduit, the network is 
becoming the market. 
In short, the evolution is from "basic" e-commerce -
with its focus on reducing costs, on control of the 
supply chain and on trading tangibles - to "full" e-
commerce - centred on maximising value, on cre­
ative and on proactive strategies and on adding 
value through service and relationships. 
The B2B landscape is rapidly evolving. Very few 
companies or sectors remain unaffected by the 
Internet and by new ways of doing business elec­
tronically. Very few, however, are Internet-specific 
companies. Most companies are hybrids - sharing 
characteristics of both the offline and the online 
environment. 
In fact, the move from "first generation" e-com­
merce tools and strategies to new forms of "collab­
orative" B2B can be a challenge for user industries. 
For example, the integration of business software 
applications already in use with new e-commerce 
tools is often a major problem, as is the migration 
from EDI to Internet systems. The interoperability of 
technologies and business processes is not always 
ensured. This evolution is also a challenge for ven­
dors, as "classic" providers of business software and 
"enterprise solutions" are challenged by new players 
offering integrated "collaborative commerce" prod­
ucts. 
Hybridisation takes other forms too. Traditional 
"bricks and mortar" companies are aggressively 
expanding (directly or through new subsidiaries) 
into e-business. Conversely, "pure" Internet compa­
nies are seeking to "materialise" their activities 
(through the acquisition of warehouses and by set­
ting up high-street stores). 
The emergence of B2B will certainly not result in the 
total disappearance of "traditional" commerce. 
However, it is clear that B2B may rapidly become 
the norm for European businesses. This does not 
mean that all sales of all companies will be done 
over the Net but it does imply that various Internet 
tools and processes will rapidly, and irrevocably, find 
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Box 6 Ε-exchanges, a heterogeneous environment 
• some e-exchanges are traditional exchanges of goods or services moving online (e.g. London Tea Market, Dutch 
Flower exchange); 
• some are new exchanges launched by a number of different players (vendors, user industries, trade associations, 
public bodies); 
• some are "vertical" exchanges, filling the needs of specific sectors (e.g. plastics, chemicals, gold and even wine). In 
many areas, accelerated diversification into highly specialised markets is taking place (e.g. individual markets for 
specific chemicals); 
• some are "horizontal" platforms set up by vendors to service many different; some are enterprise specific; 
• some are neutral platforms among equals; some are set up by dominant industry players; 
• some are open; some are closed (by invitation only). 
their way into business processes, and will be used 
by a majority of companies. 
"Most businesses believe that e-commerce will 
become the norm for each of the sales, post-sales, 
purchasing and marketing functions within three 
years, i.e. before the end of 2001 " (Figure 3).
5 
For many companies, however, this race to embrace 
e-commerce may lead to failure. Not only is it likely 
that a number of "dotcom" businesses will fail, but 
traditional companies will also have to prove that 
their e-business projects can be successfully 
delivered. 
Impact on inter-enterprise relations: 
outsourcing and "intangible" assets 
B2B not only affects the internal organisation of 
companies; it has a strong impact on inter-enter­
prise relations - e.g. subcontracting, supply chain 
management, procurement, product develop­
ments, marketing and distribution. 
B2B is accelerating the move to outsourcing, paving 
the way to innovative, dynamic and flexible forms of 
inter-enterprise relations. This is reinforced by the 
emergence of increasingly complex, intangible 
products (software, services, etc.). In many cases, a 
company's main asset resides in the value added 
capability derived from knowledge, services offered 
and intellectual property rather than machinery and 
physical inventory. In many sectors (logistics, ICT, 
services), this shift from tangible to intangible prod­
ucts is driving an evolution from linear, vertical sup­
ply chains - organised in a traditional, hierarchical 
manner - to new networks of interdependent, flexi­
ble, competence-based companies. In short, a com­
pany's competitiveness depends as much on its own 
organisation as on the efficiency of its network of 
customers, suppliers, partners and intermediaries. 
Impact on market structures: electronic 
exchanges 
A specific aspect of such new relationships is the 
fast-growing phenomenon of electronic market­
places (e-exchanges). Over the past year, more than 
1000 such electronic marketplaces were launched 
and this number is expected to triple until 2003.
6 
Exchanges are a highly specific activity, a subset of 
overall B2B. For many companies, taking part in an 
exchange is only one of a number of possible, 
broader e-business strategies (one of the existing 
channels for sourcing). E-marketplaces establish 
communities of buyers and sellers, as well as mech­
anisms that allow business to participate cost-effec­
tively in national and global markets. 
E-exchanges: the "small business' ticket 
to e-commerce"? 
For some analysts, electronic marketplaces are the 
"small business' ticket to B2B e-commerce".
7 
According to Goldman Sachs
8, SMEs will be the 
main drivers of B2B (from 1 7% of global Internet 
commerce in 1997 to 30% in 2003). In many areas, 
SMEs are already key users of such marketplaces. 
This contrasts sharply with former views that SMEs 
risk being "trapped" in such networks run by large 
5 "Becoming the norm" is defined as follows: "When 50% of organisations in a partic­
ular country or industry sector have adopted a new practice and/or new technology, 
a critical mass can be said to exist for that practice/technology, compelling further 
adoption by other organisations if they are to remain competitive" (EITO,1999). 
6 See Gartner (2000). 
7 See IDC (2000). 
8 See Goldman Sachs (1999). 
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companies. Today, the main concern of SMEs is to 
become an integral part of emerging electronic 
marketplaces and to avoid being locked out. 
Electronic marketplaces take many different forms, 
with different drivers and different rules (see Box 6). 
Large players and vendors play a key role. However, 
there are several common issues that need to be 
addressed so that SMEs can truly participate in B2B. 
These include inter alia, the establishment of a com-
mon system to automate and consolidate the verifi-
cation process, the provision of efficient and cost-
effective conflict resolution and of automated credit 
management services. 
B2B: "net bubble" or "creative 
destruction"? 
It is generally recognised that a number of e-
exchanges are doomed to fail. On the one hand, it 
is clear that in a number of areas, future growth 
expectations have been too high, leading to the 
recent correction. On the other, we may be wit-
nessing a process of creative destruction that always 
occur in dynamic industries. 
As in the retail "dot.com" environment, causes for 
failure include the inability to aggregate a critical 
mass of users - there may be just too many 
exchange places for the market to support. Another 
factor is the lack of a sustainable business model - a 
variety of revenue models (advertising, subscrip-
tions, transaction fees) are being tested with more 
or less success. Moreover, the vast majority of these 
exchanges are centred on classical, "linear" 
buy/sell/auction models. There are currently only a 
few examples of advanced collaborative commerce 
marketplaces. 
Therefore, it is likely that the "net bubble" will burst 
not only in the B2C area, but also in the field of B2B. 
There will be winners and losers. For vendors, such as 
B2B software providers, early winners may keep their 
advantage, while others may disappear. For user 
industries, and in particular for "traditional" compa-
nies, failures may also occur. This is not because the 
migration to e-business is "wrong" (as many estab-
lished companies still believe), but because specific 
business models, strategies and methods of imple-
menting e-business will have failed. 
Despite such failures, it is clear that e-business will 
increase substantially. The question is not if, but 
when, it will become the norm. The main challenge 
for enterprise policy is thus to manage the change. 
4. Enterprise policy issues 
The development of B2B has crucial implications for 
the EU's enterprise policy. It has a direct impact on a 
number of key areas, such as competitiveness issues, 
SME policies and standardisation. The EU's policy 
has traditionally focused on removing inhibitors and 
barriers in order to foster a market-driven process. 
This has been done, primarily, by guaranteeing 
undistorted competition, preventing anti-competi-
tive market developments, and ensuring the right 
conditions for entrepreneurship to develop. 
Consensus building (e.g. through standardisation, 
or through the promotion of self-regulation and co-
regulation) has also played a key role. 
In this perspective, a number of new questions and 
challenges may arise. These concern the impact of 
B2B on productivity, prices and growth; the means 
ensuring a broad participation of SMEs in B2B; the 
role of standardisation in shaping open electronic 
marketplaces; the development of better synergies 
between SME policies, research, innovation and 
standardisation to promote the take-up of B2B and 
finally how to encourage traditional sectors to 
embrace fully the new opportunities. 
Macroeconomic estimates: an uncertain 
picture 
This is a crucial area for policy makers. Goldman 
Sachs estimates that cost savings in B2B alone will 
bring a sustained extra economic growth of 0.25% 
per annum over the next ten years. If this were true, 
B2B would have a major impact on growth - a fact 
that should not be politically ignored. Similarly, the 
impact of the B2B revolution on job creation and 
employment is of prime political concern. In short, 
increases in the use of B2B are likely to provide an 
additional impetus to economic progress, and may 
unleash some of the network or scale effects that, so 
far, have been very difficult to detect in the data. 
So far, the analysis is mainly based on the assump-
tion that B2B will lower prices and costs which will 
stimulate demand, both directly (through price elas-
ticity of demand) and indirectly (through wealth 
effects). This is the proposed explanation for the 
combination of full employment, low inflation and 
rapid growth experienced in the United States
9 as 
well as in some European countries. 
9 See US Department of Commerce (2000). 
116 Supplement - B2B e-commerce: recent market developments and future challenges 
If this analysis is correct, B2B may, however, induce 
changes in many areas, such as productivity, invest-
ments and savings. The fundamental economic laws 
of the "new economy" may not differ from those of 
the industrial age. But the dynamics might change, 
and the short-term effects might differ from the 
long-term perspectives. 
Thus the challenge is to reliably assess and fully val-
idate the macroeconomic effect of B2B, i.e. its full 
impact on productivity, growth, job creation, and 
inflation. Transmission mechanisms are still far from 
being fully understood. Past difficulties in assessing 
a narrower phenomenon - the impact of ICT on 
productivity - foretell future difficulties in assessing 
far more complex e-business processes. In addition, 
B2B is still at an early stage so that the macroeco-
nomic impact is difficult to measure. 
In the absence of statistical evidence concerning the 
impact of B2B commerce on growth there is real 
political interest in benchmarking national policies 
aimed at stimulating e-business. Although these lack 
methodological consistency, they seem to be inter-
esting for the assessment of macroeconomic param-
eters. Further analysis is necessary to explore the 
validity of these indicators, which in going beyond 
the traditional ones show a country's readiness for 
structural change. 
SME policy issues 
• B2B: global opportunities, global 
challenges 
For SMEs, e-commerce represents unprecedented 
opportunities. With the "death of distance" and the 
lowering of barriers to entry in global markets, e-
commerce allows SMEs to "punch beyond their 
weight" and, in many cases, successfully take on 
much larger companies. SMEs are therefore ideally 
placed, in theory at least, to benefit from the e-com-
merce revolution, not only in terms of cost savings 
and improved processes, but also in terms of 
expanding opportunities. 
However, obstacles are well documented: high 
telecommunication costs, limited bandwidth avail-
ability, skill gaps and training challenges, difficult 
access to finance, administrative obstacles to the 
creation of companies, legal and regulatory com-
plexities of cross-border trade, lack of recognised 
brands, need to ensure transaction security, etc. 
Additionally, in many areas (for example distribu-
tion), distance still counts. Proximity is an asset, and 
SMEs remain crucially dependent on the efficiency 
of logistics. 
The key challenge is to ensure that SMEs fully grasp 
the opportunities not only of e-commerce in gen-
eral, but specifically of B2B. At this time, for a num-
ber of reasons, B2C seems to be a key preoccupa-
tion for the majority of SMEs, both in the US and in 
Europe. The challenge is to ensure that SMEs 
become key players in the "main league" of e-com-
merce - B2B. This is where the money is, and where 
legal and regulatory hurdles are less daunting, but 
where fierce commercial competition from global 
players is at its most intense. 
• Global competition - the ultimate test for 
entrepreneurship 
At stake is the competitiveness of SMEs. In the B2B 
environment, only the most competitive companies 
will succeed. Easier access to global markets is coun-
terbalanced by easier access to home markets by 
global competitors. Professionalism, quality of man-
agement, excellence of products, strength of 
brands, reliability of supply are the condicio sine qua 
non of success and of survival. What applies in the 
global markets will also apply at local/national level, 
where many SMEs will concentrate their activities. 
• "Awareness" and "best practice": 
reassessing the role of public policy 
In this highly competitive environment, the chal-
lenge is no longer to promote "awareness". Most 
EU entrepreneurs already know about e-commerce 
and about B2B. Industry itself (vendors, trade asso-
ciations, consultants) has done its job. The challenge 
is to see SMEs move beyond the learning phase and 
put their new found awareness of e-commerce into 
practice. This is a task in which the industry has a 
crucial role to play. Generic public campaigns, par-
ticularly at EU level, are in general no longer justi-
fied. However, targeted public-private initiatives 
(such as the Syntens initiative in the Netherlands, or 
the Go Digital initiative under the e-Europe 
umbrella) may have a role to play. Additionally, 
while generic awareness campaigns may not be use-
ful, there is a need for targeted regional support, 
especially in the less favoured regions. Promoting 
the information society, through packages of spe-
cific measures, is one of the priorities of the new 
programming period of Structural Funds. 
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• Building entrepreneurship 
For policy makers, the real challenge is about entre-
preneurship. It is to arm and to "steel" European 
SMEs to help them face the test of global competi-
tion. For many companies, taking part in global 
electronic exchanges is a competitive shock and a 
true test of entrepreneurship. Policy makers cannot 
absorb the shock for companies, but can play a cat-
alytic role to help them do the job in a competitive 
environment. 
the methodology to define the relevant market) 
remain as valid for electronic marketplaces as for 
their "brick and mortar" equivalents. Also, the com-
petition concerns do not change fundamentally. For 
example, EU competition law makes it illegal for 
companies to fix prices, including "rig" bidding, or 
to agree to divide the market. The task of competi-
tion authorities is to determine how those general 
principles should be applied to the new fact patterns 
that emerge. 
5. Market access and openness 
Competition issues 
The development of electronic marketplaces raises 
important issues for competition policy. Such e-mar-
ketplaces, in their different forms, provide SMEs 
with new and crucial gateways to "go digital" and 
to access global markets. They create virtual com-
munities of buyers and sellers, potentially on a much 
broader scale, and with lower access thresholds, 
than "brick and mortar" equivalents. However, 
there is also a risk that the development of such 
marketplaces may lead to competition problems. 
One is the emergence of new cartels. Illegal coordi-
nation between competitors could be facilitated in 
electronic marketplaces, as information sharing is 
difficult to detect and as some markets allow com-
petitors to bundle sales on purchase volumes. 
Another potential competition policy issue involves 
the design of an electronic market. The ownership 
of B2B electronic marketplaces and the rules gov-
erning them can raise competition problems, in par-
ticular where an online marketplace is controlled by 
a number of market participants. These owner-par-
ticipants could then use the rules to exclude certain 
participants from the most efficient marketplace, 
thus putting them at a competitive disadvantage. 
Other risks may include the possibility of monopo-
lising an industry's marketplace. As the value of 
many marketplaces increases with the number of 
users, the first successful market may obtain a head-
start that makes it difficult for rival marketplaces to 
develop as competitors. 
Competition laws show continued relevance in the 
fast changing world of B2B. Such laws were enacted 
to give businesses a level playing field and in partic-
ular to ensure buyers' trust in the market's pricing 
practices. The principles of competition policy (e.g. 
Shaping marketplaces: a challenge for 
enterprise policy 
In the B2B area, standardisation is a key issue. 
Combined with the Euro, B2B is potentially a pow-
erful driver towards the realisation of the Internal 
Market. Standardisation is needed to deliver the full 
potential of B2B. This implies ensuring interoper-
ability, and facilitating the creation of trust and con-
fidence in secure e-commerce solutions. 
The issue is not only new deliverables (e.g. work-
shop agreements, instead of formal standards), but 
also working methods. Standardisation organisa-
tions should evolve from their current role as tech-
nical experts to become service providers for con-
sensus building. 
Additionally, the use of open access to e-business 
frameworks by SMEs should be a key factor to 
encourage new job creation and therefore to meet 
the Lisbon employment rate targets. Standardisation 
organisations could play an important role in this, 
e.g. through quality standards for new Internet 
services. 
Openness: the role of Research and 
Technology Development 
There is currently a large number of Research and 
Technology development (RTD) projects in the area 
of B2B. Clustering is frequently used to maximise 
the impact of such projects. The links between RTD 
projects and standardisation should be improved 
with a view to better exploiting the results and bring 
them into the open environment. Similarly, there is 
a crucial role for innovation policy to be integrated 
with both RTD and standardisation. 
RTD projects should result in wide dissemination 
into the public domain. Dissemination of results is a 
contractual obligation. Indeed, many RTD projects 
have contributed to standardisation in a number of 
areas (such as XML, agent technologies, negotiation 
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protocols). In parallel, participants in RTD projects 
should be encouraged to become involved in open 
standardisation fora. The selective approach of 
many RTD projects in the field of B2B platforms can 
only be justified if they ultimately contribute to 
openness and fair market access. In general, the 
objective must be to create a level playing field, not 
to promote proprietary solutions. 
Additionally, European participation in key de facto 
standardisation initiatives should be concretely 
encouraged. Many of these initiatives - such as 
W3C, IETF, Open Group, OMG - have a direct, con­
crete impact on the market. To ensure the active, 
strategic participation of European companies and 
institutions in such fora should be an important 
focus of standardisation policy 
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